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ABSTRACT

In 2005, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate
Body presided over United States-Measures affecting the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services (U.S.Gambling), in which Antigua argued that U.S. criminal laws
banning the provision of cross-border online gambling services
violate U.S. commitments under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS). For the first time, the WTO's dispute
settlement process directly addressed the applicationof GATS to
domestic regulatory barriers restricting cross-border trade in
This Article examines GATS rules on domestic
services.
regulation as well as the WTO Appellate Body and Panel
decisions in the case and asks if the WTO has improperly
restricted members' ability to regulate domestic concerns. What
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will be the broader impact of the WTO's rulings for cross-border
trade in e-services? Highlighting the difficulties that members
face in trying to resolve the conflict between liberalizationand
regulatory autonomy in the context of cross-border e-services,
this Article argues that the scope of GATS rules on domestic
regulation needs to be refined if GATS is to remain an
instrumental force in liberalizing trade in e-services. The
Article concludes with proposals to guide the negotiations on
domestic regulation to ensure that such regulations are not
unnecessarily burdensome to trade in e-services. Identifying
certain unresolved issues of U.S.-Gambling that characterize the
tension between market access and domestic regulatory
autonomy, it also argues that these issues must be addressed in
the negotiations on domestic regulation if a desirable balance
between regulatory autonomy and progressive liberalization of
global e-services markets is to be achieved.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Has the recent decision in United States-Measuresaffecting the
cross-bordersupply of gambling and betting services (U.S.-Gambling)1
significantly deprived World Trade Organization (WTO) 2 members of
their domestic regulatory autonomy3 under the General Agreement of
Trade in Services (GATS)? 4 What are the implications of this decision
for liberalization 5 of cross-border trade in electronic services (e6
services) and the growth of electronic commerce (e-commerce)?

1.
Appellate Body Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) (adopted Apr.
20, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/englishtratop-e/dispu-e/285abr-e.pdf
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report]; Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting
the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10,
2004), availableat http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/ 285r e.pdf [hereinafter
Panel Report].
2.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) came into being on January 1, 1995,
under the terms of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The
WTO has 151 members (as of July 27, 2007) and is the single largest multilateral body
dealing with international trade policy and regulation. Understanding the WTO,
Members
and
Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/
org6_e.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2007).
3.
The right of WTO members to regulate in order to meet national policy
objectives is consistent with the international law principle recognizing a nation's
sovereignty in the conduct of its national policies in its territory. Jan Wouters &
Dominic Coppens, Domestic Regulation Within the Framework of GATS 5 (Inst. for Int'l
Law, Working Paper No. 93, 2006), available at http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nlwp/
WPIWP93e.pdf. Thus, the discussion of members' rights under GATS to exercise
domestic regulatory autonomy with respect to e-services provided to residents of a
member state directly involves issues of national sovereignty. In this Article, the term
domestic regulation is defined broadly and consistently with the definition found in
scholarship related to GATS. Domestic regulation is "a process or activity in which
government requires or proscribes certain activities or behavior on the part of
individuals or institutions, mostly private."
Id. (quoting MICHAEL D. REAGAN,
REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF POLICY 15 (1987)).
4.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services was negotiated during the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations as an Annex to the WTO
Agreement and came into effect on January 1, 1995. General Agreement on Trade in
Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
5.
A key challenge for the drafters of GATS was to "strike a balance between
trade liberalization and the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members." Wouters &
Coppens, supra note 3, at 4. In principle, GATS incorporates a weighing scale for the
balance between trade liberalization and regulatory autonomy; it aims to achieve
progressive liberalization of services, while also recognizing the right of members to
regulate services in order to meet national policy objectives. Id. at 5. In GATS,
F'[1]iberalization' is mostly understood as the process of the removal of legal or other
barriers to competition and/or market access." Id. Pursuant to this understanding,
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In U.S.-Gambling, the WTO Appellate Body (and Panel)
challenged conventional understanding of the market access
obligation under GATS. 7 It did this by equating a U.S. ban8 on the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services to a quota,
prohibited under the market access obligation of GATS.9 Critics were
quick to condemn the ruling for its expansion of what they termed a
"per se" prohibition of an exhaustively defined list of quantitative
restrictions under the market access obligation in GATS.10 Many
said the ruling erroneously expanded a GATS prohibition on market
access restrictions to include substantive qualitative restrictions
based only on their quantitative effects,1 1 which contradicted
previous views that GATS distinguishes between quantitative

liberalization may involve reducing or eliminating domestic laws and other regulations
that operate as trade barriers to foreign supply of services. Id. This Article explores
the implications of this balance in the context of cross-border trade in e-services.
6.
The WTO Secretariat's definition of electronic supply of services
encompasses "transactions in which services products are delivered to the customer in
the form of digitized information flows." General Council, WTO Agreements and
Electronic Commerce, 2, WT/GC/W/90 (July 14, 1998) [hereinafter WTO Agreements
and Electronic Commerce]. The WTO Secretariat also noted that in addition to
electronically delivered services, electronic commerce in relation to the services trade
also includes "the provision of Internet access services themselves-meaning the
provision of access to the Internet for business and consumers" and "the use of the
Internet as a channel for distribution services by which goods and services are
purchased over the net but delivered to the consumer subsequently in non-electronic
form." Id. These latter aspects of trade in services that relate to e-commerce are not
addressed in this Article. For a discussion of the issues within the general context of
GATS and electronic commerce, see generally William J. Drake & Kalypso Nicolaidis,
Global Electronic Commerce and GATS: The Millennium Round and Beyond, in GATS
2000 NEw DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 399 (Pierre Sauv6 & Robert
Stern eds., 2000).
See also SACHA WUNSCH-VINCENT, WTO, E-COMMERCE AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES: FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND THROUGH THE DOHA
DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA
(Joanna
McIntosh
ed.,
2005),
available
at
http://www.unicttaskforce.org/perl/documents.pl?id=1536 (discussing the WTO's role in
Internet governance); MARC BACCHETTA ET AL., WORLD TRADE ORG., SPECIAL STUDIES

2: ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE ROLE OF THE WTO (1998), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/ecom-e/special-study-e.pdf (focusing on electronic
commerce, its associated benefits and challenges, and their relation to international
trade and the WTO).
7.
See GATS, supra note 4, art. XVI (outlining Market Access). An overview of
GATS as it relates to liberalization and domestic autonomy is provided in Part II of
this Article.
8.
See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
9.
See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Condemnation of U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling
Pits Free Trade Against Moral Values, ASIL INSIGHT, Nov. 2004, http://www.asil.org
insights/2004/11/insightO41117.html (noting that the WTO panel considered the fact
"the U.S. seemed to prosecute foreigners more frequently than U.S.-based suppliers,"
and finding such actions to be a prohibited import restriction).
10.
Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Softens Earlier Condemnation of U.S. Ban on
Internet Gambling but Confirms Broad Reach into Sensitive Domestic Regulations,
ASIL INSIGHT, Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/2O05/O4/insightO50412.html.
11.

Id.
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restrictions prohibited under the terms of the market access rule and
qualitative regulations permitted under the general rules on domestic
regulation. 12 The WTO dispute settlement panels were accused of
authorizing "WTO intrusion into the regulatory freedom of WTO
Members far beyond what was originally agreed to in the WTO
Treaty,"'13 and threatening "with the stroke of a pen, the validity of
scores of domestic services regulations, including those that are nondiscriminatory."' 14 Responding to the initial Panel Report, the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) called the Panel decision "deeply
flawed," stating that "the Panel inappropriately found that our
regulations on gambling services were a prohibited quota based on a
faulty new legal theory that places unwarranted restrictions on the
15
ability of all WTO Members to regulate their service sector.'
Attorney Generals of twenty-nine U.S. states called the ruling "quite
troubling."'1 6 In April 2006, the Governor of the state of Oregon asked
the U.S. Trade Representative to exclude Oregon from the proposed
expansion of U.S. commitments under GATS, including those that
17
would cover gambling services.
Although it may be argued that U.S.-Gambling undermines
regulatory autonomy, it is less obvious that U.S.-Gambling deprives
members of any legitimate rights to regulate services covered by

12.
See generally Joost Pauwelyn, Rien ne Va Plus? Distinguishing Domestic
Regulation from Market Access in GATT and GATS, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 131 (2005)
(clarifying the distinction between market access restrictions and domestic
regulations).
Id. at 133.
13.
Pauwelyn, supra note 10, 11.
14.
Richard Mills, Spokesman, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative [USTRI,
15.
Statement from Richard Mills Regarding the WTO Gambling Dispute with Antigua
and Barbuda (Nov. 10, 2004), available at http://www.unicttaskforce.org/perl/
documents.pl?id=1536. Subsequently, marking the success of the U.S. appeal to the
Appellate Body, Acting USTR Peter F. Allgeier stated:
We are pleased that the Appellate Body has agreed with our position that the
U.S. gambling laws at issue here protect public order and public morals. By
reversing key aspects of a deeply flawed panel report, the Appellate Body has
affirmed that WTO Members can protect the public from organized crime and
other dangers associated with Internet gambling. This is also a victory for the
federal and state law enforcement officers and regulators who protect the
public from illegal gambling and its associated risks of money laundering and
organized crime.
Press Release, USTR, U.S. Internet Gambling Restrictions Can Stand as U.S. Wins
Key Issues in WTO Dispute (Apr. 7, 2005), availableat http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary[PressReleases/2005/AprilIUSInternetGamblingRestrictionsCan St as U
S_WinsKeyIssues-in WTODispute.html.
Joanne O'Connor, US Attorney-Generals [sic] Gang Up On WTO Gambling
16.
Ruling, THE LAWYER, June 13, 2005, at 7.
Edward Walsh, Oregon Seeks Global Trade Pact Exclusion, THE
17.
OREGONIAN, Apr. 3, 2006, at D1.
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members' commitments under GATS. Concluding its report on the
U.S.-Gambling dispute, the Panel categorically states:
We also wish to emphasize what we have not decided in this case. We
have not decided that WTO Members do not have a right to regulate,
including a right to prohibit, gambling and betting activities. In this
case, we came to the conclusion that the US measures at issue prohibit
the crossborder supply of gambling and betting services in the United
States in a manner inconsistent with the GATS. We so decided, not
because the GATS denies Members such a right but, rather, because we
found, inter alia, that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the
measures at issue were inconsistent with the United States' scheduled
18
commitments and the relevant provisions of the GATS.

The U.S.-Gambling reports confirm that both the Panel and the
Appellate Body are unequivocal in their rejection of a general "effects"
doctrine from being incorporated into the interpretation of the market
access obligation. 19 Critics condemned the Panel as having "already
made up its mind that the U.S. laws are prohibited market access
restrictions simply because they have the effect of a prohibition on
certain cross-border supplies of gambling services. '20 However, it is
not obvious that the decisions of the WTO dispute settlement panels
extend the prohibition on market access restrictions beyond the
quantitative restrictions already prohibited by GATS to include all
domestic regulation that is quantitative in effect. 21 Moreover, as
acknowledged by the Panel in U.S.-Gambling,22 the architecture of
GATS explicitly recognizes the sovereign right to regulate services,
and provides flexibility for members to regulate in order to pursue
public policy objectives such as consumer protection (for example,
regulations that ensure the quality of services and the capacity of
service suppliers to supply services).2 3 Although U.S.-Gambling blurs
the conventional boundaries of the market access obligation, it is not
clear that it converts these types of consumer protection regulations

18.
Panel Report, supranote 1, 7.4.
19.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, T 232; Panel Report, supra note 1, IT
6.304-6.306, 6.327.
20.
Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 163.
21.
As critics note, such a conclusion would effectively draw all domestic
regulation under the purview of the GATS market access rule since "all regulation has
the effect of limiting or restricting supply to some degree, and the 'effects' approach
would negate restrictions whether slight or significant." Comment from the Advisory
Board, Gambling-with Regulation and Market Access in the GATS, 32 L. ISSUES
ECON. INTEGRATION 231, 233 (2005).
22.
Panel Report, supra note 1, T 6.316.
23.
GATS recognizes "the right of Members to regulate and to introduce new
regulations, on the supply of services within their territories in order to meet national
policy objectives." Panel Report, supra note 1,
6.314 (quoting GATS, supra note 4,
pmbl). Articles VI and XIV of GATS provide specific rights to regulate services in order
to achieve policy objectives. GATS, supra note 4, arts. VI, XIV. The right to regulate is
discussed infra in Part IV of this Article.
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into prohibited market access restrictions based purely on their
quantitative effects. 24
Nevertheless, ambiguities in the U.S.Gambling decision have prompted some to recommend a
precautionary approach for members in terms of scheduling further
liberalization commitments under GATS. 25
As one legal
commentator views it:
It would probably be prudent and cautious to assume that the coverage
of Article XVI:2 [the GATS provision prohibiting a list of quantitative
and quantitative type restrictions on market access] extends to
measures having the same effect as those explicitly mentioned.
Negotiators may therefore find it useful to schedule more conditions
and limitations to a market access commitment than they deem
necessary. Negotiators should generally be especially careful about
scheduling commitments in sectors which remain strictly regulated.
Indeed, it may be more appropriate not to schedule any commitments
26
at all in such a sector.

The outcome of the U.S.-Gambling litigation has significant
implications for cross-border trade in e-services, which is a major
component of e-commerce. 27
Indisputably, it broadens our
understanding of the sphere of the market access obligation under
GATS in a manner that significantly advances liberal trade in eservices. 28 This interpretation of U.S.-Gambling is based on a finding

24.
This point is implied by the Panel in maintaining the distinction between
Article XVI, GATS on market access and Article VI, GATS on domestic regulation. See
Panel Report, supra note 1,
6.302-6.308. See also infra Part IV.A (discussing this
aspect of the Panel decision in detail).
25.
See Joel P. Trachtman, International Decisions: United States-Measures
Affecting
the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services
WT/DS285/AB/R, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 867 (2005) (cautioning that the
interpretation of the market access obligation, GATS art. XVI, may make the current
services negotiations more difficult as states determine whether measures that they
thought were qualitative regulations outside the scope of Article XVI may be within its
scope).
26.
Markus Krajewski, Playing by the Rules of the Game?, 32 L. ISSUES ECON.
INTEGRATION

417, 437 (2005).

27.
GATS defines trade in services as the supply of a service according to four
modes of supply. While these are described in detail in Part II of this Article, the crossborder supply of a service in the context of GATS is defined as the supply of a service
"from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other member." GATS,
supra note 4, art. 1, § 2(a).
28.
See Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Internet, Cross Border Trade in Services,
and the GATS: Lessons from U.S.-Gambling, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 319, 323-24 (2006),
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/wunsch1205.pdf (discussing how
U.S.-Gambling has advanced matters regarding the cross-border trade of electronic
services). According to Wunsch-Vincent:
The greatest progress of US-Gambling is the confirmation that WTO rules are
indeed applicable to e-commerce and/or to electronically supplied services.
Both rulings apply the GATS framework to the concerned electronic crossborder delivery of services without hesitation, finding that the specific subsector of the US GATS schedule includes specific commitments on Internetdelivered gambling services....
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in the case that the United States' commitment to liberalize crossborder trade in a services sector that included gambling services,
although made at a time when gambling services were not offered
online, also included a commitment to liberalize online gambling
services. 29 This adoption of a technology-neutral interpretation of the
relevant GATS rules by the WTO dispute settlement panels will
make it difficult for members to commit to full market access and
national treatment for cross-border services while simultaneously
retaining a closed market for the same types of services provided
online. Clearly, restrictions applicable to the electronic supply of
such services will be treated as limitations on market access or
30
national treatment under GATS.
Also significantly, U.S.-Gambling is the first WTO dispute to
directly address the application of GATS rules to regulatory barriers
restricting the cross-border supply of e-services. 31 But while it

For the negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda, this means that the
GATS rules and-existing and revised-specific GATS commitments fully
apply to cross-border Internet-based service transactions.
Id.
29.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.285. The Panel concluded, in line with the
principle of technological neutrality, that a full commitment to apply the market access
obligation to cross-border services (or mode 1) under GATS, "encompass[ed] all possible
means of supplying services from the territory of one WTO member into the territory of
another WTO member." Id. Accordingly, the Panel reasoned that a market access
commitment under mode 1 "implies the right for other Members' suppliers to supply a
service through all means of delivery, whether by mail, telephone, Internet, etc. unless
otherwise specified in a Member's schedule." Id.
30.
Id.
6.286-6.287; see also Council for Trade in Servs., Work Programme
on Electronic Commerce: ProgressReport to the General Council, 4, S/L174 (July 27,
1999) [hereinafter E-Commerce Progress Report] (stating that the general view of WTO
members is that the GATS is technologically neutral in that it does not contain
provisions that distinguish between the different technological means by which a
service may be supplied). In line with both of these approaches, and the decision in
U.S.-Gambling, some countries make distinctions in their GATS Schedules of Specific
Commitments based on a means of delivery. For example, in its commitment on crossborder retailing services, Australia maintains the following limitation on market
access: "Unbound except for mail order." World Trade Organization, Schedule of
Specific Commitments, http://tsdb.wto.org/wtolWTOHomepublic.htm (follow "Full-text
search on pre-defined reports"; then search "Australia"); see infra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text (discussing GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments).
31.
U.S.-Gambling is also only the second WTO dispute to deal solely with the
provisions of GATS. The first such dispute was the Panel Report on Mexico-Measures
Affecting Telecommunications Services (Mexico--Telecoms). Panel Report, MexicoMeasures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004) (adopted
June 1, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds204_e.htm (dealing chiefly with Mexico's GATS commitments and obligations with
respect to telecommunications services under the limited scope of Mexico's additional
GATS
commitments
and incorporating
the
Reference
Paper
on
Basic
Telecommunications and the GATS Annex on Telecommunications); see also Bjorn
Wellenius et al., Telecommunications and the WTO: the Case of Mexico (World Bank
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resolves some of the general issues with regard to the scope of GATS

rules to e-services,3 2 U.S.-Gambling also reinforces the uncertainties
of a relatively undeveloped GATS legal framework.3 3 In U.S.Gambling, both dispute settlement panels labored to establish that a
U.S. ban on online gambling and betting services, which placed

limitations on the cross-border supply of electronic gambling and
betting services, was a prohibited quantitative restriction under
specific U.S. commitments on market access. 34
Given that the
present rules do not satisfactorily define the boundaries between
measures that ought to be classified as market access restrictions and
those that are subject to a more limited review under the general
provisions in GATS on domestic regulations, the WTO Dispute

Settlement Panels' interpretation of the regulatory reach of GATS
rules in

the dynamic

context of cross-border

e-services trade is

Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3759, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.coml
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=844849#PaperDownload (discussing the findings of the
Mexico--Telecoms dispute).
32.
See Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 28, at 323-27 (discussing the application
of GATS rules and commitments to electronically delivered services and analyzing
GATS mode 1 commitments relevant to cross-border electronic delivery of services).
33.
Several Articles analyzing the implications of U.S.-Gambling from a
general GATS perspective have been written by mostly European legal scholars who
have also evaluated the distinction between Articles XVI and Article VI of OATS in the
light of findings by the Panel and Appellate Body. See, e.g., Krajewski, supra note 26,
at 429-47 (outlining the aspects of U.S.-Gambling that may have impacted GATS
negotiations and discussing the possible implications of the rulings on GATS
negotiations); Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body
Report in US -Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 117, 132-46 (2006) (reviewing
the interpretative approach followed by the Appellate Body in reaching the U.S.Gambling decision); Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 148-68 (discussing government
intervention and comparing "market access restriction" with "domestic regulation").
The U.S.-Gambling decision has also been examined by U.S. scholars from the
perspective of domestic regulation of online gambling in the United States. See, e.g.,
Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities
Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371 (2006)
(examining the similarities of certain gambling activities and investment activities and
concluding that the United States government's stance against Internet gambling is
misguided); Edward A. Morse, ExtraterritorialInternet Gambling: Legal Challenges
and Policy Options, 1 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL INFO. MGMT. 33 (2006), available at
http:/Iaw.creighton.edulindex.aspx?p=402&sp=20 (exploring legal concerns and policy
options for internet gambling). However, less has been written about the implications
of U.S.-Gambling and its impact on the interaction between the liberalization rules of
GATS and the regulatory rights of WTO members from a cross-border e-services trade
perspective. See, e.g., Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 28, at 319-20 (stating that "hopes
were high that the judgments would bring clarity to the thorniest issues concerning
cross-border trade in services and thus maintain the relevance of the multilateral trade
framework in a changing technological environment.").
34.
See Panel Report, supra note 1,
6.320 (discussing the four elements of
Article XVI:2(a) that had to be interpreted in order for the Panel to determine whether
the challenged measures violated Article XVI).
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inevitably controversial. 35
U.S.-Gambling reflects the prevailing
uncertainty as to the dividing line between prohibited and
permissible domestic regulation. It also indicates that GATS rules on
domestic regulation may be less than effective in preventing the more
pervasive and less transparent regulatory barriers from nullifying the
liberalization gains obtained through negotiations. Accordingly, this
Article argues that as long as GATS disciplines on domestic
regulation remain undefined, there is little hope that these
boundaries will be resolved with the degree of precision and certainty
that is required to respond to the unique issues arising with regard to
the domestic regulation of electronically delivered cross-border
services.
Perhaps the clearest impact of U.S.-Gambling is that it confirms
members' retention of considerable regulatory flexibility to override
their GATS commitments under the policy exceptions recognized by
the agreement.
Notably, these exceptions permit members to
maintain measures that achieve a range of policy objectives that are
particularly relevant to cross-border e-services trade, and more
generally, to global e-commerce. 36 This potentially broad flexibility in
GATS will undoubtedly create future tension between the
predictability and security of multilateral liberalization commitments
37
and the autonomous regulatory rights of WTO members.

35.
See generally Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 152-65 (comparing the Article
XVI market access provision with the Article VI domestic regulation provision).
36.
The general exceptions clause in GATS permits members to, inter alia,
maintain domestic measures necessary to protect public morals and public order, the
privacy of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data and for the
prevention of deceptive or fraudulent practices, provided certain conditions are met.
GATS, supra note 4, art. XIV(a), (c). The relevance of the exceptions clause to crossborder e-services trade and e-commerce has been noted by WTO members in
deliberations under the WTO Work Program on E-Commerce. See Council for Trade in
Servs., Note by the Secretariat: The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce,
WT/I274 (Sept. 30 1998) [hereinafter Work Programmeon E-Commerce 1]. Divergent
opinions have also been expressed in relation to the scope of the general exceptions as
they apply to e-commerce concerns. While some members have argued that the general
exceptions clause as an exceptional provision should be interpreted narrowly and not
be expanded to cover regulatory objectives not listed in Article XIV, other members
have proposed the development of criteria in the WTO for the policy objectives
identified therein. Council for Trade in Servs., Interim Report to the General Council:
The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, at 10, S/C/8 (Mar. 31, 1999)
[hereinafter Work Programme on E-Commerce Interim Report]; see also Council for
Trade in Servs., Note by the Secretariat: Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, T
26, S/C/W/68 (Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Work Programmeon E-Commerce II] (noting
the relevance of the policy objectives for restrictions on electronically delivered services
and stating that "[m]easures to curb obscenity or to prohibit internet gambling might
well be justified" on the grounds of Article XIV).
37.
See, e.g., Heinz Hauser & Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, A Call for a WTO ECommerce Initiative, INT'L J. COMM. L. & POLVY, Winter 2000, at 22, available at
http://www.ijclp.org/6-2OO1/index.html (noting that "a balanced relationship between
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This Article evaluates the application of GATS rules to domestic
regulation from the perspective of enhancing cross-border electronic
trade in services and ultimately promoting growth in global ecommerce. 38 Part II presents an overview of the legal framework of
GATS, focusing on provisions relating to the liberalization of servicestrade and domestic regulatory autonomy. Part III reviews the U.S.Gambling litigation and summarizes key findings that relate to the
tension between the rights of members as sovereigns to regulate
cross-border trade in services and the goal of GATS to liberalize
trade.
Part IV examines the extent of members' regulatory
autonomy 39 under GATS, drawing on insights gleaned from U.S.Gambling that further clarify the scope of domestic regulatory
autonomy. Part V examines the role of the WTO and GATS in
regulating e-services; it argues that the regulatory role of GATS is too
important to remain so undefined, and proposes adopting precise
disciplines on domestic regulation that are relevant to cross-border
trade in e-services as a critical next step for WTO members under the
current negotiations. 40 Only with such disciplines in place will there
be sufficient clarity on the permissible scope of members' domestic
regulatory autonomy to ensure that members have the ability to take
full advantage of the tremendous potential for liberalization of trade

regulatory aim and regulatory methods is hard to be found."); WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra
note 6, at 82 (stating that "it is within the mandate of the services negotiations for
WTO Members to develop further regulatory disciplines pursuant to Article VI that
could specifically or generally address domestic regulations affecting electronically
traded services."). But c.f. Jeremy C. Marwell, Note, Trade and Morality: The WTO
Public Morals Exceptions after Gambling, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 824-26 (2006)
(arguing for a broader definition of public morals under Article XIV of GATS in that
members ought to be permitted to define public morals unilaterally and be required to
submit evidence supporting claims that an issue has moral significance subject only to
the existing least trade restrictive and non-discriminatory tests in Article XIV).
38.
This objective is shared by the Doha Round, which emphasizes "the
importance of creating and maintaining an environment which is favorable to the
future development of electronic commerce." World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration of 14 November 2001, T 34, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
39.
See GATS, supra note 4, arts. VI, XIV (preserving the regulatory autonomy
of members subject to certain conditions).
40.
The term "disciplines" has acquired a specific meaning when used in the
context of Article VI:4 of GATS. Essentially, "disciplines" are rules that are negotiated
in the context of Article VI:4 and that clarify the application of GATS to domestic
regulation of trade in services. The purpose of such rules is to ensure that measures
relating to "qualification requirements and procedures, licensing requirements and
technical standards do not constitute unnecessary barriers" to the services trade.
GATS, supra note 4, art. VI:4. Article VI:4 provides a mandate for the Council for
Trade in Services to develop such disciplines which will ensure that these domestic
regulations are based, inter alia, on objective and transparent criteria, and not be more
burdensome that necessary to ensure the quality of the service. Id.; see Council for
Trade in Servs., Note by the Secretariat: Article VI:4 of the GATS: Disciplines on
Domestic Regulation Applicable to All Services,
1-3, S/C/W/96 (Mar. 1, 1999)
[hereinafter Disciplines on Domestic Regulation] (further explaining Article VI).
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in global e-services. 41 Part VI explores the continuing ambiguity
post- U.S.-Gambling in defining the precise boundary between the
regulatory reach of GATS rules and the autonomous regulatory rights
of WTO members. It identifies a number of weaknesses in GATS that
may affect future guarantees for trade in cross-border e-services and
deter growth of global e-commerce. This analysis of the remaining
post-U.S.-Gambling ambiguities is offered as input for a much-needed
discussion to advance the process of developing disciplines on
domestic regulation under GATS.
II. GATS, TRADE

LIBERALIZATION, AND DOMESTIC REGULATION

While GATS is reminiscent of the older and more established
WTO framework for trade in goods, there are significant differences
between the two.42 GATS is a highly specialized legal framework
with its own unique philosophy for promoting liberalization of the
global services economy. 43 Essentially, GATS aims to address the
subtle complexities of protectionism in international services trade.
Unlike GATT, the predominant focus of GATS is not on reducing or
eliminating external barriers to trade (such as import tariffs or other
border-type measures). 44 As external barriers are relatively less
common in the services trade, the principal objective of GATS is to

41.
See Aaditya Mattoo, World Bank, Economics and Law of Trade in Services,
at 1 (Feb. 2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.orgINTRANETTRADE/
Resources/Topics/Accession/Economics&LawOfTradeInServicesMattoo.pdf
(noting
that "[s]ervices are the fastest growing sector of the global economy" and presenting
research that greater liberalization in services is associated with more rapid growth);
Aaditya Mattoo & Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Pre-emptingProtectionism in Services: The
GATS and Outsourcing, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 765, 765-74 (2004) (stating that "[crossborder trade in business services, especially the so called 'IT-enabled services,' is today
among the fastest growing areas of international trade" and detailing the dramatic
growth of cross-border trade in business services, particularly: business process
outsourcing services; the global gains across both OECD member countries and
developing countries; and the possible impact of protectionism and trade barriers on
such trade); see also COALITION OF SERV. INDUS., MAKING THE MOST OF THE DOHA
OPPORTUNITY: BENEFITS FROM SERVICES LIBERALIZATION 17-18 (2006), available at
http://www.uscsi.org/services-study (noting the substantial benefits of liberalized trade
in cross-border business process outsourcing services to India, Malaysia, and Brazil).
42.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (1999) [hereinafter GATT] (as amended and incorporated into the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Annex 1A,Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)).
43.
See generally Geza Feketekuty, Assessing and Improving the Architecture of
GATS, in GATS 2000: NEw DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 85, 90-94
(discussing the influences of GATT on the design and architecture of GATS).
44.
See id. at 90-91 ("The great difficulty in designing GATS was that barriers
to trade in services are generally embedded in domestic regulations. Unlike barriers to
trade in goods, they do not take the form of transparent barriers imposed at the border
against foreign services. Cross-border flows of services are largely invisible.").
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eliminate or reduce protectionist internal regulatory policies that
restrict foreign competition in trade in services. 45 Thus, GATS is very
much designed to address domestic laws that serve as barriers to
global trade in services.
As a multilateral trade agreement, GATS is often viewed as
imposing constraints on domestic regulatory autonomy that go
beyond prohibiting discrimination against foreign suppliers. This
view stems from the fact that GATS regulates both discriminatory
and nondiscriminatory domestic regulation. 46 Specifically, GATS
regulates domestic policies that restrict competition between
domestic services or service suppliers as well as domestic policies that
restrict competition for foreign services and service suppliers. 47 For
example, the obligation under GATS to grant market access, if
applied in full, prohibits the use of quantitative limitations on the
number of service suppliers, as this practice tends to operate as a
trade barrier by restricting competition in ways that limit both
domestic and foreign suppliers from supplying services to the
domestic market. 48 This prohibition against restricting the number
of service suppliers applies even if a member's laws imposing
quantitative limits on the number of service suppliers equally restrict

45.
According to Feketekuty, "where governments have tried to protect their
local service suppliers from foreign competition, they have embedded the protective
measures in domestic regulations focused on the local consumption of services or the
local provision of services." Id. Further, Feketekuty says that another challenge in
designing GATS was that:
[Diomestic regulations frequently limit trade even if they do not explicitly
discriminate against foreign providers. This was a crucial point because the
regulatory involvement of governments in the provision of services has been
much more intensive than their involvement in manufacturing. Regulations
often limit the number of firms, the number of employees, the number of
distribution outlets, the services that can be sold, prices, marketing practices,
and distribution channels. These types of regulations protect existing firms
from competition by new entrants, whether domestic or foreign.
Id. at 91.
46.
In WTO agreements, different terms are used to describe regulations, such
as "laws, decrees, regulations, procedures, requirements, administrative guidelines,
administrative ruling of general applications, administrative proceedings, decisions, or
actions." Keiya Iida & Julia Nielson, Transparency in Domestic Regulation: Practices
and Possibilities,in DOMESTIC REGULATION AND SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION 7, 8
(Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauv6 eds., 2003). Domestic regulation includes legislative
measures that have been finally enacted by a member's legislative branch (i.e.,
statutes), subordinate measures established by regulatory authorities in the executive
branch that are within the legislative mandate (i.e., administrative regulations), and
administrative decisions by regulatory authorities within the executive branch (i.e.,
administrative decisions). Id. at 8-9. The term regulations may also encompass
measures taken by nongovernmental entities. Id. at 9 (referring to the Reference
Paper on Basic Telecommunications).
47.
See generally GATS, supra note 4, art. XVI:2 (setting forth the "market
access" provision).
48.
Id. art. XVI:2(a).
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competition between domestic suppliers and competition between
49
domestic and foreign service suppliers.
On the other hand, a key feature of GATS that is often
overlooked is that member obligations under GATS are more flexible
than under GATT. 50 This is because GATS imposes only a limited
number of general obligations on WTO members. The two main
general obligations imposed on WTO members are the obligations of
Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment and transparency. 5 1 These
obligations are binding upon all members and apply, with limited
exceptions, to all measures affecting trade in services covered under
52
GATS.
However, unlike GATT, GATS does not generally obligate
members to grant market access and national treatment to other
members. 53 Instead, market access and national treatment are
termed "specific commitments" under GATS. Members only make
54
specific commitments under GATS through trade negotiations.
Significantly, a member does not grant national treatment or market
access to foreign services or service suppliers in a particular sector
unless it specifically enters a commitment to do so in its "schedule of
specific commitments" (Schedule). 5 5 The degree to which a member

49.
See Feketekuty, supra note 43, at 95 ("All quantitative limits on services or
service providers are dealt with under the rubric of market access, whether such limits
are being imposed on foreign services on a discriminatory basis or on both domestic and
foreign services on a nondiscriminatory basis."). Feketekuty further states:
The intermingling of commitments on discriminatory and nondiscriminatory
barriers has the further effect of mixing two laudatory, but separate goals:
trade liberalization and domestic regulatory reform. Removing discriminatory
regulation, whether in quantitative or qualitative form, is all about trade
liberalization. Removing nondiscriminatory restraints on services is frequently
an exercise in domestic regulatory reform. The use of nondiscriminatory
quantitative restraints more often than not reflects a country's approach to the
regulation of activity in a services sector, and telling a country to eliminate
such restraints is tantamount to saying it must reform its approach to the
regulation of that sector.
Id. at 96.
50.
See id. at 94 (stating that "GATS provides for the negotiation of a hierarchy
of commitments").
51.
GATS, supranote 4, arts. II-III.
52.
Id.
53.
Id. arts. XVI-XVII.
54.
See Council for Trade in Servs., Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific
2, S/L/92
Commitments Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
(Mar. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Scheduling Guidelines] (defining specific commitments as
"negotiated undertakings particular to each GATS signatory").
55.
The Schedule is a legal record of the specific commitments of each WTO
member and is annexed to GATS. It is thus considered to be an integral part of GATS
and binding on all WTO members. GATS, supra note 4, art. XX; Scheduling
Guidelines, supra note 54, 3.
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grants market access and national treatment to services or service
suppliers in a particular sector is also negotiable.5 6 However, a
member undertaking specific commitments in relation to a particular
service sector or subsector is prohibited from maintaining any
measure that violates the market-access and national treatment
obligations unless it specifies in its Schedule, with absolute clarity,
the limitations and restrictions on market access and national
treatment it wishes to retain.5 7 Thus, a member's Schedule is the
most significant outcome of negotiations under GATS-it is both a
positive record of a country's liberalization commitments under GATS
and a negative list of the remaining market-access and national
treatment restrictions and limitations that still apply to its scheduled
sectors.
The WTO provides administrative and dispute-settlement bodies
related to the operation of GATS. The Council for Trade in Services

56.
See Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54,
1, 8-18; infra notes 70-72
and accompanying text (discussing the technique of making specific commitments); see
also Feketekuty, supra note 43, at 95-96 (discussing market access and national
treatment).
57.
See generally Michael Steinicke, Trade in Services, in WTO LAW-FROM A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 279-317 (Birgitte Egelund Olsen et al. eds., 2006) (discussing,
inter alia, GATS and associated issues including progressive liberalization, specific
commitments, and institutional provisions). GATS defines the term "sector" of a
service to mean "with reference to a specific commitment, one or more, or all,
subsectors of that service, as specified in a Member's Schedule" or "otherwise, the
whole of that service sector, including all of its subsectors." GATS, supra note 4, art.
XXVIII(e). The Scheduling Guidelines encourage WTO members to use the Services
Sectoral Classification List prepared by the Secretariat that classifies services into 12
sectors and more than 150 subsectors for the purposes of scheduling specific
commitments.
World Trade Org., Note by the Secretariat: Services Sectoral
Classification List, MTN.GNS/W/120 (July 10, 1991) [hereinafter W/120]; see
Scheduling Guidelines,supra note 54, 23 ("In general the classification of sectors and
sub-sectors should be based on the Secretariat's Services Sectoral Classification List.").
The W/120 also lists the corresponding number for the service sectors and subsectors
under the United Nations Provisional Central Product Classification (CPC), a detailed
classification of both goods and services. W/120, supra, at 35, Annex 2, Attachment 8;
see also Dept. of Int'l Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Statistical Div. of the U.N., Central Product
Classification (CPC), Statistical Papers, Series M No. 77 Version 1.1. (2004)
[hereinafter CPC] (providing the latest revised version of a complete product
classification covering goods and services and setting forth a framework for
international comparison and harmonization of various statistics pertaining to goods
and services). Even though GATS defines "services" to include "any service in any
sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority," the scope of
GATS is not limited to any list of covered sectors of services and the use of the CPC to
define services is not mandatory. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 611-12 (2d ed. 2003); see also infra notes
131-32, 142-46 and accompanying text (discussing of the importance of precisely
scheduling limitations and restrictions on market access and national treatment if full
liberalization of a particular sector or subsector of a member's services market is not
desired).
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is the body responsible for administering GATS.58 The WTO's dispute
settlement mechanism5" applies to disputes arising under GATS.
Any dispute regarding a failure to observe the substantive obligations
of GATS, 60 as well as complaints of nullification and impairment not
involving a violation of a substantive GATS obligation, 6 1 may be
62
referred to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for resolution.
The main text of GATS also contains a group of "final provisions" that
regulate, among other things, the circumstances in which a member
may deny the benefits of GATS to services supplied from the
territories of non-members and even other WTO members to which it
does not apply the WTO Agreement. 6 3 These final provisions also
define key terminology, 64 and extend legal recognition to the Annexes

The Council for Trade in Services was established under the WTO
58.
Agreement to oversee the functioning of GATS. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art.
IV:5. It carries out such functions as may be assigned to it in order to facilitate the
operation of GATS and further its objectives. GATS, supra note 4, art. XXIV.
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
59.
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. The WTO Agreements covered by the DSU consist of
all multilateral agreements listed in the WTO Agreement Annexes 1 and 2, and all
Id. art. 1
plurilateral agreements listed in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement.
(referencing Appendix 1 of the DSU).
GATS, supra note 4, art. XXIII: 1.
60.
Article XXIII:3 of GATS incorporates the concept of "non-violation
61.
nullification and impairment" into GATS as a basis for a complaint to the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB). Id. art. XXIII:3. Article XXIII:3 provides:
If any Member considers that any benefit it could reasonably have expected to
accrue to it under a specific commitment of another Member under Part II of
this Agreement is being nullified or impaired as a result of the application of
any measure which does not conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, it
may have recourse to the DSU. If the measure is determined by the DSB to
have nullified or impaired such a benefit, the Member affected shall be entitled
to a mutually satisfactory adjustment on the basis of paragraph 2 of Article
XXI, which may include the modification or withdrawal of the measure. In the
event an agreement cannot be reached between the Members concerned, Article
22 of the DSU shall apply.
Id.
Id. art. XXIII. The DSB is established under Article 2 of DSU. DSU, supra
62.
note 59, art. 2.
See GATS, supra note 4, art. XXVII (dealing with the circumstances in
63.
which a member may deny the benefits of the Agreement to the supply of a service or
service suppliers, "if it establishes that the service is supplied from or in the territory of
a non-Member or of a Member to which the denying Member does not apply the WTO
Agreement" or in the case of a service supplier that is a juridical person, "if it
establishes that it is not a service supplier of another Member or that it is a service
supplier of a Member to which the denying Member does not apply the VTO
Agreement").
Id. art. XXVIII.
64.
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of GATS.6 5 The eight Annexes 66 clarify the operation of certain
provisions of GATS, 6 7 and also regulate its application to specific
services.
A.

68

Making Commitments to Liberalize Trade in Services

The extent to which a member has liberalized trade in services
under GATS is ascertained by reference to the text of GATS and by

examining the member's Schedule. 6 9 Specific commitments
refer to the degree of liberalization that each WTO Member deems optimal for
its own market. WTO Members are free (subject of course, to negotiating
pressure from their trading partners) to open their services market in the
sectors where they wish to do so and with the caveats they deem appropriate.
70
Specific commitments are, consequentially, sector specific.

In reality, specific commitments are negotiated commitments that
rely on the process of scheduling. 7 1 When a member enters a full
market access and national treatment commitment to sectors
specified in its Schedule, the member guarantees it will impose no
limits on market access or national treatment in relation to services
72
and service suppliers falling within the scope of those sectors.
Consequentially, if a member wants to limit market access or
national treatment obligations for a scheduled services sector, it must
specify the limits in its Schedule in relation to each sector in which it
has made specific commitments. 73 However, scheduling specific

65.
Id. art. XXIX.
These eight annexes cover: Article II Exemptions, Movement of Natural
66.
Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement, Air Transport Services, Financial
Transport
Services,
on
Maritime
annexes),
Negotiations
Services
(two
Telecommunications, and Basic Telecommunications. See id. (setting forth the eight
annexes).
67.
See, e.g., id. art. XXIX, Annex on Article II Exemptions.
See, e.g., id. art. XXIX, Annex on Financial Services, Second Annex on
68.
Financial Services. For a concise overview of the sector specific Annexes, see Steinicke,
supra note 57, at 311-17.
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 57, at 611-17 (discussing the liberalization
69.
approach of GATS and explaining that WTO members are only required to liberalize a
given services sector if they have undertaken to do so in their Schedule).
70.
MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 239 (1st ed. 2003).
71.
Article XX of GATS stipulates that each Member sets out in a schedule the
specific commitments it undertakes under Part III of the Agreement. GATS, supra
note 4, art. XX:1. Guidance on the manner and technique of scheduling specific
commitments is to be found in the Scheduling Guidelines. Scheduling Guidelines,
supra note 54.
This is indicated in the member's Schedule by marking the word "NONE"
72.
under both the market access and national treatment columns of the Schedule in
respect of each sector (or subsector) and mode of supply. Id. 42.
73.
That is to say, a member must schedule the terms, limitations and
conditions on market access and the conditions and limitations on national treatment
that apply to each scheduled sector. GATS, supra note 4, art. XX:l(a)-(b); Scheduling
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commitments for sectors listed in the member's Schedule does not
imply that the member has totally lost the right to regulate those
sectors. Members still retain their sovereign rights to regulate
scheduled services as long as they do not violate either general
74
obligations or specific commitments under GATS.
The scope of the global services trade to be liberalized by GATS
is highly ambitious. GATS applies to all "measures by Members
affecting trade in services ' 75 and to any service in any sector except
services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority. 76 The

Guidelines, supra note 54, T 44.
Schedules may also contain "additional
commitments." GATS, supra note 4, art. XVIII. Such additional commitments relate to
measures that are not subject to scheduling under either the market access or national
treatment obligations but which affect trade in scheduled sectors. Id. Such measures
may include qualification, standards or licensing measures. Id. In addition, members
also schedule time frames for implementation of any commitments as well as the
effective date for entry into operation for commitments. Id. art. XX:A(d)-(e).
74.
See, e.g., Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note 40, 77 7-9
(commenting on the Members' right to regulate).
75.
GATS, supra note 4, art. 1:3(a). In European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, the Appellate Body affirmed the
Panel's ruling that "no measures are excluded a priori from the scope of the GATS as
defined by its provisions" and that "the scope of the GATS encompasses any measure of
a member to the extent it affects the supply of a service regardless of whether such
measure directly governs the supply of a service or whether it regulates other matters
but nevertheless affects trade in services."
Appellate Body Report, European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distributionof Bananas, 217,
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) (adopted Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas111];
c.f. Complaint of Ecuador, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, 7 7.285, WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997); Complaint of
Mexico, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,Sale and Distributionof
Bananas, 7.285, WT/DS27/RIMEX (May 22, 1997); Complaint of the United States,
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas,
7.285, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997).
The Appellate Body also
confirmed the broad scope of the GATS under Article I of GATS, ruling: "[tihe ordinary
meaning of the word 'affecting' implies a measure that has 'an effect on,' which
indicates a broad scope of application." EC-BananasIII, supra, 220. It also went on
to state:
This interpretation is further reinforced by the conclusions of previous panels
that the term "affecting" in the context of Article III of the GATT is wider in
scope than such terms as "regulating" or "governing." We also note that Article
1:3(b) of the GATS provides that "services" includes any service in any sector
except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority," and that
Article XXVIII(b) of the GATS provides that the "supply of a service" includes
the production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery of a service." There
is nothing at all in these provisions to suggest a limited scope of application for
the GATS.... For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding that there is no
legal basis for an a priori exclusion of measures within the EC banana import
licensing regime from the scope of the GATS.
Id. (emphasis added).
76.
GATS, supra note 4, art. I:3(b). Services supplied in the exercise of
governmental authority exclude services supplied on a commercial basis as well as
those supplied in competition with one or more service suppliers. Id. art. I:3(c).
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term "measures by Members" is defined as measures taken by
central, regional, or local governments and authorities, 77 and includes
"any measure by a Member, whether in the form of a law, regulation,

rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form.

78

Thus, "measures" includes, for example, all forms of domestic laws in
force in the United States including federal, state, and local laws, and

laws established by legislation, court decisions, and administrative
bodies. 79 Further, GATS defines "trade in services" as the supply of a
service 80 in the following "modes of supply":
(1) [F]rom the territory of one member into the territory of any other
member [(cross-border supply or mode 1)];
(2) in the territory of one member to the service consumer of any other
member [(movement of the consumer or mode 2)];
(3) by a service supplier of one member, through commercial presence
in the territory of any other member [(commercial presence or mode 3)];
[and]
(4) by a service supplier of one member, through presence of natural
persons of a member in the territory of any other member [(movement
of natural persons or mode 4)].81

Id. art. I:3(a). Measures by members also include measures taken by non77.
governmental bodies that exercise powers delegated by government. Id. art. I:3(a)(ii).
In U.S.-Gambling, Antigua appealed the Panel's
78.
Id. art. XXVIII(a).
rejection of what Antigua termed a 'total prohibition' [by the United States] on the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services" as a measure "in and of itself,"
arguing, inter alia, that a prohibition was subsumed under the broad definition of the
term "measure" under GATS. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 64; Panel Report,
supra note 1, 9 6.171, 6.175. The Appellate Body, rejecting the Antiguan appeal on
this point, held that the "total prohibition" referred to by Antigua was the "collective
effect" of the underlying U.S. laws, and that a party "without demonstrating the source
of the prohibition could not challenge a 'total prohibition' as a 'measure,' per se in
dispute settlement proceedings under the GATS." Appellate Body Report, supra note
1, 99 124, 126. The Appellate Body went on to uphold the Panel's finding "that 'the
alleged "total prohibition"' on cross-border supply of gambling and betting services
describes the alleged effect of an imprecisely defined list of legislative provisions and
other instruments and cannot constitute a single and autonomous 'measure' that can
be challenged in and of itself." Id. 126. Addressing another point of appeal, this time
by the United States, regarding whether "practice" alone could be considered as an
autonomous measure that can be challenged in and of itself, the Appellate Body
clarified that while this was not a "finding" of the Panel, but mere obiter dictum, it
nevertheless disagreed with the Panel's understanding of previous Appellate Body
decisions, clarifying that the Appellate Body had not pronounced upon the issue of
whether practice may be challenged as such as a measure in dispute settlement. Id. 99
131-132.
79.
See supra note 45 for a discussion of the types and sources of regulations
covered by GATS.
80.
The "supply of a service" includes the production, distribution, marketing,
sale, and delivery of a service. GATS, supra note 4, art. XXVIII(b).
81.
Id. art. I:2(a)-(d). The modes of supply are relevant to recording specific
commitments. While commitments, or conversely, limitations on market access must
be recorded in respect of each mode of supply, limitations on national treatment are
also, in practice, listed in respect of each mode of supply. See id. arts. XVI:1, XVII:1,
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The distinction between these different modes of supply is clarified by
the Scheduling Guidelines, which state that "the modes are
essentially defined on the basis of the origin of the service supplier
and consumer and the degree and type of territorial presence which
they have at the moment the service is delivered. '8 2 For instance, in
cross-border services (mode 1), the supplier of the service remains
outside the territory of the member, but the service is delivered to
consumers within the territory of that member.8 3 However, in
consumption abroad (mode 2), the supplier is outside the territory of
the member and delivers the service to consumers of that member
84
outside the territory of that member.
Finally, GATS incorporates the principle of progressive
liberalization of trade in services, 8 5 which is the guiding principle of
trade negotiations under GATS.8 6 Consistent with the principle of
progressive liberalization, WTO members must enter into successive

XX; see also Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54,
3. While the text of Article XVII
does not specify whether limitations on national treatment ought to be listed
separately in relation to each mode of supply, it is the Scheduling Guidelines that
instruct members to do so. Id. 1 13, 39. A member that makes specific commitments
only in relation to one mode of supply in a particular sector (or subsector) remains free
to restrict market access or national treatment in respect of any of the modes of supply
to which it does not apply the market access or national treatment obligations. This is
indicated in a member's Schedule by marking the word "unbound" in regard to all other
modes of supply to which it does not apply the market access or national treatment
obligations under a particular sector. Id. T 46.
82.
Id. 26.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
1 28-29.
However, distinguishing between modes 1 and 2 and
allocating specific transactions in the context of the electronic delivery of services has
been problematic. See Work Programmeon E-Commerce Interim Report, supra note 36,
T 5; Work Programmeon E-Commerce II, supra note 36, $ 7 ("[T]he distinction between
cross-border supply and consumption abroad hinges upon whether the service is
delivered in the territory of the Member or outside. It is difficult to make this rule
operational when electronic delivery makes a transaction possible without the
movement of either the supplier or the consumer."); see also Comm. on Trade in Fin.
Servs., Informal Note by the Secretariat: The Distinction Between Modes 1 and 2, in
Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54, at 19,
2-3 (addressing the ambiguities
present in distinguishing between modes 1 and 2 in relation to electronically delivered
financial services). The United States has posed the question as to why services
delivered electronically and accessed from another member's economy cannot be
considered as mode 2 "based on the fact that consumers can 'visit' foreign websites
electronically and initiate transactions at those sites." Submission by the United
States, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, at 4, WT/GC/16, G/C/2, S/C/7,
IP/C/16, WT/COMTD/17 (Feb. 12, 1999) [hereinafter U.S. Submission on E-Commerce].
The United States has also pointed out the obvious liberalization advantages in doing
so as mode 2 specific commitments are usually far more comprehensive than mode 1.
Id. But see Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 28, at 325-26 (suggesting that the U.S.Gambling rulings may have contributed towards bringing legal certainty as to the
application of mode 1 to cross-border e-services).
85.
GATS, supra note 4, pt. IV.
86.
See id. pmbl.
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rounds of negotiations directed at reducing or eliminating the traderestrictive effects of measures affecting services. 87 The objective of
such negotiations is the achievement of progressively higher levels of
liberalization in services. 88 Accordingly, GATS stipulates that the
general level of specific commitments undertaken by members shall
be advanced in each round through bilateral, plurilateral, or
multilateral negotiations. 89 In practice, progressive liberalization
translates into negotiations between members that are aimed at
removing limitations and restrictions on market access and national
treatment in scheduled sectors, as well as adding more specific
commitments to a member's Schedule.
B. Most Favored Nation, Transparency,and Other General
Obligationsof Members
GATS contains general principles and rules that are, with a few
exceptions, 90 applicable to all measures of WTO members affecting
trade in services. 9 1 One such general obligation is the MFN
obligation, 92 which prohibits a member from discriminating between
"like" services and service suppliers of other WTO members. 93 The

87.
In pursuance of this goal, the first round of negotiations under GATS was
to commence in 2000 (five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement), and to continue periodically thereafter. Id. art. XIX. With the failure of
the WTO Ministerial Meeting in 1999 (in Seattle), the Council for Trade in Services
adopted the Guidelines and Procedures for Negotiations on Trade in Services in 2001,
setting out objectives for a new round of negotiations. See Council for Trade in Servs.,
Guidelines and Proceduresfor the Negotiation on Trade in Services, S/L/93 (Mar. 29,
2001) [hereinafter Guidelines and Procedures]. The Doha Round also provided much
needed momentum for the services negotiations. See Doha Declaration, supra note 38,
15.
88.
GATS, supra note 4, art. XIX:1.
89.
Id. art. XIX:4.
90.
For example, the procedural and interim substantive obligations on
domestic regulation and obligations on payments and transfers apply only to sectors in
which a member has made specific commitments under Part III of GATS. See id.
arts.VI:l, VI:3, VI:5-6, XI:I.
91.
In contrast, the provisions of Part III of GATS apply only to the extent that
a member has negotiated a commitment to liberalize a particular service sector. Such
specific commitments will be listed in the member's Schedule. See supra notes 54-56
and accompanying text.
92.
GATS provides: "With respect to any measure covered by this agreement,
each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service
suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like
services and service suppliers of any other country." GATS, supra note 4, art. 11:
1.
93.
Under GATS, the question of how two services or service suppliers can be
considered to be "like" for the purposes of the MFN obligation is not defined in the text
of Article II and is yet to be clearly interpreted in dispute settlement proceedings. The
concept of likeness has been evoked in a number of high profile cases brought under
both the GATT and the GATS, in relation to both the MFN obligation and the national
treatment obligation of GATS. See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada-CertainMeasures
Affecting the Automotive Industry,
10.247-10.248, WTIDS139/R & WT/DS142/R
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MFN obligation applies generally to all measures affecting trade in
services and covers both de jure (formal) and de facto (origin neutral)
discrimination in trade in services. 94 However, a caveat to the MFN
obligation curtails its otherwise beneficial effects on the elimination
of discrimination between WTO members. At the time GATS entered
into force, provision was made to allow WTO members to reserve
exemptions to the MFN. 95 As a result, several members, including a
number of industrialized countries, reserved 'MFN exemptions" that
modified their obligations under the MFN rule. 96 These MFN
exemptions are considered to be derogations from a general
97
obligation; as such, they are time-bound and eventually expire.
Nevertheless, although MFN exemptions are subject to negotiations
aimed at their removal, efforts to remove such exemptions during the
98
current round of negotiations have yielded only limited success.

(Feb. 11, 2000) (adopted June 19, 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report
WT/DS139/ABR, WT/DS142/AB/R) [hereinafter CanadaAutos]; EC-BananasIII, supra
note 75, 9 7.322. In both these disputes, the panels accepted that the services and the
service suppliers in question were "like" without engaging in any in-depth discussion
on the issue. Panel Report, supra note 1, 9 3.149. Following the experience of GATT,
where the determination of "likeness" has taken place on a case by case basis in the
context of trade in goods, the issue of "likeness" under MFN and national treatment in
GATS is also likely to be assessed and resolved more or less through dispute
settlement. Joel P. Trachtman, Lessons for the GATS from Existing WTO Rules on
Domestic Regulation, in DOMESTIC REGULATION AND SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION,

supra note 45, at 57, 64. However, Trachtman also notes that "GATT/WTO dispute
resolution has been unable to provide a predictable, consistent approach to
determining when products are 'like' and questions whether "this situation of case-bycase analysis by the dispute settlement mechanism is superior to a more discrete, ex
ante specification that could be provided by treatymaking or other quasi-legislative
process." Id.
94.
EC-BananasIII, supra note 75, TT 233-234.
95.
GATS, supra note 4, art. 11:2. GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions.
Measures inconsistent with Article 11:1 of GATS must be listed in and meet the
conditions of the GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions. Id.
96.
Id.
97.
In principle, MFN exemptions cannot exceed a period of ten years
calculated from the date of GATS entry into force. GATS, supra note 4, art. XXIX,
Annex on Article II Exemptions, 1 1, 6. However, since 1995, a member's application
for a GATS Article II exemption is treated as a waiver under Article IX:3 of the WTO
Agreement. Id. T 2. Waivers under Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement may only be
granted by the Ministerial Conference of the WTO in "exceptional circumstances," and
must be secured by a decision of three fourths of the WTO membership. See WTO
Agreement, supra note 2, art. IX:3.
98.
The Doha Declaration, consistent with the Guidelines and Procedures for
the Negotiations on Trade in Services, reaffirms the need to continue with negotiations
on the MFN Exemptions. See Doha Declaration, supra note 38,
15; Guidelines and
Procedures, supra note 87, 6. Additionally, the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the WTO
(held in Hong Kong in 2005) affirmed that members should negotiate towards the (i)
removal or substantial reduction of exemptions from MFN treatment, and (ii)
clarification of remaining MFN exemptions in terms of scope of application. See World
Trade Org., Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on the Doha Work Program, Annex C,
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Thus, a considerable number of these exemptions continue to exist
and weaken the overall effectiveness of the MFN rule under the
GATS framework. 99
Another significant general obligation under GATS is the
principle of transparency,10 0 which requires members to publish basic
information on measures of general application that affect trade in
services. 10 1 Members must notify the Council for Trade in Services of
any new laws or changes to existing laws, regulations, or
administrative guidelines that affect trade in services covered by
10 2
members' specific commitments, as listed in their Schedules.
Members are also required to respond to requests for specific
information made by other members relating to measures of general
application, and they must also establish national points of inquiry
03
for such purposes.
In addition to MFN and transparency, there are other general
provisions under GATS that range from obligations commonly found
in most multilateral trade liberalization agreements 10 4 to obligations
addressing the special interests of developing countries, 10 5 as well as
provisions that cover other specific issues that arise in trade in
06
services.1

I

1(e), WTIMIN(05)/DEC (Dec. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration].
99.
In the context of the Doha Round and the ongoing services negotiations, a
recent Report by the Chairman of the Council for Trade in Services to the Trade
Negotiations Committee states that "[w]ith respect to MFN exemptions, only 15 offers
propose improvements; some 400 exemptions would remain." Council for Trade in
Servs., Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee,
3, TN/S/20
(July 11, 2005).
100.
GATS, supra note 4, art. III.
101.
See id. Article 111:1 of GATS provides:
Each Member shall publish promptly and, except in emergency situations, at
the latest by the time of their entry into force, all relevant measures of general
application which pertain to or affect the operation of this Agreement.
International agreements pertaining to or affecting trade in services to which a
member is a signatory shall also be published.
Id. art. 111:1.
102.
Id. art. 111:3.
103.
Id. art. 111:4. GATS does not, however, require members to disclose public
or private confidential information which would be contrary to the public interest or
legitimate commercial interests. Id. art. III bis.
104.
See id. pt. II (including provisions on economic integration (Article V), labor
market integration (Article V bis) and restrictions to safeguard balance of payments
issues (Article XII)).
105.
See id. art. IV (aiming to increase the participation of developing countries
in services trade).
106.
For example, see the GATS provisions aimed at preventing monopolistic
and anti-competitive practices from adversely affecting the benefits of the Agreement
(Article VIII dealing with monopolies and exclusive service suppliers and Article IX
dealing with restrictive business practices), as well as the prohibition on restricting
international transfers and payments for current transactions relating to the specific
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C. Limitations on Domestic Regulation that Restricts Trade:
Balancing Liberalizationwith RegulatoryAutonomy
Key components of the obligations under GATS are provisions
that govern members' imposition of domestic regulation restricting
trade in services. 10 7 For example, while Article VI of GATS is
perceived as preserving members' regulatory autonomy, paragraphs 4
and 5 of Article VI nevertheless subject domestic regulation to
scrutiny on the basis of whether such measures are more burdensome
than necessary to achieve legitimate objectives.' 0 8 However, the most
significant restrictions on members' regulatory autonomy come in the
form of GATS specific commitments, or more precisely, the
obligations on market access and national treatment (Articles XVI
and XVII respectively). 10 9
These obligations curtail members'
abilities to impose quantitative restrictions on the supply of services
or services suppliers (Article XVI) or to impose regulations
discriminating against foreign services or service suppliers (Article
XVII) in scheduled sectors. The balance between these specific
obligations, which focus on eliminating restrictive regulations to
liberal trade in services and the sovereign powers of individual
members to protect vital domestic interests, is achieved by providing
broad public policy exceptions. The GATS exceptions clause (Article
XIV) regulates the circumstances in which national interests may
override the provisions of GATS. 110 It is this combination of GATS
rules and general exceptions that defines the liberalization
commitments of members and draws the parameters of regulatory
autonomy under GATS.

commitments made by members (Article XI). Id. pt. II. GATS provisions also provide
for mutual recognition and harmonization of service standards relating to education,
licensing, and certification (Article VII). The use of emergency safeguard measures
(Article X), government procurement (Article XIII), and government subsidies (Article
XV) are left as areas requiring further negotiations. Id.
107.
See Exhibit A for a summary of GATS restrictions on regulatory autonomy.
108.
See Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note 40,
9-11; see also
infra Part IV.B.
109.
Consequently, it is the specific commitments that are most important to the
liberalization of the services trade under GATS.
110.
GATS, supra note 4, art. XIV; Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54,
20;
see also Kalypso Nicolaidis & Joel P. Trachtman, From Policed Regulation to Managed
Recognition in GATS, in GATS 2000: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE
LIBERALIZATION, supra note 6, at 241, 256 (discussing when national interests may be
found to override the GATS provisions).

1214

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40:1189

Exhibit A
How GATS Imposes Limitations on Members' Domestic
Regulatory Autonomy
Type of Limitation

GATS Textual Reference

Market Access
Requires opening
domestic markets to
foreign services and
suppliers to the extent
promised in the member's
Schedule of
Commitments.

Art. XVI
Applies only and to the
extent a member has
scheduled a specific
commitment to grant market
access to a specific services
sector. A member may grant
full or partial market access
for a sector or subsector.
However, if any commitment
is made, the member must list
any limitations in respect of
such sector and mode of
supply to which they apply. In
the absence of such
limitations, it will be deemed
to have made a commitment
for full market access.
Art. XVII
Applies only to the extent a
Member has scheduled a
specific commitment to grant
national treatment. A member
may list conditions or
limitations in its Schedule
that limit this obligation,

Prohibits domestic
regulation that imposes
quantitative and
quantitative type
restrictions on market
access.

National Treatment
Requires treating foreign
services and suppliers no
less favorably than
domestic like services and
suppliers.

Legal Tests to Analyze
Member's Domestic
Measures
Does the regulation
impose a quantitative or
quantitative type
restriction on the supply of
services (or service
providers)?
Six categories of
quantitative and
quantitative type measures
are prohibited unless listed
in the member's Schedule.

Does the regulation treat
foreign services or services
suppliers less favorably
than it treats "like"
domestic services or service
suppliers?
Less favorable treatment
Prohibits domestic
is treatment that modifies
regulation that
conditions of competition in
discriminates against
favor of domestic services
foreign services or foreign
and suppliers in
suppliers by providing less
comparison to foreign like
favorable treatment to
services or suppliers.
such services or suppliers
Thus the obligation covers
than that provided to like
both de jure (formal) and de
domestic services and
facto (origin-neutral)
service suppliers,
discriminatory regulations.
General Procedural
Art. VI:1-3
Are measures of general
Obligations on
Articles 1-3 apply only to
application administered in
Domestic Regulation
sectors in which a member has a reasonable, objective
scheduled specific
and impartial manner?
commitments of market access
Are decisions relating to
and/or national treatment,
applications for the
authorization of the supply
of services covered under
specific commitments given
within a reasonable time?
Is due process provided?
Is there judicial review
of administrative decisions,
and where justified,
remedies consistent with
the member's legal system?
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Type of Limitation

GATS Textual Reference

General Substantive
Obligations on
Domestic Regulation
Limits the trade
restrictiveness of nondiscriminatory
qualitative regulations
relating to qualification
requirements and
procedures, technical
standards and
licensing requirements.

Art. VI:4
In principle, applies whether
or not the member has
scheduled specific
commitments of market access
and/or national treatment,
Requires the Council for
Trade in Services to develop
"disciplines" (rules) to
regulate domestic regulation
that may operate as
unnecessary barriers to trade
in services.
Such disciplines have not yet
been adopted except with
respect to domestic regulation
in the accountancy services
sector.
Art. VI:5
Applies only to sectors in
which a member has
scheduled a specific
commitment on market access
and/or national treatment,

Interim Rule on
Domestic Regulation

Applies only until disciplines
are adopted under Art VI:4.

Measures Necessary to
Protect Fundamental
Policy Interests of a
Member
Exempts domestic
regulation that is
necessary to protect
public morals, maintain
public order, protect
human, animal or plant
life or health or to secure
compliance with laws and
regulations.
Also exempts domestic
regulation that is
necessary to pursue
essential security
interests.

Art. XIV
This exception shields
domestic regulation necessary
to achieve certain policy
objectives even if the
regulation is otherwise
inconsistent with the
members' obligations under
GATS.
Types of regulation shielded:
To prevent deception or
fraud,
To deal with default on a
contract,
To protect privacy of
individuals regarding
processing of personal data.
To protect public morals and
maintain public order.

Legal Tests to Analyze
Member's Domestic
Measures
Is the regulation more
burdensome than
necessary to achieve a
legitimate goal, that is, to
ensure the quality of the
service provided?
Are the regulations based
on objective and
transparent criteria such
as competence and the
ability to supply the
service?
In the case of licensing
measures, are they in
themselves a restriction on
the supply of the service?

Does the regulation
nullify or impair
specific commitments
made in the member's
Schedule in a manner that
does not comply with the
criteria outlines in Article
VI:4?
Is the regulation
nevertheless justified
because it could have
reasonably been expected of
that member at the time
the specific commitments
were made?
Is the regulation justified
by overriding national
interests?
Two part test:
Is the regulation
necessary for the
realization of the particular
objectives listed under
Article XIV?
Is the regulation applied
in a manner that is
arbitrary or constitutes
unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where
like conditions prevail or a
disguised restriction on
trade?
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The Article VI Mandate to Develop Disciplines on Qualitative
Domestic Regulation

Article VI on domestic regulation contains both procedural and
substantive obligations for members. Article VI:1 and Article VI:3
contain a number of procedural safeguards that relate to
transparency and due process in the administration of domestic
regulations. 1
In addition, Article VI:2 requires that members
provide judicial review of administrative decisions affecting trade in
services and, where justified, appropriate remedies for such
administrative decisions. n 2 However, the obligation to provide
judicial review and remedies is limited in that it applies only to the
extent such procedures are consistent with a member's constitutional
structure and legal system." 3 Generally, these Article VI procedural
obligations are broadly worded and apply primarily to service sectors
in which members have already made specific commitments of
market access and national treatment. In contrast, Article VI:4which provides for the negotiation of substantive obligations with
respect to qualification requirements and procedures, technical
standards, and licensing requirements-applies independently of
whether a member has scheduled specific commitments under
GATS." 4 Basically, Article VI:4 provides a mandate for the Council
for Trade in Services to develop "disciplines" that will ensure that
such qualitative regulations referring to minimum requirements,
such as the quality of the service supplied or the ability of the service
supplier to supply the service, will not operate as unnecessary
barriers to trade. 115 These disciplines will ensure that domestic
regulations covered by Article VI:4 are "based on objective and
transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the
services," and are "not more burdensome than necessary to ensure

111.
For example, Article VI:A requires that all measures of general application
affecting trade in scheduled sectors be administered in a reasonable, objective, and
impartial manner. In U.S.-Gambling, the Panel did not consider whether there was
violation of Articles VI:1 and VI:3 as alleged by Antigua because it ruled that Antigua
had failed to make a prima facie demonstration that the U.S. measures were
inconsistent with the said provisions. Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.437. However,
the Panel did clarify that Article VI: I "did not apply to measures of general application
themselves but to the administration of these measures." Id.
6.432. It also
confirmed that Article VI:3 "imposed transparency and due process obligations with
respect to the processing of applications for authorization to supply in a sector where
specific commitments have been undertaken." Id. Thus, paragraphs (1) and (3) of
Article VI were confirmed to contain disciplines of a procedural nature. Id.
112.
GATS, supra note 4, art. VI:2(a).
113.
Therefore, Article VI:2, which applies generally to all services, does little to
compel a member to actually alter its existing administrative procedures and judicial
review mechanisms. Id. art. VI:2(b).
114.
Id. art.VI:4.
115.
Id.
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the quality of the service." 116 Further, Article VI:4 requires the
"disciplines" to ensure that licensing procedures do not operate to
117
restrict the supply of services.
Pending the development of the Article VI:4 "disciplines" that
would apply horizontally across all sectors (horizontal disciplines),
Article VI:5 provides an interim rule. This interim rule prohibits
members from applying licensing and qualification requirements and
technical standards that nullify or impair specific commitments in a
manner that does not comply with the criteria that guide
development of the "disciplines." l 8 However, measures that could
have reasonably been expected of members at the time the specific
commitments were made (for example, prior to 1995) are exempt from
scrutiny under Article VI:5.119 Significantly, Article VI:5 only applies
to services subject to specific commitments in a member's
Schedule. 120 The sphere of application of Articles VI:4 and V1:5 is
generally considered to be limited to domestic regulation "consistent"
with the specific obligations of GATS. 121 Although Article V1:5

116.
Id. art.VI:4(a)-(b).
117.
Id. art.VI:4(c). The Working Party on Domestic Regulation ("Working
Party"), which is the successor of the Working Party on Professional Services, was
established in April 1999 by the Council for Trade in Services. Council for Trade in
Servs., Decision on Domestic Regulation, 1, S/L/70 (Apr. 28, 1999). Its mandate is to
develop any necessary disciplines on domestic regulation under Article VI:4 for
recommendation to the Council for Trade in Services. Id.
2. Under its mandate, it
must develop generally applicable disciplines and may also develop disciplines for
individual sectors or groups of sectors. Id. $ 3.
118.
GATS, supra note 4, art. VI:5(a)(i) (referring to the criteria outlined in
GATS art. VI:4(a)-(c)).
119.
Id. art. VI:5(a)(ii). See also Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note
40,
11 (noting that this would mean, at the very least, that all measures which were
already in place in 1995 would be exempt under Article VI:5 of GATS).
120.
GATS, supra note 4, art. VI:5(a).
121.
See Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54, T$ 13-14 (discussing domestic
regulation and the "limitations on national treatment").
The Discussions of the
Working Party on Professional Services (WPPS) developed during the course of
designing disciplines for the accountancy sector under Article VI:4 of GATS, notes that:
[A]lthough it was not in the mandate of the WPPS to provide an interpretation
of GATS provisions, the important relationship between the new disciplines
and Articles XVI and XVII was noted. While these two Articles relate to the
scheduling of specific commitments on measures falling within their scope, the
disciplines developed under Article VI:4 aim at ensuring that other types of
regulatory measures do not create unnecessary barriers to trade. It has been
noted that Article XVI (Market Access) covers the categories of measures
referred to in paragraph 2 (a) to (I), whether or not any discrimination is made
in their application between domestic and foreign suppliers. Article XVII
(National Treatment) captures within its scope any measure that
discriminates-whether de jure or de facto-against foreign services or service
suppliers in favour of like services or service suppliers of national origin. A
Member scheduling commitments under Articles XVI and XVII has the right to
maintain limitations on market access and national treatment and inscribe
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obliges members to refrain from enacting domestic regulation that
nullifies or impairs members' specific commitments, it does not oblige
members to review or eliminate domestic regulation that existed prior
to the time in which they made such commitments:
Thus longstanding regulatory practices or circumstances are protected.
This means that the domestic circumstances as they are form a
background for all concessions; as a matter of negotiation strategy,
members of the GATS must recognize this and bear the burden of
negotiating an end to existing measures that reduce the benefits for
which they negotiate. It is also clear . . . that Article VI.5 will not
impose substantial discipline on domestic regulation, which will place a
122
greater burden on Article VI.4 as a source of discipline.

2.

Article XIV Exceptions Permitting Regulations Necessary to
Protect Fundamental Domestic Policy Interests

The concept of regulatory autonomy finds its strongest
expression in GATS under the general and national security
exceptions that are found in Articles XIV and XIV bis, respectively.
In essence, Article XIV
affirm[s] the right of Members to pursue objectives identified in the
paragraphs of these provisions even if, in doing so, Members act
inconsistently with obligations set out in other provisions of the
respective agreements provided that all of the conditions set out therein
12 3
are satisfied.

them in its schedule. On the other hand, the disciplines to be developed under
Article VI:4 cover domestic regulatory measures which are not regarded as
market access limitations as such, and which do not in principle discriminate
against foreign suppliers. They are therefore not subject to scheduling under
Articles XVI and XVII. However, it is also recognized that for some categories of
measures the determination as to whether an individual measure falls under
Article VI:4 disciplines or is subject to scheduling under Article XVII will
require careful consideration.
Council on Trade in Servs., Working Party on ProflI Servs., Discussion on Matters
relating to Article XVI and XVII of GATS in connection with the Disciplines on
Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, SIWPPS/4 (Dec. 10, 1998) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, when adopting the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the
Accountancy Sector, WTO members also clarified that the accountancy disciplines do
not apply to measures that are subject to scheduling under the specific commitments of
GATS. See Council for Trade in Servs., Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the
1, S/L164 (Dec. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Accountancy Sector
Accountancy Sector,
Disciplines].
Trachtman, supra note 93, at 67. For example, Pauwelyn argues that had
122.
the substantive aspects of the U.S. measures challenged in U.S.-Gambling been
considered under Article VI, they would not have been found to violate Article VI:5
since "[a]ll US laws at issue pre-date the point in time where the United States made
its GATS commitments" and, therefore, would be exempt under Article VI:5 (a)(ii).
Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 167.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 291.
123.
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Article XIV allows members to adopt and enforce laws necessary to
protect public morals; protect the life or health of humans, animals,
or plants; maintain public order; or secure compliance with other
GATS-consistent laws and regulations. 124
Such measures are
justified as exceptions to GATS, 125 provided the measures are both
considered necessary and designed to meet any one of the objectives
listed in Article XIV.1 26 In WTO jurisprudence, the necessity of a
measure under the general exceptions clause is determined in terms
of whether a reasonably available, WTO-consistent alternative exists
to the measure at issue. 127 Additionally, the measure must satisfy
the conditions of the opening paragraph of Article XIV (commonly
referred to as the "chapeau"). The chapeau stipulates that measures
falling within the scope of Article XIV must not be applied in a
manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries sharing the same conditions, nor amount to a
disguised restriction on international trade. 128 Article XIV of GATS
also provides considerable flexibility for action taken in the
pursuance of essential security interests, 129 and does not require a
member to divulge any information that is contrary to such

124.
The full list of Article XIV exceptions covers measures necessary for the
protection of public morals, maintenance of public order, the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health, and the securing of compliance with laws and
regulations, which are themselves not inconsistent with GATS. GATS, supra note 4,
art. XIV(a)-(c).
This includes laws relating to the prevention of deceptive and
fraudulent practices; dealing with the effects of a default on services contracts; the
protection of privacy of individuals with regard to processing and dissemination of
personal data and confidentiality of individual records and accounts; and safety. Id. It
also covers measures that are inconsistent with the national treatment obligation of
GATS, which aim at ensuring the equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct
taxes in respect of services or service suppliers of other members and measures
inconsistent with the MFN obligation, provided that the difference in treatment is the
result of an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation or provisions on the
avoidance of double taxation in any other international agreement or arrangement by
which the member is bound. Id. art. XIV(d)-(e).
125.
Id. art. XIV(a)-(c).
126.
As exceptions to GATS, measures falling under the scope of Article XIV are
not subject to scheduling in a member's Schedule of commitments.
Scheduling
Guidelines, supra note 54, 7 20.
127.
Report of the Panel, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, T
5.26, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1989) [hereinafter U.S.
Tariff Act of 1930]. As Article XIV of GATS is largely modeled on Article XX of GATT
(the general exception clause of GATT), the jurisprudence of Article XX is applied in
interpreting the analogous provisions of Article XIV of GATS. This interpretation was
specifically confirmed by both the Panel and Appellate Body in U.S.-Gambling. Panel
Report, supra note 1, 77 6.448, 6.461; see also EC-Bananas III, supra note 75,
231
(confirming that jurisprudence under GATT is generally relevant for the interpretation
of analogous provisions contained in GATS).
128.
GATS, supra note 4, art. XIV.
129.
Id. art. XIV bis (1)(b).
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interests.1 30 Finally, it does not prevent members from taking action
in the pursuit of any obligation under the United Nations Charter
3
concerning the maintenance of international peace and security.' '
3.

Articles XVI and XVII: Restrictions on Quantitative
Discriminatory Forms of Domestic Regulation

and

Articles XVI and XVII (the market access and national
treatment obligations of GATS) are primarily designed to achieve
progressive liberalization of trade in services, which essentially
means minimizing or eliminating domestic regulations that restrict
trade. Therefore, when a member makes market access and national
treatment commitments under GATS, GATS restricts the right of
that member to impose either trade-distorting quantitative limits on
imported services (or service suppliers) or qualitative regulations that
of the
discriminate against foreign services or suppliers on the basis
3 2
origin of the service or the nationality of the service supplier.'
i.

Market Access Obligations Restrict Domestic Regulations that
Place Quantitative Limits on Access to Services Markets

In general, the market access obligation under GATS (Article
XVI) restricts the use of quantitative or quantitative-type measures
limiting access to services markets. 133 A member is prohibited from
maintaining measures in a scheduled sector that fall within any of
the six categories and types of measures mentioned in Article XVI:2,
unless the measure is listed as a limitation on market access in the
relevant column of its Schedule.' 3 4 An undertaking to grant market

130.
Id. art. XIV bis (1)(a).
Id. art. XIV bis (1)(c).
131.
Id. art. XVI.
132.
133.
Its functional equivalent in GATT is Article XI, which prohibits the use of
quantitative measures in the goods trade. GATT, supra note 42, art. XI.
Article XVI of GATS provides:
134.
(1) With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in
Article 1, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other
Member treatment no less favorable than that provided under the terms,
limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.
(2) In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures
which a Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional
subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in
its Schedule, are defined as:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of
numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements
of an economic needs test;
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of
numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
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access with respect to any services sector or subsector under GATS is
an obligation to accord treatment "no less favorable than that
provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions, agreed and
specified" in the Schedule. 135 Thus, unconditional market access is
granted if a member does not maintain any of the measures listed in
Article XVJ, but a member may grant "partial access" by listing any of
the Article XVI:2 restrictions it still wishes to apply. 136 Article XVI
also requires that such limitations be listed in respect of each sector
and mode of supply to which they apply. A significant feature of the
market access obligation is that it is worded broadly to cover both
quantitative measures aimed specifically at restricting competition
between foreign and domestic services or service suppliers (i.e.,
discriminatory quantitative measures), and quantitative measures
that restrict competition for both domestic and foreign competitors
137
alike (i.e., non-discriminatory quantitative measures).
The measures prohibited by Article XVI range from quantitative
restrictions (e.g., limits on the number of suppliers) 138 to
quantitative-type limitations (e.g., limits on the types of legal entities
permitted to supply a service 139 and maximum percentage limitations
on foreign equity participation). 140 The list of prohibited quantitative

(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity
of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form
of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in
a particular service sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are
necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific service in the form
of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint
venture through which a service supplier may supply a service; and
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum
percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or
aggregate foreign investment.
GATS, supra note 4, art. XVI.
135.
Id. art. XVI:I; Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.263. In U.S.-Gambling, the
Panel confirmed that: "[t]he standard of 'no less favorable' treatment in Article XVI is
established by reference to the specific commitments inscribed in the market access
column of a member's schedule." Id.
136.
See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
137.
Compare GATS, supra note 4, art. XVI:2(a) (referring to limitations on the
number of service suppliers), with id. art. XVI:2(f) (referring directly to limitations on
the participation of foreign capital).
138.
See, e.g., id. art. XVI:2 (a)-(d) (limiting the number of service suppliers, the
total value of service transactions or service operations, or the total number of
individuals who may be employed in a particular sector).
139.
See, e.g., id. art. XVI:2(e) (limiting the provision of services to corporations
or partnerships that have limited liability protections).
140.
See, e.g., id. art. XVI:2(f) (placing an eighty percent ceiling on foreign
ownership of banking companies).
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measures contained in Article XVI:2 is exhaustive, 14 1 and
determination of whether a particular domestic regulation falls
within the scope of Article XVI necessarily turns on the interpretation
of the measures listed in Article XVI:2.14 2 From a trade liberalization
perspective, determining whether a domestic regulation that affects
the supply of services in a scheduled sector falls inside or outside the
scope of the six categories of Article XVI:2 is a crucial issue. Domestic
regulations falling outside the scope of any of the six categories of
measures prohibited under Article XVI:2 may be imposed or
maintained without violating Article XVI:1, even if such regulations
14 3
have the effect of limiting the supply of the service.
ii.

National
Treatment
Domestic Regulation

Obligations

Restrict

Discriminatory

144
The obligation to grant national treatment (Article XVII)
obliges members to treat the services and service suppliers of other
WTO members no less favorably than they treat their own "like"
services and service suppliers. 145 In practical terms, this obligation to
extend "treatment no less favorable" than that accorded to domestic
"like" services and service suppliers under Article XVII applies in
relation to each mode of supply in a scheduled sector by virtue of the

141.

Panel Report, supra note 1,

6.318; Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54,

8.
142.
This was the principal issue in U.S.-Gambling discussed infra in Parts III
and IV of this Article.
143.
Panel Report, supra note 1,
6.256-6.257.
For example, in U.S.Gambling, Antigua argued that the U.S. "total prohibition" violated Article XVI:2
paragraphs (a) and (c), while the United States argued that the restrictions on online
gambling and betting services were not covered by Article XVI as they referred to "the
character of the activity involved" rather than limiting "the number of service suppliers
or the total number of service operations or total quantity of service output." Id.
144.
Article XVII of GATS provides:
(1) In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply
of services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.
(2) A Member may meet the requirements of paragraph 1 by according to
services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical
treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.
(3) Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be
less favorable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favor of services or
service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers
of any other Member.
GATS, supra note 4, art. XVII:1-3
145.
Id. art. XVII:I.
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scheduling mechanism for listing specific commitments. 146 A member
may grant national treatment by providing formally identical
treatment or formally different treatment, 147 as long as it does not
modify the conditions of competition in favor of domestic services and
service suppliers. 148
Article XVII covers both de jure (formal)
discrimination as well as de facto (origin-neutral) discrimination in
trade in services. 149 Like Article XVI, the obligation to grant national

146.
Id. art. XX:2. Note that measures inconsistent with both Articles XVI and
XVII must be listed in the market access column of a member's Schedule. As this
causes discrepancy between the text of Articles XVI, XVII, and the Schedule, and may
confuse a member's understanding of the Schedule of another member, the Scheduling
Guidelines caution:
While there may be no limitation entered in the national treatment column,
there may exist a discriminatory measure inconsistent with national treatment
inscribed in the market access column. However, in accordance with Article
XX:2, any discriminatory measure scheduled in the market access column is
also to be regarded as scheduled under Article XVII and subject to the
provisions of that Article.
Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54,
18; see also Feketekuty, supra note 43, at 9697 (noting the discrepancy this creates between specific commitments and members'
Schedules and suggesting that Article XX should be reversed and measures that
impose quantitative limitations on a discriminatory basis should be listed under
national treatment rather than market access).
147.
GATS, supra note 4, art. XVII:2.
148.
Id. art. XVII:3.
149.
Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54, 13(a)-(b). The Guidelines provide
the following examples of de jure and de facto discrimination that are inconsistent with
national treatment:
(a) Domestic suppliers of audiovisual services are given preference in the
allocation of frequencies for transmission within the national territory. (Such a
measure discriminates explicitly on the basis of the origin of the service
supplier and thus constitutes formal or de jure denial of national treatment.)
(b) A measure stipulates that prior residency is required for the issuing of a
license to supply a service.
(Although the measure does not formally
distinguish service suppliers on the basis of national origin, it de facto offers
less favorable treatment to foreign service suppliers because they are less likely
to be able to meet a prior residency requirement than like service suppliers of
national origin).
Id. Nevertheless, distinguishing between regulations that do not violate national
treatment on the one hand and those that discriminate de facto is difficult when
regulations are origin neutral (i.e., they do not explicitly distinguish between foreign
and domestic services or services suppliers). Thus, for example, the Scheduling
Guidelines also caution that the question of whether residency requirements constitute
limitations on national treatment has to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
14. Determining whether regulations that do not formally discriminate between
foreign and domestic services or services providers constitute de facto discrimination
also hinges on issues of domestic regulatory autonomy. Non-discriminatory regulatory
measures that "indirectly result in negative effects on foreign-service suppliers" are
"particularly problematic as these de facto discriminatory effects of a regulatory
measure are hard to anticipate." AARON OSTROVKSY ET AL., GATS, WATER AND THE
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treatment under GATS may be conditioned or limited by a member as
long as such limitation or condition is specified in the member's
150
Schedule.
Whether a member's domestic regulation violates a specific
commitment to grant national treatment hinges on two principle
elements. First, the foreign service (or service supplier) and the
domestic service (or service supplier) must be "like.' 151 Second, the
regulation must discriminate against the foreign service by according
treatment that is "less favorable" than that given to the domestic
service. 152 Under GATS, "less favorable treatment" is treatment that
"modifies conditions of competition" in favor of domestic services and
service suppliers when compared to foreign "like" services or service
153
suppliers.
Proving "likeness" between domestic and foreign services or
154
foreign and domestic service suppliers is also a complex matter:
There is perhaps only one point on which everyone agrees: the
application of the national treatment obligation and the determination
of likeness give rise to a wider range of questions-and uncertaintiesunder the GATS than under the GATT. The intangibility of services,
the difficulty to draw a line between product and production, the
existence of four modes of supply, the combined reference to services
and service suppliers, but also the lack of a detailed nomenclature and
the "customized" nature of many transactions are some of the factors
155
which complicate the task of establishing likeness in services trade.

ENVIRONMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES FOR
WATER RESOURCES 43 (2003). This is so because "in many cases whether a measure
exhibits such negative effects on foreigners depends on the nature of the foreign-service
supplier, on practical market conditions or on consumer preferences." Id.
150.
GATS, supra note 4, art. XVII:I (indicating that unlike Article XVI, Article
XVII does not provide a list of measures that would constitute violations of national
treatment under GATS).
7.314. This case was cited as authority
151.
EC-Bananas III, supra note 75,
by the United States in the U.S.-Gambling dispute. The United States argued that
Antigua had both failed to establish how its services and service suppliers were "like"
U.S. services and service suppliers and how the specific U.S. measures accorded less
favorable treatment to Antigua. Panel Report, supra note 1, 3.152.
Id.
152.
153.
GATS, supra note 4, art. XVII:3. The concept "modifies conditions of
competition" borrows directly from GATT jurisprudence established under Article III,
GATT. See Mireille Cossy, Determining "likeness" under the GATS: Squaring the
Circle? 4 (World Trade Org., Econ. Research & Statistics Div., Working Paper ERSD2006-08, 2006) (noting the concept "modify the conditions of competition" was first
established in the Italian Agricultural Machinery case. It was subsequently endorsed
by the US-Section 337 panel, which found that "[t]he words 'treatment no less
favorable' in paragraph 4 [of GATT Article III] call for effective equality of
opportunities for imported products" and that the purpose of that provision was to
protect "expectations on the competitive relationship between imported and domestic
products"); see also U.S. Tariff Act, supra note 127.
154.
Trachtman, supra note 93, at 62.
Cossy, supra note 153, at 2.
155.
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As GATS provides no definition of "like" services or service suppliers
in the context of national treatment, the determination of 'likeness"
is left to be decided through the process of scheduling commitments,
and ultimately through dispute settlement in the event of
156
disagreement.

156.
Compare EC-Bananas III, supra note 75, T 7.314 (answering the question
of whether the service suppliers concerned were alike, the Panel ruled that to the
extent the services were alike, those providing them were like service suppliers), and
Canada Autos, supra note 93, TT 10.289, 10.307 (finding that in the absence of like
service suppliers there could not be a violation of national treatment under GATS. The
Panel also addressed the relevance of the modes of supply in determining like services
and stated, though only "for the purposes of this case," that "services supplied in
Canada through modes 3 and 4 and those supplied from the territory of other Members
through modes 1 and 2 are 'like' services."), with Cossey, supra note 153, at 14-15
(critiquing the Canada Autos decision and noting that interpreting likeness across
modes of supply would limit the possibilities for regulatory distinctions between modes
of supply and more generally between services supplied through different means); see
also Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.426. In U.S.-Gambling, although Antigua initially
alleged violation of the national treatment obligation by the United States, it
subsequently submitted that a Panel finding under Article XVI of GATS obviated the
need to assess whether there was also a violation of Article XVII of GATS. This led to
the Panel exercising judicial economy over the Antiguan claim of a violation of national
treatment. However, in arguments before the Panel, both parties raised a number of
factors relevant to a determination of "likeness" in the services context. Such factors
ranged from product characteristics, the differences in the modes of supply, regulatory
distinctions, the intangibility and adaptability of services, the close nexus between the
service and the service supplier, differences in the suppliers of such services, consumer
perception, technological differences, and the differences in the risks (including
The parties also referred to the relevance of international
regulatory risks).
classification systems and the criteria used to assess likeness in the context of national
treatment under GATT. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European CommunitiesMeasures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 7 99-103,
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos]. In the goods context, in
the case of national treatment under Article III of GATT, the "like product analysis"
continues to evolve through dispute settlement. In GATT, likeness has been said to be
"fundamentally a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive
relationship between and among products." Id. 7 99. The Appellate Body, using
criteria developed in the famous Border Tax Adjustment Report, has stated that there
are four categories of characteristics that are used to assess likeness of goods under
GATT: (1) physical properties, (2) capability of serving the same or similar end-users,
101. On the
(3) consumer perception, and (4) international tariff classification. Id.
other hand, the Appellate Body also stated that such general criteria provide a
framework for analyzing the "likeness" of particular products on a case-by-case basis
and do not eliminate the need to examine all pertinent evidence "the kind of evidence
to be examined in assessing the 'likeness' of products will, necessarily, depend upon the
particular products and the legal provision at issue." Id. 7 103. Thus, for example, the
Appellate Body ruled that "evidence relating to health risks may be relevant in
assessing the competitive relationship in the market place between allegedly 'like'
115; see also Robert E. Hudec, Like Product: the Differences in
products." Id.
Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAw 101 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C.
Mavroidis eds., 2000) (presenting leading discussions on the evolution of the "like"
products analysis under Article III of GATT); Robert E. Hudec, GATTIWTO
Constraintson National Regulation: Requiem for an "Aim and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L
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With this overview of GATS in place, the next section of the
Article reviews key aspects of the U.S.-Gambling case that impact the
balance struck in GATS between liberalizing trade in services and
preserving members' autonomy as sovereigns to regulate within their
borders.

III.

THE

U.S.-

GAMBLING LITIGATION

In 2003, Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua)157 brought a complaint
to the WTO's DSB against the United States, claiming that a U.S.
ban on online gambling violated GATS by imposing a "total
prohibition" on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services. 158 The basis for Antigua's complaint was grounded in the
U.S. Schedule of specific commitments under GATS. 159 Antigua
claimed that the U.S. Schedule made a full commitment to grant
national treatment and market access to the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services. 160 By maintaining domestic laws
16
prohibiting cross-border supply of gambling and betting services, '
Antigua argued that the United States was violating its obligation to
grant treatment "no less favorable that that provided for under the
terms, limitations and conditions specified in its schedule.' 1 62 The
United States categorically denied that it had made a specific

LAWYER 619 (1998) (same); Amelia Porges & Joel P. Trachtman, Robert Hudec and
Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection of Aim and Effects, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 783,
784-86 (2003) (same).
157.
See Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review-Antigua and Barbuda,
WT/TPRIS/85/ATG (May 7, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
countries_e/antigua-andbarbudae.htm (providing an overview of the trade policies of
Antigua and Barbuda).
158.
See Krajewski, supra note 26, at 419-22 (providing an insightful account of
the background to this dispute).
159. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, Annex III.
160. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,
46; Panel Report, supra note 1, 7
3.30, 3.48.
161. Antigua submitted an extensive list of U.S. federal and state laws that in
its opinion constituted the "prohibition" of cross-border gambling and betting services.
However, the Panel determined that the laws "sufficiently identified by Antigua" as
constituting the "prohibition" were limited to three federal laws [mainly the Wire Act
(18 U.S.C. § 1084), the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952) and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act (18 U.S.C. § 1955)] as well as several states laws. Panel Report, supra note 1,
6.249. On appeal, the Appellate Body further narrowed down this list finding that only
the three federal laws identified by Antigua were relevant to this dispute. Appellate
Body Report, supra note 1, 7 153-155. The Appellate Body overruled the Panel's
consideration of the state laws on the basis that Antigua had not made a prima facie
case in respect of the inconsistency of these state laws with reference to U.S.
obligations under GATS. Id.
162. Antigua also asked the Panel to find that the U.S. prohibition was in
violation of GATS Article VI (domestic regulation) and Article XI (payments and
transfers). Panel Report, supra note 1, 2.1.
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commitment in its Schedule to grant market access or national
treatment to cross-border gambling and betting services. 163
In
support of its argument, the United States cited the severity of U.S.
legal restrictions on gambling services in general, and the particular
stringency with which U.S. laws apply to the remote supply of
gambling services, irrespective of the nationality or location of the
supplier. 164 The case generated as much interest in the United
States 16 5 as it did in the international community, 16 6 reflecting the
16 7
global significance of the U.S. market for online gambling services.

163.
3.44.
164.

Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,

14; Panel Report, supra note 1,

As the United States argued:

Gambling in the United States is permitted only within particular locations
and facilities designated by law, and only in forms that the United States
believes can be effectively regulated. Where it exists, it operates under the most
rigorous regulatory constraints ....
The purpose of that regulatory scrutiny is
to protect the public, not to protect domestic industry. Indeed, if its purpose
were protectionist, it would have failed miserably, since numerous foreign
suppliers of gambling services are already present in the US market.
Regardless of foreign or domestic origin, all providers of gambling services in
the United States operate under severe restrictions. And when it comes to
remote supply of gambling, those restrictions are particularly stringent.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 3.20. The Panel distinguished the term "remote" supply
from the "cross-border" supply of services under Article 1:2(a) of GATS in the following
manner:
"Cross-border" must be distinguished from "remote" supply, which is a term
that has been used by the parties to this dispute. The Panel will use the latter
term to refer to "any situation where the supplier, whether domestic or foreign,
and the consumer of gambling and betting service are not physically together."
In other words, in situations of remote supply, the consumer of a service does
not have to go to any type of outlet where the supply is supervised, be it a retail
facility, a casino, a vending machine, etc. Instead, the remote supplier offers
the service directly to the consumer through some means of distance
communication. Hence, cross-border supply is necessarily remote, but remote
supply amounts to "cross-border" supply only when the service supplier and the
consumer are located in territories of different Members.
The Panel
understands "non-remote" supply to refer to situations where the consumer
presents himself or herself at a supplier's point of presence.
Id.

6.32 (emphasis added).
165.
See Associated Press, WTO Issues Mixed Ruling on U.S. Limits on Net
Gambling, SILICON VALLEY.cOM, Apr. 7, 2005 (on file with authors) (discussing the ruling
in the U.S.-Gambling case); Paul Blusterin, U.S. Claims Victory on Web Betting Ban:
Others See WTO Ruling as Murky, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2005, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/articles/A35826-2005Apr7.html (same); Joanna
Glasner, Ruling Unlikely to Deter Gaming, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.wired.com/newslbusiness/O,1367,67170,00.html (same).
166.
Third party members in U.S.-Gambling included Canada, the European
Communities, Japan, Mexico, and Chinese Taipei. Panel Report, supra note 1,
1.5.
Only the European Communities, Japan, and Chinese Taipei made submissions during
the proceedings before the Appellate Body. Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,
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A. The Panel'sDecision
One of the first questions addressed in the dispute was whether
the U.S. Schedule included specific commitments on gambling and
betting services.
The dispute centered on the scope of the
commitment made by the United States in its Schedule granting full
"market access" and "national treatment" to the cross-border supply
of "other recreational services (except sporting). '168 Antigua argued
the term "recreational services" included gambling and betting
services according to the classification list of services commonly used
by WTO members when drafting specific commitments under
GATS. 169 In rebuttal, the United States argued that gambling and
betting services fell within the ordinary meaning of the term
"sporting," which the United States has specifically excluded from the
scope of its market access and national treatment commitments
under "recreational services. ' 170 The Panel ruled in favor of Antigua
that the U.S. Schedule included specific commitments for gambling
and betting services under the service subsector titled "other
recreational services. '171 Because the United States had inscribed

98-113. The United Kingdom (a member of the European Communities) is now
host to some of the largest companies in the online gaming industry. Mark Oliver,
Britain to Host Online Gambling Summit, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (London), Jan. 16,
2006 (on file with authors); Reuters, U.K. to Host Global Online-Gambling Summit,
CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 17, 2006 (on file with authors). The Commission which
regulates gambling in the public interest will from September 2007 also regulate
betting and online gambling. Oliver, supra;Reuters, supra.
167.
According to estimates by the then U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO),
half of the revenue from the global online casino industry, which amounted to five
billion U.S. dollars in 2003, is derived from the pockets of U.S. consumers. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES 6 (2002),
availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0389.pdf; see also U.K. DEPT. OF CULTURE,
MEDIA & SPORT, THE FUTURE REGULATION OF REMOTE GAMBLING: A DCMS POSITION
PAPER
102 (2003), available at http://www.culture.gov.uk/Reference-library/
Publications/archive_2003/gamb-position.paper.htm (noting that "despite the apparent
illegality of cross border gambling, more [U.S.] citizens gamble online than anywhere
else in the world.").
168.
The relevant section of the U.S. Schedule titled "10 Recreational, cultural
and sporting services" lists no market access restrictions or national treatment
limitations for mode 1 under subsector 10D, which is titled "other recreational services
(except sporting)." Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.43
169.
Id.
3.31. Under the W/120, "sporting and recreational services" is listed
under section 10D of the W/120, which corresponds to CPC group 964. W/120, supra
note 57. CPC group 964 is further broken down into two classes, mainly sporting
services (9641) and other recreational services (9649). CPC, supra note 57, at group
964. The CPC class of services titled "Other recreational services" (9649) includes the
subclass for gambling and betting services (96492), while the CPC class of sporting
services (9641) does not. Id.
170.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 3.45.
171.
Id. 6.93. In order to reach its decision, the Panel, in interpreting the U.S.
Schedule, followed the customary rules of interpretation of public international law as
required under the DSU, mainly Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention. DSU, supra
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the term "none" with respect to "other recreational services" in the
market access and national treatment columns of its Schedule, the
Panel concluded that the United States had made specific
commitments with respect to limitations on services falling within
172
the scope of that subsector.
A second issue in the dispute was whether U.S. federal and state
laws prohibiting the supply of cross-border online gambling and
betting services were maintained in violation of GATS Articles XVI
(market access) and XVII (national treatment).173 The Panel found
that under the terms of the market access obligation of GATS, U.S
laws prohibiting foreign businesses from supplying cross-border
gambling and betting services violated the obligation to grant
"treatment no less favorable than that provided for under the terms,
limitations and conditions agreed and specified under its
Schedule."'174
Although the Panel confirmed that the list of
limitations covered in Article XVI:2(a) were exhaustive, 175 it ruled
that the challenged U.S. laws, by limiting the means of cross-border
delivery of gambling and betting services, also limited the number of
service suppliers (and the total number of service operations in that
sector) that could supply such services to zero. According to the
Panel, this "limitation in the form of a numerical quota" (albeit a
"zero quota") fell within the scope of the market access restrictions

note 59, art. 3.2; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M.
679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Panel Report, supra
note 1, 9 6.45. Schedules of specific commitments by members are considered to be an
integral part of the GATS. GATS, supra note 4, art. XX:3. Based on Article 31(1) of
the Vienna Convention, the Panel consulted a number of dictionary definitions in order
to determine whether the ordinary meaning of the term "sporting" included gambling
and betting services as contended by the United States. Panel Report, supra note 1,
6.55-6.59. In general, the Panel found that dictionary definitions of the terms
"entertainment," "recreational," and "sporting" did not offer any definitive answer with
respect to whether the U.S. Schedule includes specific commitments on gambling and
betting services. Id. Nevertheless, the Panel found that according to the dictionary
definitions offered, the ordinary meaning of the term "sporting" did not include
gambling and betting services. Id. $T 6.61, 6.67. Continuing its analysis under Article
31(2) of the Vienna Convention, the Panel then reasoned that the Scheduling
Guidelines and the W/120 comprised the "context" for interpreting GATS Schedules
6.82; Scheduling
within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. Id.
Guidelines, supra note 54; W/120, supra note 57. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that
in the light of the W/120 and the corresponding CPC numbers, the term "sporting" did
not include gambling and betting services and the term "other recreational services"
covered gambling and betting services. Panel Report, supranote 1, 9 6.93.
172.
Panel Report, supra note 1, $$ 6.134, 6.279.
173.
See supra Part II.C (providing an overview of these provisions in GATS).
174.
Panel Report, supra note 1, IT 6.365, 6.373, 6.380, 6.389, 6.395, 6.412,
6.418.
175.
Id. $$ 6.298, 6.325. The Panel also ruled that the six categories of
measures under Article XVI:2 were exhaustive of the types of market access
restrictions prohibited by Article XVI, GATS. Id. 6.298.
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prohibited by paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI(2). 176 Rejecting
the United States' arguments that the federal laws prohibiting online
gambling and betting services could not be in violation of Article
XVI:2(a) as they did not take the "form of a quota," the Panel
carefully explained why it considered a "zero quota" to fall within the
definition of a "limitation in the form of a numerical quota" under
Article XVI:2(a):
It is true that the wording of Article XVI:2(a) covers numerical quotas
other than zero. That is because the subparagraph is designed, in part,
to indicate the limitations, short of total prohibition, that Members may
specify in their schedules, on the number of service suppliers. The fact
that the terminology embraces lesser limitations, in the form of quotas
greater than zero, cannot warrant the conclusion that it does not
77
embrace a greater limitation amounting to zero.1

The Panel went on to reason that "[a] measure that is not expressed
in the form of a numerical quota ... may still fall within the scope of
Article XVI:2(a). To hold that only restrictions explicitly couched in
numerical terms fall within Article XVI:2(a) would produce absurd
1 78
results.

As the U.S. Schedule contained an unconditional obligation to
grant market access, the Panel found that three federal laws (mainly
the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act),
when read together with the relevant state laws (of Louisiana,

176.
Id. T 6.330, 6.355. The text of paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2 are
reproduced here:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of
numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements
of an economic needs test;
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity
of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form
of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
GATS, supra note 4, art. XVI:2(a), (c).
Panel Report, supra note 1,
177.

6.331. The Panel went on to reason that:

Paragraph (a) does not foresee a 'zero quota' because paragraph (a) was not
drafted to cover situations where a Member wants to maintain full limitations.
If a Member wants to maintain a full prohibition, it is assumed that such a
Member would not have scheduled such a sector or sub-sector and, therefore,
would not need to schedule any limitation or measures pursuant to Article
XVI:2.

Id.
178.
Id.
6.332. The Panel found support for this conclusion in the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines, which provided the following example of a limitation under
Article XVI:2(a): "nationality requirements for suppliers of services (equivalent to zero
quota)." Id. The Panel reasoned that "this suggests that a measure that is not
expressed in the form of a numerical quota or economic needs test may still fall within
the scope of Article XVI:2(a)." Id.
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Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Utah), as well as the relevant
state laws themselves, were all maintained in violation of Article
179
XVI:2(a) and Article XVI:2(c) of GATS.
The final issue in the dispute was whether the U.S. prohibition
on the supply of cross-border gambling services was justified as a
policy exception under the general exceptions of Article XIV of
GATS. 180 Article XIV permits members to derogate from their GATS
obligations to protect certain fundamental domestic policy interests,
provided several conditions are met. 181 Because the policy exceptions
under Article XIV of GATS are similar to the policy exceptions
permitted by Article XX of the GATT, the Panel analyzed Article XIV
by applying jurisprudence developed under Article XX of the GATT.
It articulated a two-tiered analysis for policy exceptions under Article
XIV. 1 82 Applying the first tier of that analysis, the "necessity" test,
the Panel found that the challenged measures were designed to
protect public morals, public order, and secure compliance with other
WTO-consistent laws.' 8 3 Specifically, it found that the U.S. laws
prohibiting online gambling protected important societal interests
that were "vital and important"'18 4 and "contribute[d], at least to some

179.
Id. 9 6.419-6.420. The Panel did not consider it necessary to examine
Antigua's claim under the national treatment obligation (Article XVII) on grounds of
6.426. In respect of its claims under the general obligation on
judicial economy. Id.
domestic regulations (Article VI), the Panel also ruled that Antigua had failed to make
a prima facie demonstration that the measures at issue were inconsistent with the
6.437. The Panel also chose to exercise judicial economy
provisions of Article VI. Id.
in respect of Antigua's claims under Article XI. Id. 6.441.
6.444 (noting that the United States
180.
See Panel Report, supra note 1,
argued that the three federal laws were necessary to "protect 'public morals' and 'public
order' within the meaning of Article X1V(a) because, inter alia, remote gambling is
particularly vulnerable to use by minors who are prohibited from gambling or can be
used for laundering the proceeds of organized crime"); see id. 6.445 (noting that the
United States also argued under Article XIV(c) of GATS, that the federal laws served
"as law enforcement tools to secure compliance with other WTO-consistent U.S. laws,
in particular, state gambling laws and criminal laws relating to organized crime").
See generally GATS, supra note 4, art. XIV (requiring satisfaction of the
181.
necessity test and the requirements of the chapeau under Article XIV). See supra Part
II.C.
6.449. Under the two-tiered analysis, a
Panel Report, supra note 1,
182.
measure must:
(a) fall within the scope of one of the recognized exceptions set out in
paragraphs (a) to (e) of Article XIV in order to enjoy provisional justification;
and
(b) meet the requirements of the introductory provisions of Article XIV, the socalled "chapeau."
Id.; see infra Part IV.C (discussing, in detail, the two-tier analysis of Article XIV by the
Panel).
6.487, 6.557.
183.
Panel Report, supra note 1,
Id. 6.492.
184.
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extent, in addressing these concerns. '185 Nevertheless, the Panel also
ruled that under the necessity test, the measures had a significantly
restrictive trade impact. 18 6 Assessing the trade impact of the
challenged measures, the Panel ruled that the United States had an
obligation to first explore and exhaust all available WTO-compatible
alternatives that would have provided the same level of protection
before adopting its prohibition of online gambling and betting
services. 187 It went on to interpret this requirement in terms of a
U.S. obligation to engage in consultations with Antigua, with a view
toward exhausting WTO-consistent alternatives that would have
addressed its concerns. 188 Given the significant trade impact of the
measures at issue, the Panel reasoned that by failing to engage in
such consultations, the United States did not fulfill the requirements
of Article XIV's "necessity test." Consequently, the Panel ruled that
the measures could not be justified as "necessary" to protect public
i8 9
morals or public order under Article XTV.
Having held that the United States failed to satisfy the first tier
of the Article XIV analysis, the Panel proceeded to consider whether
the U.S. measures also met the requirements of the second tier,
which addresses requirements found in the chapeau of Article XIV. 190
In doing so, the Panel found that the measures at issue violated the
chapeau of Article XIV as well. 19 1 It found that the United States
had enforced its prohibition on online gambling and betting services
(particularly the Wire Act) in a manner that discriminated against
foreign service suppliers of online gambling and betting services,
rendering its measures inconsistent with the requirements of the
chapeau of Article XTV. 1 92 Although the United States produced
statistical evidence that the Wire Act and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act had been enforced against domestic suppliers of online
gambling and betting services, 193 the Panel relied on evidence
submitted by Antigua showing that the United States had not
enforced the challenged federal measures against some domestic

185.
Id. 7 6.494.
186.
Id. 7 6.495.
187.
Id. 6.528.
188.
Id.
6.529-6.531.
189.
Id. 77 6.533-6.535.
Applying a similar analysis to the necessity of
measures that the United States sought to provisionally justify under Article XIV(c),
the Panel found that the United States had not demonstrated that the challenged
measures were necessary within the meaning of Article XIV(c). Id. 6.565.
190.
Id. T 6.566. Strictly speaking, a Panel is not required to proceed to the
second tier of the Article XIV analysis if it finds that a measure does not satisfy the
requirements of the "necessity test" imposed under the first tier of the Article XIV
analysis. In U.S.-Gambling, the Panel proceeded to the second tier of the analysis in
order to "assist the parties in resolving the underlying dispute of this case." Id.
191.
Id. 6.589.
192.
Id.
193.
Id. 6.586.
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online gambling operators. 94
Accordingly, it found evidence
introduced by the United States to dispute this claim to be
"inconclusive," and ruled that the United States had failed to prove
non-discriminatory enforcement against foreign suppliers of gambling
and betting services. It also agreed with Antigua that a federal civil
statute, the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA),195 appeared to permit
interstate pari-mutuel wagering over the telephone and other modes
of electronic communication (such as the Internet) within the
territory of the United States.' 96 It found that the IHA appeared to
exempt domestic suppliers of covered betting services from the
provisions of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act in a manner that was inconsistent with the
requirements of the chapeau. 197
Thus, in light of U.S. nonenforcement of the prohibition against certain domestic suppliers of
online betting services and the ambiguities present in the IHA, the
Panel ruled that the United States had failed to demonstrate that its

194.
Id. J 6.585-6.588. Antigua identified four U.S. firms that it claimed
offered online gambling and betting services but had not been prosecuted by the United
States under the federal Wire Act or the Illegal Gambling Business Act. Id. The firms
were Youbet.com, TVG, Capital OTB, and Xpressbet.com. Id. 1 6.585. In contrast,
Antigua cited the case of an Antiguan service supplier (United States v. Jay Cohen, 260
F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001)) who was prosecuted and convicted under the Wire Act. Id. In
its defense, the United States introduced statistical evidence from the Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section of the Department of Justice showing that it approved 90
racketeering prosecutions from 1992-2000 under the Wire Act, the Illegal Gambling
Business Act, or both. Id.
6.586, 6.588. It also claimed that prosecution proceedings
were pending against the domestic supplier Youbet.com. Id.
195.
15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007 (2006).
196.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 77 6.595, 6.599. As evidence of alleged
discrimination in the application of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the IGBAcontrary to the terms of the chapeau of Article XIV-Antigua argued that the federal
laws prohibiting the use of remote communication to supply gambling and betting
services did not apply to certain types of remote horse race betting within the United
States because the revised IHA effectively exempted such betting from the application
of the federal laws. Id. T 6.595. Although the United States submitted that the IHA,
as a civil statute, did not amend the pre-existing federal laws, the Panel agreed with
Antigua that the text of the revised IHA could be understood, on its face, to permit
interstate pari-mutuel wagering over the telephone or other modes of communication
as long as such wagering was legal in both states. Id. 7 6.598.
197.
Based on these findings the Panel found that:
[T]he United States has not demonstrated that it applies its prohibition on the
remote supply of these services in a consistent manner as between those
supplied domestically and those that are supplied from other Members.
Accordingly, we believe that the United States has not demonstrated that it
does not apply its prohibition on the remote supply of wagering services for
horse racing in a manner that does not constitute "arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail" and/or a
"disguised restriction on trade" in accordance with the requirements of the
chapeau of Article XIV.

Id.

6.607.
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prohibition on the remote supply of wagering services for horse racing
was applied in a manner that did not constitute arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions
prevail (i.e., that the prohibition was not a disguised restriction on
trade). 198 Needless to say, the Panel's decision was unacceptable to
the United States; it was viewed as a serious invasion of U.S.
sovereignty in terms of its right to regulate and protect its populaceparticularly minors-against harmful activity. As was expected, the
United States appealed the Panel's decision to the WTO's Appellate
19 9
Body.
B. The Appellate Body's Decision
The Appellate Body employed a different methodology to
interpret the U.S. Schedule,2 0 0 but nevertheless upheld the Panel's
findings that the United States had made a specific commitment to
provide market access for the supply of cross-border gambling and
betting services.2 01 It also confirmed the Panel's analysis of the U.S.
prohibition as a violation of the market access obligation,20 2 though it
confined its decision to the federal Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act. It did not address the impact of the
state laws restricting online gambling. 203 Confirming the Panel's

198.
Id.
199.
See Appellate Body Report, supranote 1, Annex 1, Notification of an Appeal
by the United States under Paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (setting forth the United States'
appeal to the Appellate Body).
200.
The Appellate Body rejected the Panel's use of the W/120 and the
Scheduling Guidelines as "context" and instead used them as "supplementary means of
interpretation" under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention to confirm the Panel's
interpretation of the U.S. Schedule, stating:
[T]he application of the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention leaves the meaning of "other recreational services (except
sporting)" ambiguous and does not answer the question whether the
commitment made by the United States in subsector 10.D of its Schedule
includes a commitment in respect of gambling and betting services.
Id. T 195.
In the Appellate Body's view, the United States used the W/120 and sought to
comply with the Scheduling Guidelines in drafting its GATS Schedule. The term
"other recreational services (except sporting)" had to be interpreted as excluding the
corresponding CPC class 9641 or "sporting services" and including within the scope of
its commitment, CPC 9649: "other recreational services" including subclass 96492
"gambling and betting services." Id.
208.
201.
Id. T 212.
202.
Id.
238-39, 251-252.
203.
The Appellate Body determined that Antigua had established a prima facie
case only in respect of the federal Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act. Id.
153. Finding that the Panel had erred in examining the eight state
laws, it reversed the Panel's findings in respect of the four state laws. Id.
154-155.
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expansive interpretation of the market access obligation of GATS, the
Appellate Body interpreted the words "in the form of' in Article
XVI:2(a) broadly, 20 4 opining that the "the four types of limitations [in
' 20 5
Article XVI:2(a)] themselves, impart meaning to 'in the form of."'
In particular, it ruled that according to dictionary definitions of the
terms "numerical" and "quota," the term "numerical quotas" appeared
"to mean a quantitative limit on the number of service suppliers" 20 6 :
The fact that the word "numerical" encompasses things which "have the
characteristics of a number" suggests that limitations "in the form of a
numerical quota" would encompass limitations which, even if not in
themselves a number, have the characteristics of a number. Because
zero is quantitativein nature, it can, in our view, be deemed to have the
"characteristics of" a number-that is, to be numerical. 2 0 7

The Appellate Body went on to rule that
when viewed as a whole, the text of sub-paragraph (a) supports the
view that the words "in the form of' must be read in conjunction with
the words that precede them-"limitations on the number of service
suppliers"-as well as the words that follow them, including the words
"numericalquotas". Read in this way, it is clear that the thrust of subparagraph (a) is not on the form of limitations, but on their numerical
208
or quantitative nature.

However, the Appellate Body modified the Panel's analysis and
reversed its denial of the U.S. defense under the policy exceptions of
GATS. Instead, it found that the United States had successfully
justified the necessity of its prohibition of online gambling and
betting services under the "necessity test" of Article XIV (the first
20 9
part of the two prong analysis imposed under Article XV).
Specifically, the Appellate Body found that the Panel had, in
assessing the trade impact of the three federal laws under the
necessity test, erred by imposing an obligation on the United States

204.
Although the United States urged that proper effect be given to the terms
"in the form of," the Appellate Body noted that dictionary definitions of the term "form"
advanced by the United States, "suggested a degree of ambiguity as to the scope of the
word. For example, 'form' covers both the mode in which a thing 'exists,' as well as the
mode in which it 'manifests itself."' Id. T 226.
205.
Id.
227. In particular, the Appellate Body found that the definitions of
the limitations themselves, mainly "numerical quotas," "monopolies," "exclusive service
suppliers," and "economic needs tests" did not make clear whether such limitations
needed to be in a particular "form." Id. 77 227-231.
206.
Id.
227. Supporting its conclusion, the Appellate Body also cited
examples under the Scheduling Guidelines of nationality requirements for service
suppliers as limitations "equivalent to a zero quota" under Article XVI:2(a) and
restrictions on broadcasting time as an example of a measure equivalent to a zero
quota under Article XVI:2(c). Id. IT 237, 249
207.
Id. 7 227.
208.
Id. 232.
209.
Id. T 326.
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to consult with Antigua as a part of its obligation to consider all
reasonably available WTO-consistent measures before imposing a
WTO inconsistent measure. 2 10 The Appellate Body ruled that not
only was it not the responding (defending) party's burden to show in
the first instance that there were no reasonably available alternatives
to achieve its objective, 2 11 but also that the Panel's analysis was
flawed because by requiring the United States to engage in
consultations with Antigua "it did not focus on an alternative
2 12
measure that was reasonably available" to the United States.
Consultations were, as the Appellate Body reasoned, "by definition a
process, the results of which are uncertain and therefore not capable
of comparison with the measures at issue. ' 213 It also reversed the
Panel's finding that the United States had discriminated against
foreign service suppliers in its enforcement of the federal Wire Act on
the grounds that the Panel had relied on inadequate evidence in
reaching this finding of discrimination. 214 However, the Appellate
Body agreed with the Panel's analysis of the federal IHA. It ruled
that the United States had failed to demonstrate that the IHA did not
permit domestic suppliers from offering wagering for horse racing
over the telephone or other modes of electronic commerce, including
the Internet. 215 It upheld the Panel's finding that "the evidence
provided by the United States was not sufficiently persuasive to
conclude that, as regards wagering on horseracing, the remote supply
of such services by domestic firms continues to be prohibited
notwithstanding the plain language of the IHA. '2 16 Accordingly, the
Appellate Body ruled that, contrary to the requirements of the
chapeau of Article XIV, the U.S. prohibition on online wagering
services was inconsistently applied between domestic and foreign
2 17
service suppliers.
Thus, there was no clear winner in the Appellate Body's report,
and each party claimed a partial victory. 218
In light of U.S.Gambling, the next section of the Article examines members' rights to
adopt domestic laws that restrict trade in services and the tension
between these rights and GATS' goal to liberalize trade.

210.
Id. 9 315; cf. Panel Report, supra note 1, 99 6.528-6.531 (relating to its
determination under Article XIV(a)), and T 6.562 (relating to its determination under
Article XIV(c)).
211.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 309.
212.
Id. T 317.
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
354-355.
215.
Id. I 361, 364; Panel Report, supra note 1, T 6.600, 6.607.
216.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 364.
217.
Id. 369.
218.
Krajewski, supra note 26, at 418.
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THE TENSION BETWEEN LIBERALIZATION AND REGULATORY
AUTONOMY: INSIGHTS FROM U.S.-GAMBLING

The central question in the debate over liberalization of trade in
services versus the sovereign rights of members to exercise regulatory
autonomy is: when does a member have the right to impose domestic
regulations that restrict foreign service providers from offering their
services to residents of that member state, particularly when the
member maintains specific commitments in the relevant service
sectors? This section of the Article examines the extent of members'
regulatory autonomy under GATS, drawing on insights gleaned from
U.S.-Gambling. As will be shown, members retain significant
regulatory autonomy that may operate to pose significant barriers to
trade in sectors where specific liberalization commitments have been
made.
A. U.S.-Gambling: An Erosion of Domestic RegulatoryAutonomy?
An important question is how Articles VI and XVI work together
to define the scope of members' rights to adopt and enforce domestic
laws that restrict trade in services. Generally, the market access
obligation (Article XVI) has been viewed as dealing with domestic
regulation that is quantitativein nature, while Article VI is viewed as
dealing with domestic regulation that is predominantly of a
qualitative nature. 219 Yet, prior to U.S.-Gambling, litigation under
GATS had not addressed the relationship between the two Articles,
which left the precise scope of members' rights and obligations with
regard to these two distinct provisions uncertain. The Panel in U.S.Gambling resolved some of this uncertainty when it explained the
distinction between Article VI and Article XVI:
Measures that constitute market access limitations within the meaning
of Article XVI and which, unless scheduled must be eliminated, are to
be distinguished from measures that impose qualification requirements
and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements, which
can be maintained so long as they do not constitute "unnecessary
barriers to trade in services", pursuant to the criteria contained in
Article VI:5 or pursuant to the criteria to be developed by the Council
220
for Trade in Services pursuant to Article VI:4.

Significantly, the Panel ruled that the provisions in paragraphs 4 and
5 of Article VI were in fact "mutually exclusive" of the provisions in
Article XVI. 22 1 Thus, domestic regulation permitted under

219.
See Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54 (discussing the quantitative
nature of Article XVI and the qualitative nature of Article VI).
220.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.303.
221.
Id. 6.305. The Panel also went on to state:
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paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI is deemed to be consistent with a
member's commitments under Article XVI, and by implication, Article
XVII. 222 Given that the legal effect of Article VI on domestic
regulatory authority is significantly different from the legal effects of
Articles XVI (market access) and XVII (national treatment), this
finding of mutual exclusiveness between Article XVI and paragraphs
4 and 5 of Article VI is important:
Measures restricting market access and national treatment are
prohibited, unless scheduled, in sectors where specific commitments
have been undertaken, whereas they can be maintained in sectors
which are not committed. The right to maintain domestic regulatory
measures is however specifically recognized and will be subject to the
disciplines to be developed under Article VI:4 with the aim of
minimizing their negative impact on trade. These measures cannot be
entered as limitations in a Member's schedule. 223

This distinct difference between Articles XVI and XVII, on the one
hand, and paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI, on the other, was made

Qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing
requirements covered by the disciplines of Article VI:4 and VI:5 could not be
evidence that a member is providing less favorable treatment than that
provided in its schedule contrary to Article XVI, even when "None" has been
inscribed in the market access column of a member's schedule.
Id.

6.306
222.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI are also viewed as dealing with
regulations that do not, in principle, discriminate on the basis of the origin of the
service or service supplier (for example, a licensing requirement for all mode 3
insurance brokers that applies to insurance intermediaries irrespective of the
nationality of the broker). Thus, the presumption is that regulations permitted under
paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI are consistent with the national treatment obligation
(Article XVII). Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54, 10. The Panel, in defining the
parameters of Article XVI and its relationship to Article VI, also referred to the
discussion contained in the Scheduling Guidelines of the relationship between
discriminatory measures falling within the scope of Article XVII and nondiscriminatory measures falling within the scope of Article VI:4. Panel Report, supra
note 1,
6.307. It noted that the Scheduling Guidelines contained a discussion on
Articles XVI and XVII in the context of the Accountancy Disciplines under Article VI:4
(under Attachment 4 of the Scheduling Guidelines) and stated that "[i]t was observed
that the new disciplines developed under Article VI:4 must not overlap with other
provisions already existing in the GATS, including Articles XVI and XVII as this would
create legal uncertainty." Id. 6.308. The Panel also noted that the Guidelines stated:
[D]isciplines to be developed under Article VI:4 cover domestic regulatory
measures which are not regarded as market access limitations as such, and
which do not in principle discriminate against foreign suppliers. They are
therefore not subject to scheduling under Articles XVI and XVII.
Id. The Panel did note, however, that Article XVIII could on the other hand include
measures falling within the scope of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI. Id. 6.309.
223.
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note 40, 13; see also Pauwelyn,
supra note 12, at 157 ("[T]he scope of application of Article XVI and the Accountancy
Disciplines is mutually exclusive in the sense that if a measure is covered by Article
XVI it cannot be covered also by the Accountancy Disciplines.").
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explicit in U.S.-Gambling and sheds light on understanding the
fundamental nature of members' obligations assumed under Articles
XVI and VI of GATS. In contrast to the specific obligations of GATS,
the inherent purpose of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI is not to
limit the regulatory rights of members, but to ensure (through the
articulation of disciplines) that members' domestic regulations
relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical
standards, and licensing requirements are maintained in compliance
with the principles of Article VI:4.2 24 The Panel affirmed that while
members "undertak[ing] a full market access or a full national
treatment commitment . . . must not apply any measure that would

be inconsistent with the provisions of those articles," 225 members
nevertheless "maintain the sovereign right to regulate within the
''226
parameters of Article VI of the GATS.
In U.S.-Gambling, the parties disputed whether the U.S. federal
laws prohibiting online gambling and betting services were
themselves prohibited as a market access limitation under GATS
because they were a limitation on the number of service suppliers and
service operations under Article XVI:2(a) and (c). 227 The United
States argued that the federal laws prohibiting both domestic and
foreign online gambling and betting services were not "ipso facto
inconsistent with Article XVI,' 2 2 8 and that its restriction on online
gambling and betting services referred to "the character of the
activity involved" rather than "the number of service suppliers or the
total number of service operations or total quantity of service
output. '229 It identified correctly that the prohibition on market
access was not a general prohibition of measures that impede market
access, but a limited one restricting the use of only a defined set of
2 30
market access restrictions that were listed in Article XVI:2.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

GATS, supra note 4, art. VI:4.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 7 6.311.
Id.
6.316.
Id. 77 6.256-6.257.
Id. 6.257.
Id.
Id. 3.126. In its arguments before the Panel, the United States stated:

Antigua asserts that the United States has made a full commitment applicable
to gambling services, and that the United States "totally impedes cross-border
market access" and therefore violates Article XVI:1 of the GATS.
This
argument appears to rest on the mistaken assumption that the existence of a
commitment in the market access column of a member's schedule implies a
generalized commitment not to impede "market access." In fact, Article XVI
does not enshrine a general rule prohibiting measures that impede "market
access" in whole or part. Instead, it prohibits only those measures falling
within the specific categories listed in Article XVI:2. While Article XVI:1
makes clear that the Article addresses market access, it is the closed list in
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The critical question in U.S.-Gambling was whether the U.S.
prohibition, which had the effect of a quota even if not expressed in
the form of a numerical ceiling, fell within the "form requirements" of
paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article XVI:2, 23 1 or whether, as the United
States argued, it was a qualitative regulation prohibiting the
character of certain services and not a prohibition on the number of
service suppliers or service operations. 23 2 The case raised the
interpretative issue of whether the prohibition in Article XVI is
confined to market access limitations that take the quantitative forms
listed in Article XVI:2 or whether it extends to measures that have
equivalent quantitative effects. The answer to this question focuses
on the fundamental difference between measures prohibited as
market access limitations under GATS, and those permitted as
domestic regulations subject only to the requirements of paragraphs 4
23 3
and 5 of Article VI.
Although the Panel in U.S.-Gambling affirmed that Article
XVI:2(a) and (c) exhaustively defined the types of market access
restrictions that were prohibited (unless scheduled) under the market
access obligation, 234 it ruled that the U.S. prohibition was a
quantitative restriction that limited the number of service suppliers
to zero ("zero quota"), and that a "zero quota" was a "numerical quota"
within the meaning and scope of Article XVI:2(a) and (c). 235 The
Panel also ruled that not only was a prohibition that applies only on
the supply of some services falling within the scope of a scheduled
sector a limitation on market access, 236 but that a limitation on one or
more means of delivery within a mode of supply was also a market
access limitation within the scope of Article XVI:2. 237 Significantly,

Article XVI:2 that defines the substance of the obligation that Article XVI
imposes.

Id.
231.
Id.
6.326.
232.
Id.
6.328.
233.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 248.
234.
Panel Report, supra note 1,
6.298, 6.318, 6.325.
235.
Id.
6.330-6.332, 6.347.
236.
Id.
6.335, 6.352.
237.
Id.
6.338, 6.355. In the Panel's view, in the context of mode 1,
prohibiting "one, several or all means of delivery" limited the opportunities for foreign
suppliers using those means of delivery to gain access to foreign markets. Id.
6.338.
Accordingly, the U.S. prohibition on online gambling and betting services was "a
limitation on the number of service suppliers in the form of numerical quotas within
the meaning of Article XVI:2(a) because it totally prevents the use by service suppliers
of one, several or all means of delivery that are included in mode 1." Id. This latter
aspect of the Panel ruling is important to cross-border services; it means that "a GATS
mode 1 commitment automatically secures market access for 'like services'
independently of the delivery technology." Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 28, at 334.
The Panel noted that "[i]f a member desires to exclude market access with respect to
the supply of a service through one, several, or all means of delivery included in mode
1, it should do so explicitly in its schedule." Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.286.
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as these latter two findings were not disputed in appellate
238
proceedings, they were also upheld by the Appellate Body.
Although at first glance it appeared that the Panel and the
Appellate Body in U.S.-Gambling had paved the way for complaining
parties to challenge domestic regulation on the basis of the
quantitative effects of a regulation2 39 and not on its explicit
quantitative form,2 40 it is also true that
this confusion of a qualitative measure with a quantitative effect and a
total prohibition does not emanate from the Panel nor from the
Appellate Body. Rather both organs of the DSB understood the US
measures as limitations amounting to a zero quota (not a qualitative
regulation!) and ruled that thus these measures are incompatible with
241
specific commitments under GATS Article XVI.

Both the Panel and Appellate Body decisions emphasize the
conceptual limitations of the market access obligation and the
implications of overstepping the boundaries of Articles XVI and VI of
GATS. 242 The U.S. prohibition was determined to be a violation of
Article XVI:2 not because it simply had the effect of a quota, but
because it was deemed to be primarily quantitative in nature: by
limiting the number of services and service suppliers to zero, it served
as a numerical quota prohibited by Article XVI:2. 243 Set against the
factual background of the dispute,2 44 the Appellate Body's emphasis
245
on the "quantitative or numerical nature" of the measure at issue
focused on unraveling the fundamental essence or inherent
characteristics of a challenged measure as quantitative or numerical
within the meaning of the four categories of quantitative restrictions
prohibited by Article XVI:2. Accordingly, under the interpretation of

238.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, T 239.
239.
See Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 163-64 (discussing the opinions of the
Panel and the Appellate Body in U.S.-Gambling).
240.
As correctly pointed out by many commentators, an interpretation of the
market access obligation on such expansive terms would clearly broaden the scope of
the market access obligation in a manner that would not only go beyond the intention
of its framers but also prove to be counterproductive to services negotiations.
Krajewski, supra note 26, at 437; Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 133.
241.
Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 28, at 342.
242.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, T 222-224. The Appellate Body
expressly rejected importing an "effects" doctrine into the interpretation of Article
XVI:2, stating: "[tihis is not to say that the words 'in the form of [in Article XVI:2(a)]
should be ignored or replaced by the words 'that have the effect of.' Yet at the same
time they cannot be read in isolation." Id. T 232.
243.
Id. IT 225-227.
244.
Particularly, the Appellate Body focused on whether the United States had
made a full market access commitment in relation to a particular mode of supply under
Article XVI on the one hand, and on the other hand, had in place domestic laws
prohibiting online gambling that simultaneously foreclosed that entire mode of supply
by prohibiting "one, several or all means of delivery" included therein. Id.
223.
245.
Id. T 232.
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U.S.-Gambling, requirements as to "form" under Article XVI:2 would
be viewed more as parameters within which a measure is judged to be
'246
a quantitative restriction, rather than as a "rigid formula.
2
47
However, the ambiguity of the relevant texts,
and a certain lack of
clarity in the reasoning of the dispute settlement panels, 248 generates
a "feeling from the report that some coherent expression regarding
the legal structure of the GATS in regard to the domestic regulatory
space is missing. ' 249 The approach advocated by the Appellate Body
and its analytical dependence on the attributes of the terms "in the
form of' and "numerical" in Articles XVI:2(a) and (c), 250 also place too
much emphasis on the particular semantics that will be employed by
dispute settlement panels to determine non-discriminatory measures
as quantitative in nature (and thus falling within the scope of the
prohibition in Article XVI) as opposed to being qualitative (and thus
within the permitted scope of domestic regulation under Article
VI).251 However, it is doubtful that the criteria to distinguish
between the scope of Articles XVI and VI can be established through
dispute resolution in order to offer the necessary predictability and
certainty for the smooth conduct of trade in services under GATS.
Despite the Panel's statements on the mutual exclusiveness of Article
XVI and VI:4, critics of U.S.-Gambling have also observed that "[t]he
only clear message to negotiators and policy makers . . . is that the
prohibition on the supply of a service in a (sub)-sector needs to be
scheduled as an explicit limitation, where market access
'2 52
commitments have been made or are about to be made.

246.
Id. 231.
247.
See, for example, the arguments of the European Communities and Japan
as third parties during appellate proceedings in U.S.-Gambling. The European
Communities (while agreeing with the Panel that Article XVI:2, paragraphs (a) and (c)
covered measures not expressly cast in the form of numerical ceilings) argued that the
relevant provisions covered measures "affecting" trade in services. Id.
101. Thus, in
the European Communities' view, prohibitions on the consumption of services,
although directed at consumers, were also restrictions on the activities of suppliers and
thus covered by Article XVI:2(a) and (c). Id. Japan, on the other hand, argued that
measures having the effect, if not the form of a quota, may be prohibited under Article
XVI:2(a) and (c), but that measures imposed on service consumers rather than service
suppliers or service operations or output were not so covered. Id.
107.
248.
Comment from the Advisory Board, supra note 21, at 233-34.
249.
Id. at 232; see also Ortino, supra note 33, at 137 ( "It seems quite odd that
in order to understand the nature and function of Article XVI (for the first time before
the Appellate Body), no consideration is given to the Agreement's other general
disciplines, in particular Articles VI and XVII.").
250.
Ortino, supra note 33, at 133, 135.
251.
Id. at 135.
252.
Krajewski, supra note 26, at 437; cf Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 28, at
342-43 (noting that "[hiad the US-rather than banning remote supply altogetherestablished certain non-discriminatroy security, and/or qualification-related domestic
regulations for online gambling service providers, it is unlikely that these measures
would have been found to be incompatible with commitments under GATS Article
XVI.").
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At the same time, following U.S.-Gambling, it is not obvious that
Article XVI:2 will be defined broadly in the future to cover nondiscriminatory measures with quantitative effects. 253 Rather than
"assume that the coverage of Article XVI:2 extends to measures
having the same effect as those explicitly mentioned," 254 the better
approach is for members to determine the conceptual boundaries of
Article VI:4 by crafting disciplines on domestic regulation. As noted
by the Appellate Body, the issue in U.S.-Gambling was not "whether
Article XVI covered quantitative measures," 255 but "how to know
where the line should be drawn between quantitative and qualitative
measures." 256 Undoubtedly, clarifying the legal scope of Article VI:4
would resolve much of the current uncertainty that prevails in
determining which measures ought to be correctly treated as
quantitative limitations prohibited under Article XVI versus domestic
regulations subject only to the disciplines of Article VI:4.
B. The Role of Disciplines under Article VI:4 and the Accountancy
Disciplines
Given the obvious weakness of Article VI:5, 25 7 the reality is that
the substantive aspects of trade-restrictive domestic regulatory

Krajewski, supra note 26, at 437.
253.
Id.
254.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 248.
255.
256.
Id.
Article VI:5, notwithstanding the various caveats that apply, is dependent
257.
on the interpretation given to the broadly articulated principles under Article VI:4. See
Trachtman, supranote 93, at 67. As emphasized previously, the Article VI:4 principles
are not in themselves a basis for constructing a specific obligation. See Working Party
8, SIWPDR/W/27 (Dec. 2,
on Domestic Regulation, "'Necessity Tests" in the WTO,
2003) [hereinafter "Necessity Tests" in the WTOI. Clearly, the principles articulated
under Article VI:4 are designed only to inform the rule-making process of Article VI:4.
Therefore, it is uncertain how domestic laws that are inconsistent with the Article VI:4
criteria would be judged in terms of dispute settlement under Article VI:5. See
Trachtman, supra note 93, at 68 (analyzing the connotations of the necessity test
Article VI:5 also requires demonstration of
incorporated under Article VI:4(b)).
"nullification and impairment" before a failure to comply with the Article VI:4
principles can be considered in dispute settlement body proceedings. This requirement
serves to further weaken the disciplinary impact of Article VI:4 on restrictive
11. Since nonDisciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note 40,
regulations.
violation nullification and impairment is an exceptional remedy, a complaining
member must generally show that it had "legitimate expectations" of improved market
access opportunities arising out of the relevant concession to prevail. Trachtman,
supra note 93, at 67. In Japan-Film,the leading case on non-violation nullification
and impairment under the WTO system, the Panel observed that the parties
[h]ave confirmed that the non-violation nullification or impairment remedy
should be approached with caution and treated as an exceptional concept. The
reason for this caution is straightforward. Members negotiate the rules that
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measures can only be properly and legally addressed under the
mandate of Article VI:4. As Article VI:4 is only a preliminary
provision that awaits the articulation of disciplines to be of any real
value, the negotiation of such disciplines becomes vitally important.
Wheni adopted, such disciplines on domestic regulation will serve to
further define the scope of members' regulatory autonomy under
GATS by ensuring consistent domestic regulation that meets the
requirements of Article VI:4. Development of such disciplines will
also illuminate the scope of the market access obligation and remove
prevailing uncertainties about the interplay between Articles XVI,
XVII, and VI in members' negotiations to liberalize services under
GATS.
Although Article VI:4 does not directly impose a "necessity test"
in relation to such regulatory measures, 258 the disciplines on domestic
regulation to be developed aim to ensure that regulatory measures
relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical
standards, and licensing requirements adopted by members do not
constitute "unnecessary" barriers to trade. 259 In WTO jurisprudence,
"necessity" generally means that a measure imposed by a member
must be the least trade-restrictive option available to achieve a

they agree to follow and only exceptionally would accept to be challenged for
actions not in contravention of those rules.
Panel Report, Japan-MeasuresAffecting Consumer PhotographicFilm and Paper,
10.36, WT/DS44R (Apr. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Japan-Film]; see also GATS, supra
note 4, art. XXIII:3 (noting that nullfication or impairment of any benefit which could
be reasonably expected to accrue to a member under a specific commitment can be
alleged in the "[absence of a] conflict with the provisions of [GATS].") In Japan-Film,
the Panel noted that "in all but one of the past GATT cases dealing with Article
XXIII:1(b) claims the claimed benefit has been that of legitimate expectations of
improved market access opportunities arising out the relevant tariff concessions."
Japan Film, supra, 10.61.
258.
See GATS, supra note 4, art. VI:4 (attempting to ensure that "qualification
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not
constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services"); see also Disciplines on Domestic
Regulation, supra note 40,
2-3 (noting that although the first draft of the GATS
contained a binding discipline on domestic regulation (see Draft Multilateral
Framework for Trade in Services, art. VII, MTN.GNS/35, July 23, 1990 (1990)), Article
VI:4 of the final draft contained only a mandate for the development of disciplines
rather than a binding rule:
[T]he simple transformation of the principles listed in VI:4 into binding rules
would in itself bring domestic regulation within the GATS legal framework.
Such a general rule, however would probably have been insufficient to provide
guidance for the settlement of disagreements or disputes about particular
measures; the purpose of developing these general principles into "disciplines"
could be seen as being to give them enough specificity to make them
operationally useful.
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supranote 40, TT 2-3).
259.
See, e.g., "Necessity Tests" in the WTO, supra note 257.
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legitimate regulatory goal. 260 Yet, given that Article VI is designed to
protect members' rights to regulate services, incorporating a
requirement under Article VI that domestic regulation be the "least
trade restrictive" may unduly restrict the choice of regulatory tools
available to achieve members' legitimate policy objectives. 26 1 The
European Communities, for example, emphasize the concept of
proportionality in assessing the trade restrictiveness of regulations
falling under the scope of Paragraph 4 of Article VI:
A measure should be considered not more trade restrictive/not more
burdensome than necessary if it is not disproportionate to the objectives
pursued. This means that the degree of trade-restrictiveness meeting
the requirement of necessity will depend on, and be assessed against,
the specific objective[s] pursued, while the validity, or rationale, of the
policy objective[s] must not be assessed. As to the wording of a
definition of necessity, the European Communities and their Member
States view "not more burdensome than necessary" and "not more trade
restrictive than necessary" as meaning essentially the same, and are
262
preferred over the concept of "least trade restrictive".

This indicates that more discussion is needed on the definition, scope,
and criteria of the necessity standard to be incorporated under any
More importantly,
generally applicable Article VI:4 disciplines.
fundamental clarification of the degree of regulatory flexibility and
regulatory choice permitted under Article VI:4 is required. It is
noteworthy that the only disciplines that have so far been developed
under the Article VI:4 mandate-the Disciplines on Domestic
Regulation in the Accountancy Sector (Accountancy Disciplines,
applicable only to the accountancy services sector) 2 3-articulate a
binding necessity test that requires non-discriminatory and nonquantitative measures to be "not more trade restrictive than
The necessity test adopted in the Accountancy
necessary." 264

19-21 (noting
See Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note 40,
260.
that this meaning of necessity is found chiefly in Article XX of GATT, Article XIV of
GATS and to some extent in the relevant provisions of the Agreements on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) (e.g., Article 2.2) and Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) (e.g. Article 2.2)).
Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Communication from the European
261.
16-17, S/WPDRIW/14 (May 1, 2001)
Communities and their Member States,
[hereinafter Communication from the European Communities] .
17.
Id.
262.
Accountancy Sector Disciplines,supra note 121, 2.
263.
Id. The Disciplines state that:
264.
Members shall ensure that measures not subject to scheduling under Articles
XVI or XVII of the GATS, relating to licensing requirements and procedures,
technical standards and qualification requirements and procedures are not
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating
unnecessary barriers to trade in accountancy services. For this purpose,
Members shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective. Legitimate objectives are, inter alia,
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Disciplines provides a non-exhaustive list of objectives that can be
used by members to justify the necessity of domestic regulation.
These objectives include, inter alia, the protection of consumers,
ensuring the quality of the service and professional competence, and
2 65
maintaining the integrity of the profession.
As sector-specific disciplines, the Accountancy Disciplines apply
only to members that have entered specific commitments on
accountancy services in their Schedules. 266 The Disciplines make
clear that they do not address measures that should be scheduled
under the market access (Article XVI) or national treatment (Article
2 67
XVII) obligations of GATS.
Under the Accountancy Disciplines, members are subject to
disciplines relating to transparency that include an obligation to
inform other Members "upon request, of the rationale behind
domestic regulatory measures in the accountancy sector in relation to
legitimate objectives referred to in paragraph 2 [of the Accountancy
Disciplines]. '' 268 A member must also "endeavor" to provide the
opportunity for other members to comment when that member
proposes new measures that have a significant impact on
accountancy services. 269 The Accountancy Disciplines also build on
the general transparency obligations contained in Articles III and IV
of GATS, obliging members to provide detailed information on
270
licensing requirements and procedures and technical standards.

the protection of consumers (which includes all users of accounting services and
the public generally), the quality of the service, professional competence, and
the integrity of the profession.
Id. The necessity test articulated in the Accountancy Disciplines cannot be used to
justify a violation of any of the substantive obligations of GATS. Likewise, a necessity
test articulated under the disciplines of Article VI:4 cannot be used to justify violation
of any of the substantive obligations of GATS, such as the specific commitments under
Articles XVI and XVII. See Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note 40, 9 22
(noting that the necessity test under Article VI:4 differs from the necessity test under
the general exceptions to GATS; the latter justifies a violation of substantive GATS
obligations). As Article VI:4 is an obligation provision as opposed to an exception
provision (for example, Article XIV of GATS), the initial burden of proof in relation to
the necessity test under Article VI:4 also rests on the complaining party. "Necessity
Tests" in the WTO, supra note 257, T 7.
265.
Accountancy Sector Disciplines, supra note 121, 2.
266.
Council for Trade in Servs., Decision on Disciplines Relating to the
Accountancy Sector, 1 1, S/L/63 (Dec. 15, 1998) [hereinafter Accountancy Sector
Decision]; GATS, supra note 4, art.VI:4; see also Disciplines on Domestic Regulation,
supra note 40, 9 15. However, as there is nothing in the text of Article VI:4 that limits
the application of disciplines to sectors subject to specific commitments, the choice
made by the Working Party on Professional Services does not determine the scope of
application of the disciplines to be developed under Article VI:4 of GATS. Id.
267.
Accountancy Sector Disciplines, supranote 121, 1.
268.
Id. 5.
269.
Id. 6.
270.
Id. TT 4-26.
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Further, the disciplines relating to licensing requirements and
In
procedures incorporate specific transparency obligations. 27 1
addition to disciplines on transparency, the Accountancy Disciplines
impose necessity requirements in relation to specific types of
regulations. 272 For instance, where residency requirements not
subject to scheduling under Article XVII exist, the disciplines require
members to consider whether less trade-restrictive means could be
employed to achieve the purposes for which the requirements were
adopted. 273 Further, the disciplines require that licensing procedures
shall be objective and should not constitute a restriction on the supply
of a service in and of themselves.2 74 The disciplines on licensing
procedures also set recommendations on time limits for approval of
licensing applications and require members to provide reasons for
rejection. 275 The concept of equivalency of foreign qualifications is
reflected in the disciplines on qualification requirements, although
the obligation itself is a limited one that only requires members to
ensure that their competent authorities take "account" of
qualifications obtained abroad on the basis of equivalency of
education, experience, examination requirements, or a combination
thereof.276 Also, members are obliged to apply technical standards
only to fulfill legitimate objectives.2 7 7 Internationally recognized
standards applied by a member shall be taken into account when
test
determining the conformity of such standards to the necessity
278
imposed under Paragraph 2 of the Accountancy Disciplines.

8 (obliging members to ensure that substantive licensing
E.g., id.
271.
requirements shall be pre-established, publicly available, and objective).
9, 15 (relating to licensing requirements and procedures espectively).
272.
Id.

273.

Id.

9.

274.
Id. 14.
Id.
16-17.
275.
19. In line with the limited obligation with regard to recognition of
276.
Id.
education, experience, licensing, or qualifications obtained abroad under Article VII of
GATS, the Accountancy Disciplines also place no obligation on members to extend
mutual recognition to qualifications or education obtained in each others territory or to
enter into mutual recognition agreements. Id. Thus, the obligation in paragraph 19 of
the Accountancy Disciplines "only adds a procedural requirement and leaves the
equivalence-awarding decision to the member." Wouters & Coppens, supra note 3, at
49.

277.

E.g., Accountancy Sector Disciplines, supra note 121,

25 (requiring

domestic accounting standards for preparing and auditing financial statements be
related to the objective of improving the quality of financial reporting).
Id.
26. The discipline follows Article VI:5(b) of GATS in that it accords
278.
the same but limited level of recognition to international standards. Thus, in contrast
to the GATT Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), "GATS does not require Members to 'use'
international standards or to 'base' their regulations on international standards. It
also does not provide for a presumption in favor of international standards as do the
TBT and SPS." Wouters & Coppens, supra note 3, at 50.
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There has been some movement towards developing a set of
generally applicable horizontal disciplines under Article VI:4, but
substantial work remains to be done.2 7 9 Further, it is not clear
whether the current work is also to be used in developing sectorspecific disciplines. A report submitted to the Council for Trade in
Services on the development of the disciplines just weeks prior to the
Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting in 2005 articulates a detailed list of
elements for negotiation under Article VI:4 (although described as
only "illustrative").280 Though general in nature, these so-called
elements provide invaluable guidance for the development of either
general or sector-specific disciplines under Article VI:4. They list
possible elements that should be considered for inclusion for the
following: licensing requirements, licensing procedures, qualification
procedures, technical standards, transparency, objectives, scope,
21
application, definition, and development considerations. s
In terms of a timeframe, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration
calls for the development of Article VI:4 disciplines before the end of
the Doha Round of negotiations. 282 However, as the development of
the Accountancy Disciplines has shown, whether such disciplines will
be ready for adoption before the end of the Doha Round, and the
degree to which they will offer precise binding obligations for WTO
members, is largely dependent on the political will of the WTO
membership as a whole. Significantly, the Accountancy Disciplines
themselves have only the status of a decision of the Council for Trade
in Services until integrated into GATS by members, which is likely to
occur at the conclusion of the current round of negotiations. 283 Until
these Disciplines are "integrated," members are obliged only "to the
fullest extent consistent with their existing legislation, [to] not take
28s4
measures which would be inconsistent with these disciplines.

279.
See Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report of the Chairman of the
Working Party on Domestic Regulation to the Special Session of the Council for Trade
in Services, at 3, JOB(05)/280 (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Report of the Chairman]
(noting that although a list of possible elements for any disciplines under Article VI:4
has been compiled on the basis of proposals presented by Members and comments
thereon, "there is no presumption that consensus has been reached on its elements.").
280.
Id. (stating that while this list is merely illustrative, it does not indicate
consensus nor can it predict the final negotiated outcome of the rules under Article
VI:4). But cf. Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra note 98, Annex C,
5
(indicating that the Declaration, however, does make reference to the list as proposals
for consideration in developing the Article VI:4 disciplines).
281.
Report of the Chairman, supra note 279, attachment 1.
282.
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra note 98, Annex C, 5. Although
there is uncertainty with regard to the date of completion of the round itself, it is
worthwhile to note that a failure to complete the current round will only delay
negotiations and not affect the original mandate to develop the disciplines under
Article VI:4. See infra note 388.
283.
Accountancy Sector Decision, supra note 266, 2.
284.
Id.
3. Accordingly, the Accountancy Disciplines are not binding until
fully integrated into GATS by the WTO membership.
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C. Article XLV Shields Domestic Regulation that Restricts
Liberalization
U.S.-Gambling confirms the overriding nature of Article XIV,
which operates as an absolute defense to members that might
otherwise be found to be in violation of their commitments and
obligations under GATS.28 5 In the first ever analysis of the general
exceptions of GATS, the Appellate Body in U.S.-Gambling had little
problem in finding that the U.S. regulations (with the single
exception of the IHA) satisfied the conditions of Article XIV. 28 6 This
confirms the significant flexibility members have under the policy
exceptions of Article XIV.
A member asserting the Article XIV defense (in U.S.-Gambling,
this was the United States) must satisfy a two-part test. First, the
member must demonstrate that the challenged measure meets the
requirements of the first tier of the Article XIV analysis-the
"necessity test. '28 7 If the requirements of the necessity test are
satisfied, the measure is considered as "provisionally justified" under
Article XIV.2 88 Next, a member asserting the Article XIV defense
must demonstrate that the challenged measure satisfies the second
tier of the test, the requirements of the chapeau, in order to
28 9
successfully defend a measure as an exception under GATS.
1.

The First Tier of the Article XIV Analysis

In assessing the first tier of the United States' defense, the Panel
articulated an objective standard of necessity that involves weighing
and balancing various factors that determine whether a measure is
"necessary" within the meaning of Article XIV. 290 This process
requires determining "whether a WTO-consistent alternative
measure which the member concerned could 'reasonably be expected
to employ' is available or whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is

285.
See Panel Report, supra note 1, T 6.450 (stating that the burden of proof is
on the member attempting to justify a measure under the Art. XIV defense. A member
claiming the defense must justify both the necessity of a measure and satisfy the
requirements of the chapeau in order to justify the maintenance of a GATS
inconsistent measure.).
286.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, T 371.
287.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 7 6.449.
288.
Id.
289.
Id.
290.
See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, TT 304-305 (confirming that "the
standard of 'necessity' provided for in the general exceptions provision is an objective
standard.").
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The factors that are "weighed and
balanced" in order to determine necessity of a particular measure are:
(a) the importance of interests or values that the challenged
measure is intended to protect;
(b) the extent to which the challenged measure contributes to
the realization of the end pursued by that measure; and
(c) the trade impact of the challenged measure. In applying this
last requirement, the existence of reasonably available WTOconsistent alternative measures must also be taken into
292
consideration.
The Panel had little trouble establishing that the U.S. measures
satisfied the first two elements of the necessity test.29 3 However, it
ran into difficulties in determining the trade impact of the challenged
measure. 294 In the Appellate Body's words, the two crucial factors to
consider, and upon which determination of necessity turns, are: "the
contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by
it" and "the restrictive impact of the measure on international
commerce." 295 Further,
[a] comparison between the challenged measure and possible
alternatives should then be undertaken and the results of such
comparison should be considered in the light of the importance of the
interests at issue. It is on the basis of this "weighing and balancing"
and comparison of measures, taking into account the interests or values
at stake, that a panel determines whether a measure is "necessary" or
alternatively, whether another, WTO consistent measure is "reasonably
296
available".

The Panel's analysis of the necessity of the measures imposed an
obligation on the United States to first explore and exhaust all
reasonably available WTO-consistent alternatives.
Had this
obligation been upheld, it would have severely curtailed members'
regulatory flexibility under Article XIV and would have constituted a
serious erosion of the sovereign autonomy of member states.
However, the Appellate Body, by overturning this aspect of the

291.
Id.
305 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting
Imports of Freshly Chilled and Frozen Beef, 166, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R
(Jan 10, 2001) [hereinafter Korea-Bee]).
292.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.477 (citing Korea-Beef, supra note 291,
162-163, 166).
293.
See id. 6.533 (noting that the "Wire Act, the Travel Act ... and the Illegal
Gambling Business Act . . . protect very important societal interests in the United
States," and that these Acts, "contribute to the realization of the ends pursued by those
laws in the United States").
294.
See id.
6.564 (noting that while the interests protected are "important,"
the measures "have a significant impact on trade and the United States has not
explored and exhausted WTO-consistent alternatives .
295.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 306.
296.
Id. 307.
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Panel's necessity analysis, rejected a requirement that a member
explore and exhaust all reasonably available WTO compatible
alternatives before imposing a WTO inconsistent measure, 297 thus
restoring the scope of members' sovereign autonomy under Article
XIV. As the Appellate Body emphatically stated:
An alternative measure may be found not to be "reasonably available,"
however, where it is merely theoretical in nature, for instance, where
the responding Member is not capable of taking it, or where the
measure imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive
costs or substantial technical difficulties. Moreover, a "reasonably
available" alternative measure must be a measure that would preserve
for the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of
protection with respect to the objectives pursued under paragraph (a) of
298
Article XIV".

The evidentiary burden on the defending member is also a relevant
factor in the necessity analysis. In U.S.-Gambling, the Appellate
Body was careful to point out that although the responding party
must make a prima facie case that the measure in question is
necessary, it did not have to show there were no reasonably available
alternatives to achieving its objective. 29 9 The Appellate Body also
emphatically stated that in discharging its burden of proof under
Article XIV, the responding party did not have to "identify the
universe of less trade restrictive alternative measures and then show
that none of these measures achieved the desired objectives. The
WTO agreements do not contemplate such an impracticable and
'30 0
indeed, often impossible burden.
However, if the complaining party raises a WTO-consistent
alternative measure, the responding party must demonstrate the
necessity of its own measure, mainly by demonstrating that the
alternative measure is not one which is reasonably available. 30 1 In
the Panel proceedings, Antigua did not submit evidence that there
were any alternative measures that the United States could have
considered. 30 2 In the Appellate Body's opinion, merely offering to
engage in consultations with the United States was not an
alternative 30 measure
because it was a "process" as opposed to a
"measure." 3 The Appellate Body found the Panel's analysis of the
necessity requirements of the first tier of Article XIV flawed because
it did not focus on an alternative measure that was reasonably
available to the United States to achieve the stated objective regarding

297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

9 315, 317-318.
308.
309.
309.

301.

Id.

311.

302.
303.

Id.
Id.

326.
317.
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the protection of public morals or the maintenance of public order.
Engaging in consultations with Antigua with a view to arriving at a
negotiated settlement that achieves the same objective as the
challenged United States' measures was not an appropriate alternative
for the Panel to consider because consultations are by definition a
process, the results of which are uncertain and therefore not capable of
3 04
comparison with the measures at issue in this case.

In its necessity analysis, the Appellate Body also addressed the
relevance of the specific commitments that the United States had
made in its Schedule relating to cross-border trade of gambling and
betting services. It ruled that the existence of specific commitments
by a member did not affect the "necessity" of a measure in terms of
the protection of public morals or the maintenance of public order: 30 5
[B]ut for the United States' alleged refusal to accept Antigua's
invitation to negotiate, the Panel would have found that the United
States had made its primafacie case that the Wire Act, the Travel Act,
and the IGBA [Illegal Gambling Business Act] are "necessary" within
30 6
the meaning of Article XIV(a).

As Antigua failed to argue the existence of an alternative measure to
that of the U.S. laws challenged in the dispute, the Appellate Body
held that the United States had succeeded in making a prima facie
case of necessity and had provisionally justified its measures under
30 7
the first tier of the Article XIV analysis.
2.

The Second Tier of the Article XIV Analysis

The Appellate Body's analysis of the second tier reveals that a strict
standard applies in determining whether a measure is applied in a
manner that contravenes the requirements of the chapeau of Article
XJV.3 08 The chapeau is significant to the Article XIV analysis
because,

304. Id. Accordingly, it went on to reverse the Panel's finding that the United
States had failed to provisionally justify its measures as necessary under Article
XIV(a). Id. 321.
305.
Id. 318.
306.
Id.
325.
307.
Id. 1 326. As the Panel's findings in respect of Article XIV(c) also rested on
the same basis, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel findings on Article XIV(c) on the
same grounds. Id.
336. However, as the Appellate Body had already found the three
U.S. federal laws to be necessary under the Article X1V(a) analysis, it did not find it
important to determine whether those measures were also provisionally justified under
Article XIV(c). Id.
337.
308. The burden of demonstrating that a measure, provisionally justified as
"necessary," also meets the requirements of the chapeau rests on the party evoking the
Article XIV exception. See Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.573 (quoting Appellate Body
Report, United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 22,
WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter US-Gasoline]).
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[b]y requiring that the measure be applied in a manner that does not
constitute "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable discrimination" or is a "disguised
restriction on trade in services," the chapeau serves to ensure that
Members' rights to avail themselves of exceptions are exercised
reasonably, so as not to frustrate the rights accorded to other Members
3 09
by the substantive rules of GATS.

Under the requirements of the chapeau, the emphasis is on the
application of the challenged measure,3 10 as opposed to its
substantive content, because the purpose of the chapeau is to prevent
abuse of the Article XIV exceptions. 311 This means that a measure
must not be applied in a manner that constitutes (a) arbitrary
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, (b)
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions
312
prevail, or (c) a disguised restriction on international trade.
Jurisprudence under the analogous provisions of Article XX of
GATT provides guidance on the meaning of the terms "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions
prevail" and "disguised restriction on international trade. '313 First, it
is recognized that the two terms are not mutually exclusive; they

309.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,
339 (citing US-Gasoline, supra
note 308, at 20-21).
310.
Id. 339.
311.
Panel Report, supra note 1,
6.574 (ruling under its analysis of the
chapeau of Article XX, that:
The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions of Article
XX may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be so applied as
to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under the
substantive rules of the General Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be
abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling within the particular
exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties
of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other parties
concerned.
(quoting US-Gasoline,supra note 308, at 22)).
312.
See GATS, supra note 4, art. XIV (setting forth the chapeau).
313.
See Panel Report, supra note 1, 99 6.578-6.580 (noting that three elements
must exist in order for a measure to be applied in a manner that would constitute
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions
prevail" (quoting Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionsof Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, at 2755, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter
US-Shrimp]). First, the application of the measure must result in discrimination (the
nature of which is different from the non-discriminatory principle prevalent in the
MFN and national treatment obligations of GATT). Id. Second, the discrimination has
to be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character. Third, it must occur between countries
where like conditions prevail. Id.
Accordingly, such discrimination could occur
between different exporting members or between the exporting and importing
members. Id. A disguised restriction is not confined to concealed or unannounced
restriction or discrimination in international trade and may also include restrictions
amounting to arbitrary and unjustified discrimination. Id. 6.579.
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overlap. 3 14 However, evidence of discrimination alone does not suffice
to prove inconsistency with the requirements of the chapeau, as the
discrimination must also be "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" in
character. 315 In U.S.-Gambling, the Panel applied a standard of
consistency to determine whether the online gambling laws were
applied in a manner that constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination. 316 The Appellate Body did not disagree with the
Panel that a standard of consistency was required by the chapeau,
but nevertheless reversed the Panel's finding that the United States
had discriminated in its enforcement of the prohibition against
foreign online gambling services. In the Appellate Body's opinion, the
Panel's consideration of isolated instances of U.S. non-enforcement of
the relevant laws (particularly the Wire Act) that arguably favored
domestic online gambling businesses, was insufficient both to rebut
the United States' defense under the chapeau and to support a
finding of "inconclusiveness" with regard to whether the United
317
States had discriminated against foreign services providers.
However, the Panel's finding on the IHA was affirmed by the
Appellate Body because the Appellate Body agreed that the evidence
adduced by the United States with regard to the relationship between
the challenged measures and the IHA was "not sufficiently
persuasive to conclude that as regards wagering on horseracing, the
remote supply of such service by domestic firms continues to be
prohibited notwithstanding the plain language of the IHA. ''3 18 While
a stricter standard appears to have been applied by the Appellate
Body in relation to legislative discrimination, a more flexible
approach seems to have prevailed in relation to the enforcement of
the laws themselves. Nevertheless, United States' implementation of
the Appellate Body's recommendations in U.S. -Gambling continues to
be an issue in the WTO's dispute settlement system.3 19 In 2006,

314.
315.
316.
arguments
were:

Id.
6.580.
Id.
6.578.
Specifically, the Panel found that a number of factual
Id.
6.584.
submitted by Antigua in response to the U.S. defense under the chapeau

[Rielevant in determining whether or not the United States is consistent in
prohibiting the remote supply of gambling and betting services. In our view,
the absence of consistency in this regard may lead to a conclusion that the
measures in question are applied in a manner that constitutes "arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail"
and/or a "disguised restriction on trade."

Id.
354-357.
317.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,
318.
Id.
364.
Status Report by the United States, United States-MeasuresAffecting the
319.
Cross-BorderSupply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/Add. (Apr. 11, 2006)
(stating that compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the
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Antigua initiated implementation proceedings under Article 21:5 of
the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)3 20 on the
grounds that the United States had failed to implement the rulings
and recommendations of the DSB and is not in compliance with U.S.
obligations under GATS. 321 In March 2007, the implementation

Gambling dispute relates exclusively to the sole point of whether the United States is
able to show that relevant U.S. laws do not discriminate against foreign suppliers of
remote gambling on horse racing). The report stated that the United States was in
compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings based on the following
statement made by the representative of the United States Department of Justice to a
subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives on April 5, 2006:
The Department of Justice views the existing criminal statutes as prohibiting
the interstate transmission of bets or wagers, including wagers on horse races.
The Department is currently undertaking a civil investigation relating to a
potential violation of law regarding this activity. We have previously stated
that we do not believe that the Interstate Horseracing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 30013007, amended the existing criminal statutes.
Peter Allgeier, U.S. Representative to the WTO, Statements at the meeting of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) (Apr. 21, 2006).
320.
DSU, supra note 59, art. 21:5.
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations or rulings
such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement
procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original panel. The panel
shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter
to it. When the panel considers that it cannot provide its report within this
time frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of its reasons for the delay
together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report.
Id.
321.
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Antigua & Barbuda, United
States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/18 (July 6, 2006). Antigua alleged that the U.S. Department of Justice
statement that the United States relied on as evidence of compliance was not a
measure for the purposes of the DSU. Id. at 3. Antigua also took the position that
regardless of whether the statement constituted a measure under Article 21:5 of the
DSU, it did not bring the United States into compliance with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB. Id. Interestingly, in an unexpected but related development, the
United States Congress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act on
September 30, 2006, which makes it illegal for banks, credit card companies, and
online payment systems to process payment to online gambling companies. 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5361-5366 (2006); see Nelson Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006 Analyzed, 10 GAMING L. REV. 537 (2006) (summarizing the
salient features of this legislation); see also Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Enacts Internet Gaming
Law Barring Use of Credit Cards, 22 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 476 (2006)
(discussing the Unlawful Internet Gambling Act); Peter Harrison, More Gaming Firms
Prepare to Flee U.S., REUTERS, Oct. 10, 2006 (on file with authors) (discussing the
effect of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Act); Michael McCarthy & Jon Swartz, New
Legislation May Pull the Plug on Online Gambling,USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2006, available
at: http://www.usatoday.com/tech2006- 10-02-internet-gambling-usatLx.htm
(same);
Chris Reiter, Gamblers Adapt to Loss of U.S. Online Sites, REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2006 (on
file with authors) (same). This legislation is currently being challenged by the

1256

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40.1189

Panel ruled that the United States had failed to comply with the
DSB's recommendations and rulings.3 22 In response to this second
defeat, rather than amend its existing legislation to accord with the
DSB rulings, the United States announced its intention to renegotiate
its specific commitments in accordance with Article XXI of GATS in
order to exclude online gambling services from the scope of its specific
3 23
commitments under GATS.

Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Association in the U.S. District Court in
K.C. Jones, Gaming Association Sues U.S. Over Internet Ban,
New Jersey.
INFORMATION WEEK, June 7, 2007, available at http://www.informationweek.com/story/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=199902123.
322.
Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and
6.38, 6.85, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007) (adopted May 22, 2007). In
Barbuda,
these implementation proceedings, the United States argued that its "measures to
comply" were essentially "the same measures that were at issue in the original
proceedings," which the United States submitted, were consistent with WTO
6.4. According to the United States, the only issue was that it had
obligations. Id.
been found to have not met its burden of showing that the measures satisfied the
requirements of the Article XIV defense. Id. It argued that its presentation of new
evidence and arguments during compliance proceedings met this burden and
accordingly, it was in compliance with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB.
Id. The United States' argument was rejected by the implementation Panel, which
stated that the "recommendation of the DSB was that the United Sates bring its
measures into conformity, not bring the assessment of the conformity of those measures
into conformity." Id. 1 6.15. "Therefore, the recommendations require a change that
eliminates the inconsistency of those measures with the covered agreements." Id.
Since the measures had not been changed, applied, or interpreted, they remained
6.27. Following the report of the
inconsistent with U.S obligations under GATS. Id.
implementation Panel, in June 2007 Antigua requested authorization from the DSB,
pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU, to suspend the application to the United States of
concessions and related obligations of Antigua and Barbuda under the GATS and the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), in an annual
amount of US$3.443 billion. See Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of
the DSU, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-borderSupply of Gambling and
Betting Services, WT/DS285/22 (June 22, 2007); DSU, supra note 59, art. 22.2;
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). In July 2007, the
United States objected to the level of suspension of concessions sought by Antigua and
claimed that the Antiguan request did not follow the principles of Article 22:3 of the
DSU. See Request by the United States for Arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU,
United States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, WT/DS285/23 (July 24, 2007); DSU, supra note 59, art. 22.6. The DSB at its
meeting on July 24, 2007 referred the matter for arbitration under Article 22.6 of the
DSU. See Recourse by the United States to Article 22.6 of the DSU, Constitution of the
Arbitrator, Note by the Secretariat, United States-Measures Affecting the Crossborder Supply of Gamblingand Betting Services, WT/DS285/24 (Aug. 6, 2007).
323.
Press Release, John K. Veroneau, Deputy United States Trade
Representative, Statement Regarding U.S. Actions under GATS Article XXI (May 4,
2007) available at: http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2007May/
Article XXI of GATS permits a member to withdraw a
Section_Index.html.
commitment in its Schedule in accordance with certain terms and conditions. GATS,
supra note 4, art. XXI. In accordance with Article XXI:2, any WTO member affected by
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As U.S.-Gambling demonstrates, members have significant
regulatory autonomy under GATS, and gaps in the regulatory reach
of GATS rules provide considerable room for policy maneuverability.
In particular, Articles VI and XIV provide enough regulatory
flexibility for members to maintain restrictive regulations with strong
policy justifications. As the next section demonstrates, the imbalance
between members' liberalization obligations under GATS and the
scope of members' domestic regulatory autonomy may seriously
restrict the continued expansion of cross-border trade in e-services.

V. ENCHANING THE REGULATORY ROLE OF GATS FOR CROSS-BORDER
ROSS-TRADE IN E-SERVICES

There has been tremendous growth in e-commerce since GATS
came into force in 1995 due to the fact that many services are now
"easily traded electronically . . .creating an even greater interest
among Members in further liberalizing services on. . . a cross-border
... basis."3 24 Economist and WTO expert Sacha Wunch-Vincent
examined members' submissions for negotiations under GATS for
evidence of this growth and discovered that
development of e-commerce and the Internet has spurred growth,
efficiency, and productivity in the services sectors . . . [and] in some
cases IT [information technology] has made existing services tradable
across borders (e.g., advertising) and created new services (e.g., some
computer services) .... Many WTO Members have requested new or
improved services commitments that would facilitate e-commerce and

the United States' withdrawal of its GATS commitment on cross-border gambling
services may request negotiations with the United States to reach a compensatory
adjustment, which may result in concessions in other sectors of a Member's Schedule.
Article XXI provides that in such negotiations, "the members concerned shall endeavor
to maintain a general level of mutually advantageous commitments not less favorable
to trade than that provided for in Schedules of specific commitments prior to such
negotiations." Id. art. XX1:2(a). Any compensatory adjustment under Article XXI
must be made on an MFN basis. Id. art. XXI:2(a)-(b). Although Antigua expressed
concern over this move by the United States at a meeting of the DSB, such protests are
unlikely to garner support from the European Community, Brazil, and India, who
generally support the right of the United States to modify its schedule in accordance
with GATS. See Press Release, World Trade Org., DSB Adopts Compliance Review
Reports on US Gambling and Chile's Price Band System (May 22, 2007), available at
http://www.wto.org/englishnews-e/newsO7_e/dsb-22mayO7-e.htm
(discussing
the
arguments of Antigua, Brazil, India and the European Community); see also Doug
Palmer, EU presses U.S. to change Internet gambling law, REUTERS, Nov. 8,2007 (on
file with the authors) (discussing EU compensation talks with the U.S.); ICTSD,
Antigua Gambling Dispute: Major Economies Demand Compensation from US,
BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., July 4, 2007, available at http://www.ictsd.orgl

weekly/07-07-04/story3.htm (discussing both the requests for compensation by WTO
members and the Antiguan request for retaliation against the U.S.).
324.
WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 6, at 71.
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services-related

The specific services-related barriers complained about by members
include domestic laws that operate as trade barriers to cross-border
trade in electronic services. 326 For example, in advertising services,
one such identified barrier related to requirements for local
participation in the production of advertising that was electronically
transmitted. 327 Additionally, in professional services, qualification
requirements that necessitated education in the importing country
were identified as a barrier to electronically provided professional
services. 328
New barriers to cross-border trade in educational
services, such as restrictions on the electronic transmission of course
materials, also appear to specifically target the electronic delivery of
such services. 32 9 Clearly, the tension between regulatory autonomy
and liberalization is evident in the context of e-commerce that
involves cross-border trade in services.
A. GATS and Developments in the WTO Work Program on
E-Commerce
Without dispute, GATS does not tell Internet users what web
sites they can visit, tell service providers how they must protect the
privacy and personal data of their online customers, or specify when
Internet advertisers may send unsolicited email communications to
promote their services ("spam").3 30 Although the WTO does not
directly regulate e-commerce, and GATS is not a treaty that directly
regulates global e-commerce, the WTO has an important role to play
331
in regulating electronic trade in services:
[Tihe need for rules and principles facilitating e-commerce has become
increasingly evident. . . . The WTO is the exclusive forum for
negotiating and enforcing global rules governing cross-border trade in
goods and services. The WTO does not aim to directly "regulate" ecommerce. But the application of its rules-based trading system to
goods, services, and intellectual property facilitate and determine the
physical, human, and legal infrastructure for e-commerce ....
In this

325.
326.
327.

Id. at 72.
Id. at 74 (Table 15: Examples of Services-related Barriers to E-Commerce).
Id.; see also Council for Trade in Servs., Communication from the United

States: Advertising and Related Services,

16, S/CSSIW100 (July 10, 2001) (describing

the barriers faced by advertisers worldwide).
328.
WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 6, at 74 (Table 15: Examples of Servicesrelated Barriers to E-Commerce).
329.
Id.; see also Council for Trade in Servs., Communication from the United
States: Higher (Tertiary) Education, Adult Education and Training, 10, S/CSSIW/23
(Dec. 18, 2000) [hereinafter U.S. Education Communication] (providing a list of
obstacles identified in reviewing the sector).
330.
WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 6, at vii.
331.
Id.
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12.59

sense, the WTO can be understood as indirectly regulating IT
[Information Technology] by establishing a broad policy framework for
332
its member states.

Over the last decade, the WTO has played a role in regulating global
e-commerce, including the electronic trade of services. 33 3 In 1998,
WTO members issued a declaration on e-commerce calling for the
establishment of a comprehensive work program to examine all of the
trade-related issues concerning e-commerce ('Work Program on ECommerce"). 334
The declaration led to the preparation of a
background note by the WTO Secretariat discussing how WTO
agreements, including GATS, relate to e-commerce.33 5 This was
followed by the General Council's establishment of a framework for
the Work Program on E-Commerce.33 6
The term "electronic
commerce" was defined in the Work Program on E-Commerce as "the
production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and
services by electronic means. ' 33 7 One of the issues under GATS that
the Work Program on E-Commerce identified was the scope of
permissible domestic regulation applicable to cross-border ecommerce.33 8 The e-commerce implications of Articles XVI and XVII
covering members' specific commitments to provide market access
and national treatment, and the implications of Article XIV regarding
general exceptions for domestic policy regulations, were listed as
specific questions that needed to be addressed in the Work Program
33 9
on E-Commerce.

332.
Id. at vii, ix (emphasis added).
333.
Id. at 1.
334.
Id. at 4; World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 20 May 1998,
WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2, 98-2148 (1998) [hereinafter E-Commerce Declaration].
The
objective of the Work Program is to examine all trade-related issues relating to global
electronic commerce, taking into account the economic, financial and development
needs of developing countries. Id.; see also John Gero & Tom Oommen, The Impact of
Technological Change in the Canada/U.S. Context: Electronic Commerce and Trade
Policy-The Government's Role, 25 CAN-U.S. L.J. 323, 325 (1999) (discussing the Work
Program and the two fundamental issues before it that are: classification of an
electronic transmission as a good or service, and WTO disciplines on domestic
regulation related to electronic commerce and its impact on trade). See generally
Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship Between
International and Domestic Law Reform, 72. TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1933-34 (1998)
(discussing the impact of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce).
335.
WTO Agreements and Electronic Commerce, supra note 6; WUNSCHVINCENT, supra note 6, at 4.
336.
Work Programme on E-Commerce I, supra note 36,
1.1; WUNSCHVINCENT, supra note 6, at 4.
337.
Work Programmeon E-Commerce I, supra note 36, 1.3.
338.
Id. 2.1.
339.
Id.
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To date, despite much discussion of the issues, no substantive
action has resulted from the Work Program on E-Commerce. 340 At
best, one could argue that the Work Program has lead to a general
consensus, mainly through discussion, on preliminary points of
clarification that deal with the general applicability of GATS rules to
electronic commerce. One issue of substance on which there exists a
"common understanding"-though by no means a final one-is
the
341
general applicability of the GATS framework to electronic services.
There appears to be consensus among members that all GATS
provisions, whether relating to general obligations or specific
commitments, apply to the supply of services through electronic
means.3 42
Another significant contribution from members'
discussions under the Work Program has been the general
affirmation of the technological neutrality of GATS. 34 3 In the GATS
context, technological neutrality means that the electronic supply of a
service is permitted by a member's specific commitments under
GATS, unless the member's Schedule of commitments states
otherwise. 344 The discussion also appears to have lead to a "general
consensus, with few exceptions, that e-commerce falls within the
scope of existing WTO agreements and that no new trade rules
should be created for e-commerce when existing rules and obligations
can address the issues at stake. ' 345 Specifically, a GATS Council
report related to the Work Program on E-Commerce expressed the
view that "provisions concerning domestic regulation in Article VI of
' 346
GATS apply to the supply of services through electronic means.
However, this report did not specify how Article VI should be applied

340.
WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 6, at 15.
341.
This understanding has been reached on the basis of the broad definition of
the term "services" in GATS, which is defined to include "any services in any sector
except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority." GATS, supra note
4, art. 1:3(b). The application of this definition to all services regardless of the means
by which they are supplied has led Members to generally accept that the GATS applies
to electronically supplied services under any one of the four modes of supply that define
trade in services under GATS. Measures affecting trade in electronically supplied
services are treated as "measures by Members affecting trade in services" within the
meaning of Article I of GATS. See GATS, supra note 4, art. I (stating that GATS
"applies to measures by Members affecting trade in services"); Work Programme on ECommerce I, supra note 36,
4.1 (discussing "intellectual property issues arising in
connection with electronic commerce").
342.
Work Programmeon E-Commerce I, supra note 36, 4.
343.
Id.
344.
Id.
345.
WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 6, at 15 (noting some contributions to the
Work Program on E-Commerce, including suggestions by other commentators who
question whether the WTO should create a framework of general principles for
electronic commerce, i.e., a "reference paper" that could operate, inter alia, as a
regulatory discipline for e-commerce).
346.
E-Commerce ProgressReport, supra note 30, 11; WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra
note 6, at 79.
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Nor did the report answer a number of other
to e-commerce.
important questions such as: What is the desirable level of regulation
affecting e-commerce? Should a specific Article VI discipline on
regulations affecting e-commerce be adopted? What is the nature of
the relationship between Article VI and Article XIV as it applies to ecommerce?3 47 These important questions have yet to be addressed.
As discussed in the next section, U.S.-Gambling demonstrates the
impending need for a strengthened regulatory discipline addressing
domestic regulations affecting cross-border e-services that will go
beyond the present rules found under paragraphs 4 and 5 of GATS
Article VI.

WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 6, at 80-81 (commenting that there was
347.
disagreement under the Work Program on E-Commerce on how to develop new
disciplines on domestic regulation under Article VI to address e-commerce; some
members argued that an e-commerce specific discipline should be developed, while
others thought a general purpose GATS regulatory discipline would sufficiently
address e-commerce considerations).
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Exhibit B(1)
Examples of Policy Considerations in E-Services Contexts
Demonstrating the Need for Balance between Domestic
Regulatory Autonomy and Liberalizing Trade
Policy Concerns Associated with E-Services that May Justify Domestic
Regulatory Autonomy
Domestic
Example of Business Practices
Policy
that Raise a Conflict between
Considerations E-trade Liberalization and
Related to
Domestic Regulatory Autonomy
Regulating EServices Trade

Effectively
Restricts
Liberalization
of E-services
Trade as
Foreign
Suppliers View
Divergent
Regulatory
Provisions as a
Trade Barrier

Protecting
Public Health
and Safety

Yes, especially
for smaller eservices
suppliers.

Preventing
Consumer
Fraud

Protecting
Consumer
Privacy and
Personal Data

Ensuring
Security of
Transactions

Online medical or pharmaceutical
services that may harm consumers
by providing medically unsound
diagnosis and treatment
recommendations and/or
inappropriately prescribing drugs
or herbal remedies.
Online fraud involving failure to
deliver services purchased.
Fraudulent use of consumer's credit
or debit cards, etc. to purchase
online services not authorized by
the consumer or for the consumer's
benefit.
E-services providers that collect
consumers' personal data without
the consumers' knowledge and/or
consent (whether opt-in or opt-out)
in order to engage in identity theft,
send consumers unsolicited
commercial advertisements (spam)
or install adware or spyware on
consumers' computers.
Online services that fail to protect
consumers' personal data, thus
enabling third parties to wrongfully
obtain and/or use the data. For
example, security risks arise from
storage or transfer of consumers'
personal data in unencrypted form
and other security lapses that
permit hacking and other forms of
data theft or unauthorized use.

Other
Impacts on
Global ECommerce
Flowing
from
Domestic
Regulations
that Promote
Identified
Domestic
Policies
Promotes
consumer
confidence in
e-services
trade.

Yes, especially
for smaller eservices
suppliers.

Promotes
consumer
confidence in
e-services
trade.

Yes, especially
for e-services
suppliers located
in countries that
have little
domestic privacy
and/or personal
data regulation.

Promotes
consumer
confidence in
e-services
trade.

Yes, especially
for e-services
suppliers located
in countries that
have little
regulation of
security of
transactions with
private
businesses and/or
privacy and
personal data
regulation.

Promotes
consumer
confidence in
e-services
trade.
Reduces the
risk of identity
theft and
other forms of
fraud.

2007]
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Exhibit B(2)
in E-Services Contexts
Considerations
Examples of Policy
between Domestic
for
Balance
Demonstrating the Need
Trade
Liberalizing
and
Regulatory Autonomy
Policy Justifications for Regulating E-Services that May Not Support
Domestic Regulatory Autonomy
Domestic
Policy
Considerations
Related to
Regulating EServices Trade

Example of Domestic
Regulations that Raise
a Conflict between
E-trade Liberaliza-tion
and Domestic
Regulatory Autonomy

Administrative
Ease of
Regulating Eservices
Providers
Including
Jurisdiction to
Pursue
Criminal or
Civil
Enforcement
Actions
Protecting
Consumers
from Content
Offered by EServices
Providers that
is Offensive
but not Illegal

Regulations that require
foreign online service
providers to register
locally to do business in
member states rather
than have domestic
postal or other addresses
in order to provide eservices in member

Effectively Restricts
Liberalization of EServices Trade because
Foreign Suppliers May
View Divergent
Regulatory Provisions
as Trade Barriers
Yes, costly for foreign
suppliers to comply with
local registration
requirements.

states and accept service
of legal documents.
Yes, costly for foreign
Regulations that limit
suppliers on a crossaccess by adults to
border basis,
Internet services that
offer access to online chat
rooms featuring adult
content, but not access to
telephone chat services
that feature similar

Protecting
Minor
Consumers
from Content
Offered by EServices
Providers that
is Dangerous,
Offensive
or
Illegal (U.S.

content. Online access to
Internet sites featuring
adult pornography,
although there are no
restrictions on access to
videos and DVDs
featuring similar
content,
Regulating the online
collection of personally
identifying information
about children under age
13 without parental
consent (see Childrens'
Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA),
15 U.S.C. Section 6501 et

perspective)

seq.).

Yes, it is likely that
personal data collection
regulations requiring
parental consent will be
viewed as trade barriers
by foreign firms including suppliers from
countries that have very
protective privacy and
data protection laws,
but do not have special
age-based regulations
(see E.U. Data
Protection Directive).

Other Impacts on
Global E-Commerce
Flowing from
Domestic
Regulations that
Further Identified
Domestic Policies
Furthers consumer
trust and confidence
by enhancing the
ability of enforcing
consumer protection
laws.

May further
consumer trust and
confidence in ecommerce by
removing access to
objectionable
material that is
easily accessible to
minors. However
may also deter
exercise of free
speech rights constitutionally protected
in some countries.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend. I
May further
consumer trust and
confidence by
parents/children in ecommerce. But
multiple approaches
to privacy and data
protection creates
inconsistencies in
global regulation
that likely operate as
a trade barrier to ecommerce.
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B. The Need for a Strengthened Disciplineon Domestic Regulation
U.S.-Gambling is significant because it is the first dispute over
the boundaries of multilateral liberalization obligations and domestic
regulatory rights in the context of globally traded e-services to reach
the WTO dispute settlement system. However, in other contexts,
there have been unilateral attempts by members to regulate crossborder e-services on the grounds of offensive content, 348 the protection
of privacy, 349 and public morals 350 that also raise legitimate concerns
of overregulation and the resulting unnecessary restriction of trade in
e-services. As domestic policymakers grapple with balancing the vast
commercial potential of the Internet with regulatory sovereignty,
there is concern that benefits associated with advances in electronic
communications technology and the development of global and
efficient markets are being undermined by overlapping and
sometimes conflicting national approaches of regulating Internetbased trade. 35 1 Yet, "[a]t the same time it is unrealistic to hope that

348.
See the much publicized Yahoo dispute where a French court ordered
Yahoo France and Yahoo! Inc. to block access by French residents to Yahoo auction
sites selling Nazi memorabilia. LICRA et UEJF v. Yahoo!Inc and Yahoo France,
Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May
22, 2000, obs. J. Gomez (Fr.); see also Caroline Penfold, Nazis, Porn and Politics:
Asserting Control over the Internet, 2 J. INFO. L. & TECH. 2001, § 4.1 (2001), available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/ilt/20O012/penfold
(discussing the Yahoo
case).
349.
Parliament & Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L281) 25 (EC) (setting
out the principle that EU Members shall only allow a transfer of personal data from
the EU to a third county if that country ensures an adequate level of personal data
protection).
350.
See Gunnar Bender, Bavariav. Felix Somm: The Pornography Convictionof
the Former CompuServe Manager,INT'L. J. COMM. L. & POL'Y, Aug. 3, 1998, available
at http://www.ijclp.org/1-998/ijclp-webdoc141_1998.html (summarizing the Felix
Somm decision). The Felix Somm decision is available in English at http://www.cyberrights.org/isps/somm-dec.htm.
351.
CATHERINE MANN ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A POLICY PRIMER 3 (2000). The International Chamber of
Commerce released a policy statement on the extraterritorial application of domestic
laws and regulations to business occurring outside national borders. Int'l Chamber of
Commerce, Policy Statement: Extraterritorialityand Business, at 4 (July 13, 2006),
available at http://iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/trade/Statements/10333%205%
20Final.pdf. The policy statement urges national legislators to "foster the convergence
and harmonization of divergent national laws and policies and to accept the mutual
recognition of equivalent standards." Id. It also noted that
[b]y
imposing
a
considerable
burden on international
business,
extraterritoriality has a significant negative impact on economic growth and
development. It increases international transaction costs for companies and
may result in steep compliance and regulatory costs. Extraterritoriality also
creates considerable commercial and legal uncertainty .... Extraterritoriality
may encourage forum shopping, duplicative legal proceedings, and potentially
divergent outcomes.
Extraterritoriality also increases tensions among
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all countries will agree on a single policy strategy" for such
3 52
regulation.
Extending regulations to the online world that have previously
only been applicable to traditional services may create unnecessary
barriers to trade in e-services.3 53 The borderless nature of the
Internet and the global availability of e-services have led to more
cross-border conflicts of domestic regulatory approaches governing
trade in services. 354 For example, the divergent approaches adopted
by the United States and the European Union towards the protection
of personal data illustrate such a difference in regulatory approaches
to cross-border trade in e-services. 355 The largely "market driven"
and self- regulatory approach of the United States with respect to
personal data protection, which is also followed in countries like
Australia and Japan, is contrasted with the more interventionist
3 56
approach of the European Union and countries like Canada.
Further, diverse approaches to regulating Internet content are also
being applied to cross-border e-services.3 57 "The same technologies
that allow parents to filter information also allow government
officials to embargo sensitive or subversive information. 3 5h
Nevertheless:

governments, stemming both from disagreements by states on the means of
regulating activity or the policies underlying extraterritorial measures and
from discord in addressing such conflicts. In some instances, governments have
enacted blocking statutes to prevent the application of another state's laws
from having extraterritorial effect, which can leave companies in an impossible
quandary where compliance with one state's laws constitutes a violation of
another's.
Id. at 2-3.
352.
MANN ET AL., supra note 351, at 3.
353.
Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Electronic Services: Its Regulatory Barriersand the
Role of the WTO 9 (2001), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/wunsch.pdf (last
visited Oct. 13, 2007).
354.
Id. at 7; see also Gero & Oommen, supra note 334, at 328-29 (discussing
some domestic regulatory approaches in the European Union and the United States).
355.
MANN ET AL., supra note 351, at 127.
356.
Id.
357.
Attempts to control electronic content have ranged from the more mundane
restrictions on electronic advertising services through the regulation of spam to more
direct forms of censorship through prohibitions and filtering technology. See id. at
140-41 (describing various domestic restrictions on Internet content advocated by the
governments of Syria, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe ).
358.
Id. at 140; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet
Jurisdiction,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1951, 1953, 1960 (2005) (arguing
[although] current Internet technology creates ambiguity for sovereign
territory because network boundaries intersect and transcend national
borders . . . innovations in information technology will also undermine the
technological assault on state jurisdiction. [Such] sophisticated information
processing and information technologies provide states with greater contact
that justify personal jurisdiction and a stronger claim to prescriptive
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As it is still an impossible task to control or supervise content and
information flows on the net, the current regulatory methods are less
than well tuned. Hence a balanced relationship between regulatory aim
and regulatory methods is hard to be found. This has negative
consequences for E-Commerce and the regulatory responsibilities of the
35 9
state.

U.S.-Gambling demonstrates how the application of traditional
regulatory schemes to the electronic world may create trade barriers.
Ironically, long before the online gambling dispute arose, it was the
United States that argued that attempts to encompass electronic
commerce and cross-border e-services in traditional regulatory
categories would impose restrictions that were more burdensome
than necessary or would undermine the innovative nature of the eservices concerned. 360 While GATS affirms the right of members "to
regulate, and to introduce regulations, on the supply of services
within their territories to meet national policy objectives," 36 1 the
concern is that this right will be construed to broadly enable national
authorities to impose regulatory restrictions on e-services trade on
the basis that such restrictions are necessary to meet a range of
domestic policy objectives even when such regulations further
362
protectionist strategies:
[i]twill also be increasingly difficult to recognize which domestic
regulations follow legitimate policy objectives with well-balanced means
and which regulations aim at protecting local markets from global
competition.
Especially the general exception paragraphs such as
Article XIV GATS, which allows exceptions from trade commitments to
protect public morals, maintain public order, protect life or health or
protect privacy etc., allow a wide range of interpretation to evade trade
openness.

363

Pressure to define the scope of such regulatory autonomy in the eservices context within the various WTO institutional forums and
mechanisms (including dispute settlement) is unavoidable. 36 4 Given

jurisdiction. At the same time these technologies offer states important means
to enforce their decisions.).
Cf. Associated Press, Google Bends to China's Will, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 25, 2006,
available at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70082-O.html (discussing Google's
release of their service in China that censors information the government deems to be
sensitive); Associated Press, A Censorship Solution... Sort of, WIRE NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006,
available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,70134-0.html (discussing Microsoft's
shutting down of blogs at the request of the Chinese government).
359.
Hauser & Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 37, at 22.
360.
U.S. Submission on E-Commerce, supra note 84, at 6.
361.
GATS, supra note 4, pmbl (fourth recital).
362.
See supra Exhibit B (illustrating various policy considerations in e-services
contexts and demonstrates the need for balance between the liberalization of crossborder e-services trade and domestic regulatory autonomy).
363.
Hauser & Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 37, at 22.
364.
For example, under the Work Program on Electronic Commerce, one
member has proposed that a list of policy objectives be drawn up in the context of
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27

that global e-services trade customarily faces fewer quantitative
restrictions than qualitative regulations compared to trade in
goods,3 65 much of the debate is inevitably focused upon defining the
precise scope of Article VI of GATS: "The interpretation of Art. VI will
therefore deserve particular attention and enforcement. Only time
will show whether Art. VI will suffice on its own to avoid a
'366
protectionist abuse of justified regulatory policies.
As U.S.-Gambling confirms, domestic regulation of cross-border
e-services with significant policy justification is exceedingly difficult
to address within the confines of the market access obligation. If, as
in the exceptional case of the U.S.-Gambling litigation, such a
measure is found to violate market access, it may nevertheless be
justified as an exception to GATS if its regulatory objectives coincide
367
with the policy exemptions recognized under Article XIV.
However, a more precise definition of members' regulatory autonomy
under Article VI will minimize the need for members to seek
regulatory flexibility for legitimate domestic policies under Article
XIV (except in a limited number of truly exceptional cases). Thus, the
most significant issue in relation to the disciplinary scope of GATS
rules is the current weakness of the regulatory discipline of Article
VI. In fact, the absence of disciplines under Article VI has already
elicited concern by the business community, which views Article VI as
giving members' regulatory authorities too much license to regulate
the Internet. 368 Therefore:
[Als unpalatable as it may seem to some parties, there probably is a need to
establish at least some intergovernmental guidelines on what is permissible

Article VI:4 that may justify domestic regulatory measures with restrictive effects in
the area of electronic commerce.
Work Programme on E-Commerce Interim Report,
supra note 36, at 10; see also Submission by the United States, Work Programme on
Electronic Commerce, 17, WT/GC/W/493 (Apr. 16, 2003) (emphasizing that although
the United States believes that each member has the right to regulate, regulations
should not act as a barrier to trade and should be transparent, non-discriminatory and
follow existing WTO agreements for such measures).
365.
Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 353, at 6.
366.
Hauser & Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 37, at 22. David Luff discusses the
issues under Article VI from a sector specific perspective. David Luff, International
Regulation of Audio-Visual Services: Networks, Allocation of Scarce Resources and
Terminal Equipment,
in
THE
WTO
AND
GLOBAL
CONVERGENCE
IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES 243, 251-52 (Damien Geradin &

David Luff eds., 2004).
367.
See infra Exhibit B1 (illustrating the policy concerns relating to e-services
that may justify domestic regulatory autonomy);
see also Ivan Bernier, Content
Regulation in the Audio-Visual Sector and the WTO, in THE WTO AND GLOBAL
CONVERGENCE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES, supra note 366,

at 215, 228 (discussing the possibility of challenging content restrictions that apply to
illicit or questionable content in the context of audio-visual services under Article XVI
and the implications of an Article XIV defense).
368.
Drake & Nicolaidis, supra note 6, at 422.
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regulation of GEC [global electronic commerce] content services. After all,
government regulations protecting basic public interests such as public health
and safety, consumer rights, and the security of transactions ought to apply
equally in both the virtual and physical worlds. There is nothing sacred about
the Internet that should or will preclude governments from, for example,
attempting to regulate the on-line supply of medical or educational services to
their citizens. And if they are going to establish such regulations, there should
be some level of multilateral agreement about what kinds of regulations are
legal under GATS. Moreover, shared principles could mitigate the growing
threats to the Internet of governments unilaterally regulating cyberspace or
subjecting service providers and transactions to multiple and totally
3 69
incompatible national regulations.

In this context, it is critical that a balance be struck in adopting
disciplines under Article VI:4. Article VI:4 provides an opportunity to
implement principles for domestic regulation that will ensure that
qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, and
licensing requirements that apply to e-services will not constitute
unnecessary barriers to trade. On the one hand, developing precise
disciplines under Article VI:4 will provide members with the muchneeded legal certainty of knowing that domestic laws that adhere to
criteria developed in the form of disciplines will not be judged as
unnecessary barriers to trade. On the other hand, the process of
defining criteria under each of the categories of measures recognized
under Article VI:4 for purposes of adopting disciplines will also
promote greater understanding of the scope of Article VI:4. This will,
in turn, encourage members to take preemptive action by reviewing
and revising domestic regulations to avoid inconsistencies with GATS
rules and minimize the need to seek protection under the broad
exemptions of Article XTV. 370 This will be important from a domestic
policy perspective as it is not so much the need for regulation that is
contested by members in multilateral forums, but rather the nature,
371
design and administration of such regulations.
However, certain general issues require resolution in relation to
e-services trade if the disciplines are to achieve their objective of
ensuring that legitimate domestic measures under Article VI do not
create unnecessary impediments to trade. The most controversial of
these issues relates to the precise nature of the necessity test under
Article VI:4. 372 It will be important to clarify whether domestic
measures will be judged according to the narrower criteria of the
"least trade-restrictive measure reasonably available to achieve the

369.
Id. at 423.
370.
See infra Exhibit B2 (illustrating how legitimate policy concerns translate
into regulatory approaches that may require restrictions on regulatory autonomy).
371.
BACCHETTA ET AL., supra note 6, at 64-68.
372.
See "Necessity Tests" in the WTO, supra note 257,
11 (noting that the
similarity in wording between provisions in WTO agreements containing necessity
tests cannot be assumed to transpose interpretations developed in the context of a
specific case or specific provision, automatically, to other provisions).
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regulatory goal, '373 or the more flexible "not more burdensome than
necessary" criteria specifically mentioned in relation to the quality of
the service under Article VI:4(b). 374 The European Communities have
already stated that a definition of necessity encompassing the concept
of the "least trade restrictive alternative" would be unduly restrictive
of the choice of the regulatory tools available.3 75 For instance, it is
not difficult to see the implications of applying a least traderestrictive principle to the regulation of personal data protection
collected in cross-border e-commerce. The European approach to data
protection currently provides a very high level of legal protection for
consumers with respect to collection and processing of personally
identifying information by businesses, which is applicable to trade in
services as well as goods. 376 In contrast, the United States has

373.
Nicolaidis & Trachtman, supra note 110, at 259. Cf. Accountancy Sector
Disciplines, supra note 121,
2 ("Members shall ensure that such measures are not
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective.").
374.
See Communication from the European Communities, supra note 261,
17
(arguing against a "least trade restrictive" standard and introducing the concept of
proportionality into the necessity analysis under Article VI:4, which would mean that a
measure would be consistent with Article VI:4 if it is not disproportionate to the
objectives pursued). Cf. Accountancy Sector Disciplines, supra note 121, 2 ("Members
shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill
a legitimate objective.").
375.
Communication from the European Communities, supra note 261, 17.
376.
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) provides: "Everyone has the right to respect for
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8,
1, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. The Treaty of the European Union
recognizes the ECHR and requires Members of the European Union to respect the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Convention. Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224).
More recently, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides: "Everyone has the right to the
protection of personal data concerning him or her." Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union art. 8, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364/1) 1 [hereinafter Charter].
The Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) requires EU Member States to adopt data
protection legislation regulating the processing of personal data and the free movement
of such data. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) [hereinafter Data
Protection Directive].
The Data Protection Directive expressly refers to the
fundamental rights of privacy that are contained in the above mentioned conventions
and treaties and states the intention to regulate the processing of personal data
consistent with these fundamental rights. Id. at pmbl.
Whereas the object of the national laws on the processing of personal data is
protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, which
recognized both in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the general principles
Community law.

to
is
of
of

The Data Protection Directive defines personal data as information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person. Id. art. 2(a). Privacy as a fundamental right
is recognized in international law, but there is no specific recognition of data protection
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largely left consumer data protection to industry self-regulation and
377
imposes little government regulation on businesses in this regard.
Under a "least trade restrictive alternative," it is likely that the
European approach to data protection could be challenged as
unnecessary given that alternatives and less trade-restrictive

approaches are in place, as evidenced by the regulatory approach
taken in the United States. This result would be unacceptable to the
European Communities and other nations that view personal data
protection as a fundamental human right, and accordingly, have more
advanced consumer data protection laws consistent with this policy
perspective.378

In the e-services context, a second issue that needs to be resolved
relates to the regulatory objectives that should be recognized as
legitimate under Article VI:4. The scope of the Article VI:4 regulatory
objectives, as well as their relationship to the policy objectives
recognized as overriding under Article XIV, will also require
clarification. According to Trachtman,
[i]n the context of Article VI:4(b), the reference is to measures "not
more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service."
The last clause could be very interventionist. It could restrict not just
the means to attain a given regulatory goal but even the types of
regulatory goals that might be achieved, as when the regulatory goal is

as a fundamental right similar to that found in the European Union. See, e.g.,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (covering privacy in
Article 17); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter Optional Protocol to ICCPR] (same). Also, Article 11 of the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) includes a right to privacy. Org. of Am. States,
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.htm
(covering privacy at Article 11). The United States is a signatory to the ACHR, but
Congress has not ratified it.
377.
In the United States, protection of consumers' personal data has been left
to the marketplace, industry self-regulation, the application of existing legislation and
common law doctrines, and the adoption of new legislation to address specific data
privacy concerns. PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 7-8
(1996) (stating that the United States "approaches fair information practices through
attention to discrete sectoral and subsectoral processing activity," and often a form of
regulation applies to the public or the private sphere, but not both); Paul M. Schwartz,
Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1680-82 (1999)
(explaining that the market approach found in the United States relies on "interactions
between individuals and data processors to generate and maintain appropriate norms
for information privacy," and concluding a failure exists in the privacy market).
378.
See supra note 376 (discussing legal recognition of data protection and
privacy as a fundamental human right); see also Jan Dhont & Maria Veronica Perez
Asinari, New Physics and the Law: A ComparativeApproach to the EU and US Privacy
and Data Protection Regulation, in L'UTILISATION DE LA Mt9THODE COMPARATIVE EN
DROIT EUROP9EN 80 (Frangois R. van der Mensbrugghe ed., Presses Universitaires de
Namur 2003) ("In Europe, privacy as well as the right to personal data protection are
considered to have human rights status.").
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not to maintain the quality of the service but to avoid some other
379
externalization or regulatory harm by the service provider.

But, provided these regulatory goals are at least "related to the broad
objective of ensuring the quality of the service,"380 it is unlikely that
Article VI:4(b) will serve to unduly restrict members' choice of
legitimate policy objectives. It has been noted, for example, that
"objectives such as consumer protection and ensuring professional
'38 1
competence would qualify as legitimate objectives.
In relation to e-services, the types of measures covered under
Article VI:4 that stand out as requiring particular attention include
licensing requirements and technical standards. "[R]elaxing licensing
requirements is especially important in the context of e-commerce
and cross-border provision of professional services. '38 2 For example,
provision of online professional legal and dispute resolution services
will certainly raise arguments that licensing requirements should be
relaxed to permit cross-border provision of such services by
international law firms and private practitioners, despite all the
consumer protection issues that arise in this context. 38 3 It would
seem that similar issues relating to licensing and technical standards
will arise in the field of cross-border medical services, or more
particularly, in the emerging area of telemedicine.38 4 In relation to
technical standards, it will be crucial for the disciplines to clarify how
restrictions on the technical means of delivery should be treated
according to the necessity and objectivity criteria of Article VI:4. For

379.
Trachtman, supra note 93, at 67-68.
380.
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note 40, 9 26; see also
Accountancy Sector Disciplines, supra note 121, $ 2 (providing a list of non-exhaustive,
legitimate policy objectives that include consumer protection, the quality of the service,
professional competence, and the integrity of the profession). C.f. Communication from
the European Communities, supra note 261, TT 19-22 (discussing the non-exhaustive
list of legitimate objectives).
381.
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note 40, 26.
382.
Drake & Nicolaidis, supra note 6, at 263.
383.
Louise Ellen Teitz, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in
Cyberspace: The Promise and Challenge of Online Dispute Resolution, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 985, 990 (2001). See generally Anne L. MacNaughton & Garry A. Munneke,
Practicing Law Across Geographic and Professional Borders: What Does the Future
Hold?, 47 Loy. L. REV. 665 (2001) (discussing emerging issues in the practice and
regulation of law on a global scale); Laurel S. Terry, GATS Applicability to
TransnationalLawyering and its PotentialImpact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers,
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 989 (2001) (discussing GATS' impact on the domestic
regulation of legal services and its effect on U.S. legal ethics).
384.
See Thomas R. McLean, International Law, Telemedicine and Health
Insurance: China as a Case Study, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 40-41 (2006) (noting that
regulations that impose obligations on providers to accept all patients, place limits on
fees to ensure universal access to health care and discipline providers with licensure
revocation rather than with fines and other methods of publicity may be regarded as
more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service under Article VI:4
of GATS).
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example, domestic legal restrictions on the electronic delivery of
course materials for online training programs have been identified as
a restriction on the technical means of delivery that arguably
constitutes an unnecessary trade barrier.3 8 5 However, the disciplines
should also be flexible enough to apply to even newer forms of ecommerce, such as the use of mobile phones by consumers to make
commercial transactions, as well as laws that are likely to be adopted
to address consumer protection, data protection, privacy, and other
38 6
policy concerns associated with mobile commerce.
It is within the mandate of the services negotiations under GATS
for members to develop regulatory disciplines under Article VI:4 that
address domestic
regulations affecting electronically traded
services.3 8 7 Resolution of these issues in the course of developing the
Article VI:4 disciplines will clarify the permissible scope of members'
domestic regulatory autonomy under GATS, and also ensure each
members' ability to take full advantage of the tremendous potential
for liberalization of trade in e-services. Clearly, an intensified effort
on the negotiations of disciplines by members under Article VI:4 is
388
needed.

385.
See U.S. Education Communication, supra note 329, T 10 (stating that
"restrictions on electronic transmission of course materials" has been identified as an
obstacle in the private sector).
386.
Mobile commerce (m-commerce) is an extension of e-commerce. It can be
defined as "all activities related to a (potential) commercial transaction conducted
through communications networks that interface with wireless (or mobile) devices."
Peter Tarasewich et al., Issues in Mobile E-commerce, in 8 COMM. OF THE ASS'N FOR
INFO. SYS. 41, 42 (2002), available at http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/tarase/CAIS8_3.pdf
(noting that mobile commerce can also be conducted on personal digital assistants and
laptops). For example, a text message to advertise a product that is sent by an
advertiser to a consumer on the consumer's cellular (mobile) phone is an example of incommerce. See id. (discussing advertising through m-commerce); see also Int'l Working
Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, Common Position on Privacy and
Data Protection RegardingLocation Data in Mobile Phones, 675.29.8 (Nov. 19, 2004),
available
at
http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/int/iwgdpt/local-neu-en.pdf
(discussing the privacy concerns associated with mobile device location information);
Mary Baker, Guest Editor's Introduction: Pervasive Computing for Emerging
Economies, 5 IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING 12, 12-14 (2006) (discussing current issues
related to information technology).
387.
See WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 6, at 82 (noting that regulatory
disciplines under Article VI:4 could either specifically or generally address domestic
regulations affecting electronically traded services).
388.
The strategic and political advantages in pursuing this particular course of
action are clear. Negotiations on rulemaking under Article VI:4 are built into the text
of GATS. GATS, supra note 4, art. VI:4. Thus, although the Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration sets a date for the completion of negotiations under Article VI:4, which is
tied to the end of the current round of services negotiations (i.e., 2008), the mandate to
negotiate the Article VI:4 disciplines will not expire if members fail to complete the
services negotiations on time. Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra note 98,
Annex C, 5.
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Exhibit C
Drafting Suggestions for Article VI:4 Disciplines on Domestic
Regulations that Focus on Cross-Border Trade in E-Services
Drafting Suggestion

Promotes Necessity of
Domestic Regulations

1. The disciplines
should focus on
rulemaking related
to the textual
requirements found
in Art. VI:4.

Domestic regulations meet
the necessity requirement if
they are not more
burdensome than necessary
to achieve the member's
policy objective,

2. The disciplines
should be drafted in
light of common
objectives of GATS to
liberalize trade in
services and provide
a trade-friendly
regulatory
environment.

The requirement that
domestic regulations be
necessary puts a substantive
limit on use of domestic
regulation as trade barriers
to e-services, thus promoting
liberalization of trade in eservices,

3. The disciplines
should provide
relevant definitional
clarification.

Although U.S.-Gambling
provided a two-part test to
analyze necessity under Art.
XIV, there is no consensus
between members on the
requirements of the
necessity analysis under
Article VI:4. A definition of
necessity is needed that is
coherent across all services
sectors while also being
flexible enough to allow for
sectoral specific
interpretation,

Transparency
Domestic regulations must
meet transparency
requirements specific to
licensing and qualification
requirements and
procedures and technical
standards.
Transparency has increased
importance in the context of
e-commerce because ecommerce increasingly
enables suppliers to provide
services from abroad and
enhances suppliers' needs to
know which regulations
apply to their cross-border
activities.
Transparency may itself
reduce trade-restrictiveness
of domestic regulations
because it may increase
legal certainty and help
suppliers identify potential
regulatory barriers and
ways to overcome them.
While Article 1II, GATS
contains significant
obligations on transparency,
the disciplines under Article
VI:4 will add clarity to
concept of "necessity" under
Article VI:4 by providing
more information and
clarification on the nature
and design of regulations of
domestic regulations. Such
information will be relevant
to establishing the necessity
of measures and their
relationship to legitimate
objectives under the
necessity test of Article
VI:4.
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Drafting Suggestion
Drafting__Suggestion
4. The disciplines
should embrace the
concept of
proportionality

5. The disciplines
should articulate
legitimate policy
objectives relating to
the concept of
necessity and
minimum
transparency
mechanisms to
facilitate the growth
of cross-border trade
in the form of eservices.

Promotes Necessity of
Domestic Regulations
Proportionality means that
domestic laws should not be
disproportionate to the
policy objectives pursued by
the laws.
This does not necessarily
require the reviewer (e.g.,
DSB) to assess the validity
of the rationale for the policy
objective (a matter of
domestic autonomy).
It is appropriate to consider
international standards
adopted by international
organizations in assessing
proportionality.
The disciplines should
include a non-exhaustive list
of legitimate policy
objectives to help clarify the
concept of necessity.
Lists of legitimate policy
objectives are found in other
WTO instruments. An
illustrative list of legitimate
policy objectives is found in
the Accountancy Disciplines.
Such a list for domestic
regulation under Art. VI:4
should necessarily be
broader than found in the
above examples because
they will apply to the broad
scope of cross-border trade
in services.
Cross border trade in eservices is similarly a broad
context encompassing many
services sectors. Further the
evolving nature of ecommerce and the impact of
communications technology
support a broad conception
of legitimate policy
objectives that will be
flexible enough to
encompass future
developments in e-commerce
like mobile commerce.

/VOL. 401189

Transparency
The concept of
proportionality also applies
to the level of notice and
other transparency
mechanisms to be required
by the disciplines to be
adopted.
Making proposed and
existing domestic
regulations transparent for
e-commerce is furthered by
use of the-Internet Web
postings for this purpose.

The disciplines should
include a list of required
mechanisms to ensure
transparency for domestic
regulation of e-services.
Such required mechanisms
to ensure and encourage
transparency are found in
the Accountancy
Disciplines:
A requirement to make
regulations publicly
available and include
inquiry and contact points.
A requirement to inform
another member (on
request) of the rationale for
a particular domestic
regulatory measure.
A requirement to make
public the procedures for
review of administrative
decisions and any
prescribed time limits
related to requesting
review.
These types of transparency
mechanisms would be very
useful in the context of ecommerce because they
would help reduce legal
uncertainties related to
engaging in cross-border eservices trade and thus
enhance the development of
global e-commerce.
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C. Going ForwardPragmatically-AModest Proposalfor Drafting
Disciplinesto Support E-Services
Several proposals have been offered to address the liberalization
objectives of GATS and members' regulatory autonomy within the
broader context of e-commerce. 38 9 A striking feature of these
proposals is that they differ significantly in relation to the level of
legal commitment that would be required of members. One option is
negotiation of a reference paper on e-commerce (similar to the
Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications) that would allow
members to choose whether to be bound by a set of regulatory
principles and rules covering e-commerce. 390 Another option would
be to add a new global electronic commerce instrument to GATS in
the form of a separate annex to the main agreement that would be
binding on all members. 39 1 However, given the lack of political
interest displayed by WTO members in pursuing either of these
proposals, and the current lack of progress on the Work Program on
Electronic Commerce, 392 it seems unlikely that such ambitious

389.
See, e.g., Judson 0. Berkey, A Framework Agreement for Electronic
Commerce Regulation under the GATS (2002), http://www.cid.harvard.edulcidtrade/
Papers/eservframe.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2007) (suggesting principles for a
framework agreement that aim at providing guidelines for the development of ecommerce legal regimes that do not inhibit commitments under GATS).
390.
Work Programme on E-Commerce Interim Report, supra note 36, at 7;
Drake & Nicolaidis, supra note 6, at 406.
The Reference Paper on Basic
Telecommunications allows members to negotiate additional commitments on
regulatory principles that relate to basic telecommunications. It has legal status only
to the extent WTO members have incorporated it in their schedules of specific
commitments.
Daniel
Roseman,
Domestic Regulation and
Trade in
Telecommunications Services: Experience and Prospects under the GATS, in DOMESTIC
REGULATION AND SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION, supra note 46, at 83, 88; World
Trade Org., Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Reference Paper, (Apr.
24, 1996), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv e/telecom_e/te123_e.htm (providing
a set of regulatory principles participants can make binding in their
telecommunications commitments).
391.
Drake & Nicolaidis, supra note 6, at 405. Presumably, the purpose of such
an annex would be to add binding obligations relating to e-commerce that would at
least compare with the more dynamic free trade agreements concluded at a bilateral
level that incorporate separate chapters on e-commerce. For example, the U.S. free
trade agreements (FTAs) with Chile and Singapore contain separate chapters on ecommerce that, inter alia, recognize that the supply of a service using electronic means
falls within the scope of obligations assumed under cross-border trade in services and
other sector specific obligations and accord non-discriminatory treatment to digital
products. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 15:2, :4, June 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 909;
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 14:2, May 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 948.
392.

WUNSCH-VINCENT,

supra note 6, at 15,

18 (noting that the issue of

classifying digital products under the GATT or GATS and the related procedural
questions on how to structure the work program has resulted in a deadlock preventing
members from making any progress on other important topics, and it does not appear
that members are interesting in moving beyond negotiating market access
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proposals will be realized within the context of the present
negotiations or even in the next negotiating round.
Pragmatic considerations suggest a more viable and general
approach to support the growth of e-services trade through GATS.
Although the negotiation of sector-specific disciplines that would
apply only to e-services has been proposed, 393 given the protracted
nature of the ongoing negotiations under Article VI:4, it is unlikely
that members will be willing to invest the time and resources
necessary to negotiate separately, on a distinct set of disciplines, for
e-services. Indeed, it appears unrealistic that members will be able to
agree on any sector-specific disciplines under Article VI:4 before the
close of the present round of negotiations. However the current
negotiations have attained progress in identifying a list of "elements"
that also address trade barriers arising in the context of cross-border
e-services.3 94 These elements, the fruits of discussions between WTO
members under the auspices of the Working Party, have been
3 95
grouped around "themes agreed for these rounds of discussions.
The elements are listed for each category of measures covered under
Article VI:4 (licensing requirements and procedures; qualification
The
requirements and procedures; and technical standards).
elements also address the more general themes for Article VI:4
disciplines, including objectives, scope, application, and definitions.
Regulatory transparency and development considerations are also
included as elements for negotiation by members under Article
VI:4. 396 These themes and elements form the nucleus for a set of
horizontally applicable draft disciplines that are currently under
negotiation in the Working Party (Draft Disciplines).3 97 Although the
substance of these Draft Disciplines are subject to change in the
ongoing negotiation process, they offer a viable basis for addressing

commitments to negotiations on new obligations for e-commerce or on understanding
Evidence
how existing obligations apply to e-commerce in the Doha Round).
supporting this conclusion is found in the summaries of the issues raised by members
in the Sixth Dedicated Discussion on Electronic Commerce under the Auspices of the
General Council on 7 and 21 November 2005, WT/GC/W/556 (Nov. 30, 2005), and the
Fifth Dedicated Discussion on Electronic Commerce under the Auspices of the General
Council on 16 May and 11 July 2003, WT/GC/W/509 (July 31, 2003).
Council for Trade in Servs., Work Program on Electronic Commerce,
393.
Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States, S/C/W/98
(Feb. 23, 1999).
Report of the Chairman, supra note 279, attachment 1.
394.
3.
395.
Id.
396.
Id.
397.
See Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Disciplines on Domestic
Regulation Pursuant to GATS Article VI:4: Consolidated Working Paper,JOB (06)/225
(July 2006) [hereinafter Consolidated Working Paper] (setting forth proposals
submitted by Members); Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Draft Disciplines on
Domestic Regulation Pursuant to GATS Article VI:4, Room Document (Apr. 18, 2007)
[hereinafter Draft Disciplines] (setting forth a draft of proposals).
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the concerns identified in this Article and for crafting the following
proposals.
An obvious point of reference for drafting the Article VI:4
disciplines is the Accountancy Disciplines; however, the horizontal
nature of the task has lead to significant differences, as evidenced in
this recent text of Draft Disciplines.
Like the Accountancy
Disciplines, the Draft Disciplines propose both general disciplines on
regulatory transparency3 98 and specific disciplines on several aspects
of procedural transparency in relation to the sub-categories of Article
VI:4 regulations.3 99 In contrast, however, the Draft Disciplines are
considerably less clear on the extent to which they apply to the
substantive aspects of transparency covering the regulatory content
of licensing, qualification, and technical measures. 40 0 While there is
considerable attention to drafting precise disciplines on licensing and
qualification procedures, the Draft Disciplines are noticeably more
limited in their application to licensing and qualification
requirements, and importantly, to technical standards, which are
arguably more relevant to cross-border e-services trade. 40 1 Further,

398.
Draft Disciplines, supra note 397, IT 13-14 (applying to measures of
general application relating to licensing and qualification requirements and
procedures, and to technical standards, and obliging members to promptly "publish
such measures through printed or electronic means" unless publication is not
practicable, in which case requiring members to make such measures "publicly
available in a manner that enables any interested persons to become acquainted with
them"). The Draft Disciplines also provide for measures relating to licensing and
qualification requirements and procedures and technical standards to be preestablished, based on objective criteria and relevant to the supply of the services to
which they apply. Id. 1 11. Additionally, the disciplines require mechanisms to
respond to inquiries, an obligation to endeavor to provide for advance publication of
proposed general measures and opportunities for comment on those measures
(including an obligation to respond collectively in writing to substantive issues raised
in comments on proposed measures). Id. 16.
399.
For example, the disciplines for licensing and qualification procedures
require that the rejection of a license/qualification assessment or verification
application should be given in writing, without undue delay and, in principle, the
applicant should be informed upon request of the reasons for such rejection. Id.
23.
The applicant should also be informed of timeframes for appeal of such decisions. Id.
77 23, 37. The Draft Disciplines on technical standards also impose the vague
obligation encouraging members "to ensure maximum transparency of relevant
processes relating to the development and application of domestic and international
standards by non-governmental bodies." Id. 7 40.
400.
Although there is a general requirement in the Draft Disciplines that
measures be based on objective criteria, there is little indication as to what objectivity
may mean in the context of licensing and qualification procedures and requirements
and technical standards. Id.
11. In contrast, the Accountancy Disciplines not only
require such measures be "not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a
legitimate objective" but also go on to articulate what those objectives might be.
Accountancy Sector Disciplines, supra note 121, 7 2, 8, 14, 25.
401.
For example, the only draft discipline on licensing requirements relates to
residency requirements and the Draft Disciplines on qualification requirements relate
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when compared to earlier articulations by the Working Party,40 2 the
concepts of recognition or equivalency of domestic standards in
relation to qualification requirements have been largely omitted from
the Draft Disciplines. 40 3 Such omission is disappointing because
cooperation between members' regulatory authorities could be
significantly enhanced by imposing a procedural obligation on
members to recognize the principle of equivalency in relation to
qualification requirements. In the context of cross-border e-services
trade, such cooperation between members' regulatory authorities
would also serve to minimize the burden on service suppliers who
would otherwise have to comply with multiple qualification
requirements in the global e-services market. In addition, while
preliminary elements of the disciplines proposed a greater role for
international technical standards by including a presumption of
consistency with the disciplines for domestic regulations in
compliance with relevant international standards, 40 4 the Draft
Disciplines significantly limit such obligation, requiring members to
only take "into account" such international standards when
40 5
developing their own domestic standards.
However, the most serious omission in this recent text of Draft
Disciplines is the absence of a clearly articulated concept of necessity
as a means of assessing the trade restrictiveness of measures falling
Although initial proposals
within the scope of Article VI:4.
incorporated concepts of necessity, objectivity, and reasonableness
applying to various aspects of licensing and qualification
requirements, procedures, and technical standards, 40 6 there is a
deliberate lack of specific language relating to a review of the
necessity of domestic regulation in the Draft Disciplines. 40 7 However,
an exception to the lack of specificity is found in relation to residency
requirements for licensing. The relevant draft discipline obliges
members "to consider whether alternative less trade restrictive
means could be employed to achieve the purposes for which these

to the due consideration of professional experience as a complement to educational
17,
qualifications and residency requirements. Draft Disciplines, supra note 397,
27-28. C.f. Accountancy Sector Disciplines, supra note 121, §§ IV, VI, VIII (setting
forth "Licensing Requirements," "Qualification Requirements," and 'Technical
Standards").
Consolidated Working Paper,supranote 397, H(3).
402.
403.
See Draft Disciplines, supra note 397, § VII (discussing the propsed
There are indirect references to such concepts in
qualification requirements).
paragraph 27, but the obligations themselves are limited. Id. § VII, 27.
Report of the Chairman, supra note 279, attachment 1, at 4.
404.
405.
Except when such standards "would be an ineffective or inappropriate
means for the fulfillment of national policy objectives." Draft Disciplines, supra note
397, 41.
Consolidated Working Paper,supranote 397, 9 F(2), G(3), H(2), 1(2), J(4).
406.
407.
There is no mention of a necessity test in the stated objectives or the
general provisions of the disciplines. Draft Disciplines, supra note 397, 9 2, 11.
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More limited exceptions are
requirements were established. '40 8
found in relation to licensing and qualification procedures that reflect
the criteria found in GATS Article VI:4(c) (mainly, that such
procedures are not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the
service) .409
Whether, and to what extent, should these Draft Disciplines
specifically address the liberalization challenges related to crossborder e-services? An examination of the Draft Disciplines reveals
that the substantive reach of the disciplines has been significantly
watered down, which has implications for trade in e-services. A
of
primary concern from an e-services perspective is the lack 410
disciplines relating to the concept of necessity under Article VI:4.
Although some part of this reluctance to negotiate such disciplines
may be attributed to the dynamics of the current round of trade
negotiations, 411 it is also reflective of persistent political concerns
among members about the potential erosion of domestic regulatory
sovereignty. 4 12 The United States, for example, has indicated its
reluctance to negotiate disciplines that would obligate it to justify the
necessity of domestic regulation, and has instead advocated a
narrower path of regulatory transparency. 4 13 A number of developing

17.
408.
Id.
Id.
18, 30.
409.
See supra notes 399-400 and accompanying text.
410.
The underlying reasons for such objections in the Working Group may
411.
extend far beyond the services negotiations and be necessarily linked to a lack of
movement in other key areas of the Doha Agenda, such as market access in the
agriculture and manufactured goods sectors. Members may be reluctant to agree on
what is perceived as the most crucial aspect of the Article VI:4 disciplines before
securing other trade-offs in the major areas of trade in goods.
For example, the references to the concept of necessity in the Consolidated
412.
Working Paper were accompanied by the following caveat in the form of a recurring
footnote: "Many delegations have made no proposals on the concept of necessity and
Consolidated
have expressed their opposition to its inclusion in the disciplines."
Working Paper, supra note 397, A(3) n.1. Opposition of this nature is not uncommon
as there is fear that a strict horizontal discipline under Article VI:4 may limit
members' discretion to regulate services, particularly in sectors where limited or no
specific commitments exist. See Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Summary of
4-9, JOB(06)/157 (May 2006)
the Informal Meeting Held on 2 May 2006,
[hereinafter Summary of the Informal Meeting] (discussing proposals relating to the
ongoing negotiations on the necessity test under Article VI:4).
The latest U.S. submission to the Working Group is restricted to a proposal
413.
for a horizontal discipline on transparency in domestic regulation (applicable across all
services sectors). Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Communication from the
United States, Horizontal Transparency Disciplines in Domestic Regulation,
JOB(06)/182 (June 9, 2006) [hereinafter U.S.-Horizontal Transparency Disciplines].
More recently, the United States issued a communication to the Working Party on
Domestic Regulation, stating that
[the U.S] do[es] not support any type of operational necessity test or standard
in any new disciplines for domestic regulation. However we share the concerns
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countries are also reluctant to negotiate a stringent, horizontally
applicable necessity test (one that would apply across all services
sectors) and instead emphasize the need to balance meaningful
414
disciplines with preserving regulatory autonomy.
Such a balance is not obvious in the emerging outcome of the
negotiations under Article VI:4. The Draft Disciplines on licensing
and qualification procedures are distinctly prescriptive when
compared to the Draft Disciplines on licensing requirements and
technical standards, and are perhaps disproportionately focused on
measures that have more relevance to some modes of supply (for
example mode 4) over others. 4 15 In addition, the value and benefit of
the proposed disciplines is severely limited by permitting delayed
implementation for all developing countries. 4 16 This is ironic since
several of the larger developing countries are at the forefront for
developing precise disciplines on qualification requirements and
procedures. 4 17
Adherence to such disciplines by these larger
developing countries (along with developed countries) should be
emphasized as the ensuing benefits will extend to all trading

raised by many Members that the right to regulate should not be used in
practice to avoid trade obligations. In that regard, we are open to discussing
non-operational language in the preamble, expressing that Members' objective
in developing any new disciplines is to establish that principle.
Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Communication from the United States,
Outline of US Position on a Draft Consolidated Text in the WPDR, T B(3), JOB(06)/223
(July 11, 2006) [hereinafter Outline of US Position]; see also Sacha Wunsch-Vincent,
The Digital Trade Agenda of the U.S.: Parallel Tracks of Bilateral, Regional and
MultilateralLiberalization,58 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 7, 17 (2003) (noting that the United
States Trade Representative has so far rejected a "least-trade restrictive approach" in
negotiations on a horizontal discipline under Article VI:4).
414.
Summary of the Informal Meeting, supra note 412, 99 3-8 (noting, in
particular, the proposals by Brazil and the Philippines). At the same time, some of the
larger developing countries (Chile, India, Mexico, Pakistan, and Thailand) have
expressed support for inclusion of a horizontally applicable necessity test in relation to
qualification requirements and procedures.
Id.
23; see also Aaditya Mattoo,
Developing Countries in the New Round of GATS Negotiations: Towards a Pro-Active
Role, 23 WORLD ECON. 471, 484 (2000) (noting the difficulties in negotiating
horizontally applicable disciplines on domestic regulation but opining that "although
services sectors differ greatly, the underlying economic and social reasons for
regulatory intervention do not" and that "focusing on these reasons provides the basis
for the creation of meaningful horizontal disciplines").
415.
There are detailed provisions for qualification requirements and procedures
that arguably apply more to individuals supplying services under Mode 4 (movement of
natural persons). Draft Disciplines, supra note 397, TT 27, 32-33.
416.
Id. T 42.
417.
See generally Communication from Chile, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru,
and Thailand, Proposed Disciplines on Qualification Requirements and Procedures,
JOB(06)/*** (May 29, 2006).
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partners, including the smaller developing country members of the
418
WTO.
Admittedly, the Draft Disciplines make vague attempts to review
the trade restrictiveness of the substantive aspects of domestic
regulation.
For example, the preamble to the Draft Disciplines
introduces the novel requirement that licensing and qualification
requirements and procedures and technical standards do not
constitute "disguised restrictions on trade in services."4 19 The use of
such terminology, which has been specifically interpreted in the
exceptional context of Article XTV, is confusing in the context of
Article VI:4, given that the latter clearly applies to nondiscriminatory regulations. 420 As such, the meaning, purpose, or,
indeed, legal effect of this new terminology is unclear. The Draft
Disciplines also generally require that licensing requirements, and
qualification requirements and procedures, and technical standards
be, amongst other things, "relevant to the supply of the services to
which they apply. '' 42 1 The latter standard appears to be unduly
restrictive of the regulatory goals that may be pursued by domestic
regulators because it purports to limit the relevance of such
regulations to only the supply of the service. There is also a lack of
coherency and uniformity in the use of criteria linked to the concept
of necessity under Article VI:4. 42 2 In addition, although the trade
restrictiveness of residency requirements in relation to licensing is
prescribed for review by members, there is no specific assessment of
the trade restrictiveness of measures falling within other categories
of domestic regulation covered by Article VI:4 (e.g., technical
standards or qualification requirements).
While acknowledging the negotiating realities at play in the
Working Party, a compromise solution should not be achieved at the
expense of the principal objective of Article VI:4, which clearly
"adopts 'necessity' as the central rule to assess the compatibility with
'423
the GATS of trade restrictive domestic regulatory measures.

418.
See Communication from the ACP Group, Pro Development Principles for
2-3, JOB(06)/136/Rev.1 (June 19, 2006)
GATS Article VI4 Negotiations, Revision,
[hereinafter ACP Group Communication].
419.
Draft Disciplines, supra note 397, 2.
420.
See supra Part IV (discussing the standards of review for Articles XIV and
VI of GATS).
421.
Draft Disciplines, supra note 397, 11.
For example, the disciplines under licensing and qualification procedures
422.
require that such procedures be "as simple as possible," but do not indicate what this
new standard of simplicity requires. Id. 7 18, 30. This standard is to be contrasted
with the standard of "less trade restrictive means" used in relation to licensing
requirements. Id.
17.
423.
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note 40,
17; see also Summary
of the Informal Meeting, supra note 412, 8 (noting that some delegations argued that
"the necessity test.., was a central part of Article VI:4 and of any future disciplines").
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Although there are legitimate concerns that a horizontally applicable
necessity test may impose too broad a constraint on domestic
regulatory rights, particularly from the perspective of a developing
country, 424 arguably these concerns may be overstated since it is
settled that the proposed horizontal disciplines will only apply to
sectors where specific commitments have already been scheduled by
members (i.e., sectors in which the exercise of regulatory autonomy is
already restricted by GATS rules). 425
Further, the proposed
disciplines, which already contain elements of a necessity analysis,
rely on vague terminology and varying standards that can only
diminish legal certainty and predictability under Article VI:4 for both
services exporters and implementing regulatory authorities. Rather
than pursue the current fragmented approach, this Article proposes a
well-defined but flexible concept of necessity that is relevant to all
sectors, including e-services, 426 as an alternative and more effective
means of addressing the trade restrictiveness of domestic regulation.
Undoubtedly, developing a test for "necessity" under Article VI:4
requires careful consideration in the specific context of regulating
global e-commerce. 427 It is reasonably clear that a necessity test
under Article VI:4 will have to be articulated by reference to an openended list of legitimate objectives. 42 8 The difficulty will be in defining
such objectives to broadly capture the regulatory concerns that are
most prevalent in cross-border e-services trade, while maintaining
adequate flexibility to avoid encumbering governments from
responding to future developments in cross-border e-commerce. 429 A
compromise, therefore, would be to follow the European proposal that
emphasizes "[a]n approach to the concept of necessity, which is
'430
coherent across all sectors, but allows for sectoral interpretation.
Such an approach would not "restrict the regulatory freedom of
Members in order to meet national policy objectives, as stipulated by

424.
See ACP Group Communication, supra note 418,
10 (discussing the
argument of developing countries).
425.
Draft Disciplines, supra note 397, 10.
426.
See supra Exhibit C (summarizing of the characteristics of a proposed
necessity test).
427.
See, e.g., Gero & Oommen, supra note 334, at 330 (noting that Article VI
neither recognizes the policy areas requiring intervention in the electronic context, nor
provides criteria against which policy measures in those sectors could be assessed to be
"not more burdensome that necessary").
428.
As reflected in the Note by the Chairman that refers to "specific national
policy objectives including to ensure the quality of the service." Consolidated Working
Paper,supra note 397, § A(3).
429.
See supra Exhibit C (providing drafting suggestions for Article VI:4
Disciplines that focus on cross-border e-services). This is also an issue that continues
to be discussed under the Work Program on Electronic Commerce; see also Work
Programme on E-Commerce Interim Report, supra note 36, at 7 (questioning the
desirability of agreeing to a list of regulatory policy objectives under Article VI, which
would justify the imposition of regulatory restrictions in electronic commerce).
430.
Communication from the European Communities, supranote 261, 16.
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the preamble but should rather serve to assess the level of traderestrictiveness of a measure. '431
Incorporating the concept of
proportionality as a means of assessing the trade restrictiveness of a
measure would not require assessing the validity of the rationale or
objective behind the measures, but would only use such rationale to
assess the trade impact of implementing measures. 432 Measures that
are not disproportionate to the objectives pursued, even if restrictive
of trade, would be, accordingly, regarded as necessary to achieve a
433
legitimate objective under Article VI:4.
This Article's proposal for a flexible horizontal necessity test is
not without support in the accumulated work of the Working Party.
Earlier articulations of the disciplines carry formulations of a general
434
necessity test based on relatively open-ended policy objectives.
Further, earlier proposals of the Working Party regarding licensing
and qualification requirements and procedures frequently refer to the
reasonableness and burdensomeness of both the substantive and
procedural aspects of these regulations, although the stringency of
the necessity standard varies substantially between them. 435 Some of
these proposals also cover issues pertinent to the cross-border supply
of e-services.
For example, the elements on necessity under
qualification requirements emphasize the need to ensure that
qualification requirements "are not adopted or applied with a view to
creating obstacles to trade in services," in addition to being "based on
objective criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the
service. '436 With regard to obtaining additional qualifications in
order to supply services, the proposals go so far as to note that "[e]ach
member shall provide the opportunity to service suppliers to fulfill
such additional requirements in the home country, host country or
third country, wherever possible. Each member shall provide
justification in case such additional requirements can be met only in
'43 7
the host country.
A review of the "necessity" of technical standards is also crucial
from the perspective of cross-border trade in e-services. Again, there
is support to be found for incorporating such a concept in the relevant
paragraph under "technical standards" in an earlier proposal of the
Working Party. That proposal states:

431.
Id.
432.
Id.
16-17.
433.
Id.
22 (summarizing the elements of a concept of necessity that embraces
the concept of proportionality).
434.
Consolidated Working Paper,supra note 397, § A(3).
435.
Id. §§ F(2), G(3)-(5), H(2), 1(2), J(2), J(4).
436.
Id. § H(2).
437.

Id. § H(5).
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Members shall ensure that technical standards are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to creating unnecessary obstacles to
trade and shall not be maintained if the circumstances or objectives
giving rise to their adoption no longer exist or if the changed
circumstances or objectives can be addressed in a less trade restrictive
manner. Requirements should be based on objective and transparent
438
criteria.

The latter is extremely relevant to the e-services trade as technical
standards applied for protectionist reasons could be used to deny
access to network infrastructure (such as technology restrictions on
access to telecommunication
networks) and complementary
439
infrastructure services (such as restrictions on payment facilities).
Such technical standards could also be used to restrict technology and
information transfers.440
Given the regulatory uncertainty that surrounds cross-border ecommerce, the incorporation of extensive obligations on regulatory
transparency will also be useful in ensuring that members'
regulations remain no more restrictive than necessary. 4 41
For
instance, requiring participatory mechanisms in the process of
regulatory decision-making would encourage more regulatory

cooperation between countries in the design and enforcement of
regulations with foreseeable trade impact than would result from a
limited transparency obligation that focuses strictly on the provision
of information. 442 In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Draft

438.
Id. § J(4).
439.
Hauser & Wunsch-Vincent, supranote 37, at 20.
440.
For example, the Background Note prepared by the Secretariat on
Accountancy Services notes
[a]s much accountancy firm know-how is proprietary, and is frequently
materialized in documentary or software form, firms may be reluctant to
transfer such know-how to jurisdictions without adequate copyright and other
intellectual property protection provisions. Restrictions on information
transfer, which often rise from data protection and personal privacy provisions,
may require processing of information to take place locally, even when it could
be done more efficiently elsewhere. Some countries even prohibit the removal of
audit and other working papers from their national jurisdiction, which
constitutes an obligation to establish a permanent presence, even when crossborder activity may be the preferred means of service delivery.

Council for Trade in Servs., Accountancy Services: Background Note by the Secretariat,
at 20, S/C/W/73 (Dec. 4, 1998) (Table 4: Impediments to Trade in Accountancy
Services).
441.
See supra Exhibit C (summarizing such enhanced transparency
obligations).
442.
See, e.g., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Annex B,
5(b), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (offering more extensive transparency provisions);
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (same). However the administrative burden
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Disciplines incorporate proposals that require members to publish
measures of general application in advance of their proposed
adoption, provide reasonable opportunities to comment on the content
of such measures, and respond collectively to substantive issues
raised in comments on such measures. 443 Even if the level of
obligation in these proposals is limited to only a procedural obligation
that requires members to "endeavor" to publish measures in advance
and provide reasonable opportunities for comment, the inclusion of
these disciplines alone is a positive development towards enhancing
regulatory transparency. 4 44 Although the administrative burden of
providing such extensive transparency mechanisms may lead some to
favor the adoption of disciplines akin to the more moderate (but less
effective) transparency obligations and participatory mechanisms of
the Accountancy Disciplines, the benefits of negotiating a
strengthened procedural discipline on transparency are convincing:
The ability of individuals and firms to comment on regulatory measures
before implementation offers a number of benefits, including increased
efficiency and credibility of the proposed measure. Prior comment also
reduces uncertainty and discriminatory treatment in a given market as
all parties are better informed through the ability to participate in the
445
development of regulations.

Thus, while a narrower transparency obligation may eliminate the
"need to consider and respond to comments on the proposed measures
on the grounds of burdensome costs," it will also "deprive countries of
'446
the benefits such procedures provide.
However, this Article proposes that the disciplines on regulatory
transparency be further strengthened by providing for more precise
disciplines on the substantive aspects of regulatory transparency.
Such disciplines should aim to provide enhanced information and
clarification on the nature and design of the regulations themselves
and be relevant to establishing the necessity of such measures and
assessing proportionality between the measures and their underlying
policy objectives. For example, akin to the Accountancy Disciplines,
the disciplines should provide a mechanism for information sharing of
members' regulations and their underlying objectives by including a
procedural obligation to inform any other member (upon request) of

of such extensive obligations on developing countries is substantial. Wouters &
Coppens, supra note 3, at 40.
443.
Draft Disciplines, supra note 397, 16.
444.
Deviating slightly, a U.S. proposal obliges members to carry out these
obligations "to the extent practicable."
U.S.-Horizontal Transparency Disciplines,
supra note 413, § B(2)-(3).
445.
Council for Trade in Sers., Communication from the United States,
Transparencyin Domestic Regulation, 6, S/CSS/W/102 (July 13, 2001).
446.

Id.
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the rationale behind domestic regulatory measures.4 47 This would
address the shortcomings of adopting a "best endeavors" approach to
the "notice and comment" procedures that would, in any case, apply
only at the national level. Such a mechanism would also enhance
great
an
imposing
too
cooperation
without
multilateral
administrative burden on individual members. There is also room for
further improvement of the procedural disciplines on transparency,
which should include requirements for reasonable time periods and
information sharing with respect to time periods on the processing of
and administrative
provision of notice,
the
applications,
448
decisionmaking.
Lastly, the role of international standards in relation to the
requirements of necessity under Article VI:4 should be acknowledged
in the disciplines. As due recognition of the role of international
regulatory standards in the disciplines would help achieve parity
across diverse regulatory systems, a rebuttable presumption in favor
of international standards should be incorporated as a part of the
This would encourage
necessity analysis under Article VI:4.
countries (especially developing countries) to follow international
standards where applicable, and incorporate these standards as a
part of their regulatory frameworks in order to benefit from a
presumed consistency with their WTO obligations.
Finally, it is important to ensure that political considerations do
not lead to the adoption of an Article VI:4 discipline on the necessity
of domestic regulation that is so generalized that it leads to legal
If domestic pressure prevents
uncertainty or ineffectiveness.
members from negotiating general disciplines on the substantive
aspects of domestic regulation under Article VI:4 during the present
round of negotiations, a sensible (if not optimum) course of action is
to pursue the development of a set of broadly applicable general
disciplines that focus on strengthening regulatory transparency. This
is particularly desirable in the context of disciplines that address the
proceduralaspects of domestic regulation, even if it foregoes adoption
of precise disciplines on the substantive elements of domestic
regulation that relate to the necessity of qualification and licensing
requirements and technical standards as elements for negotiation on
a sectoral basis. This approach would allow members to both address
the specific regulatory issues and burdens in a particular sector, and
minimize the risk of inappropriate general disciplines that might
4 49
unreasonably limit members' regulatory rights in specific sectors.
Unfortunately, the current proposals, which do not fit into either of
these approaches, create imbalance by incorporating numerous

447.
Accountancy Sector Disciplines,supra note 121, 5.
448.
See U.S-Horizontal Transparency Disciplines, supra note 413 (offering
proposals on transparency in Communication).
449.
Wouters & Coppens, supra note 3, at 38.
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caveats and exceptions and selectively emphasizing the governing
principles of Article VI:4. The current proposals will also complicate
the future process of developing Article VI:4 disciplines on a sectoral
basis in a principled and systematic manner.

VI. LIBERALIZING E-SERVICES: THE CONTINUING DEBATE OVER THE
BOUNDARIES OF DOMESTIC REGULATORY AUTONOMY AFTER U.S. GAMBLING

As trade in e-services continues to grow, WTO members are
4 50
likely to rely more on the legal security of the GATS framework,
particularly the multilateral rules guaranteeing market access and
nondiscriminatory treatment. This is so for many reasons, including
the desire to gain favorable access to foreign services markets and to
have recourse to the WTO's dispute settlement process to resolve
disputes about restrictive trade barriers. But accompanying the
expansion of trade in e-services is the reality that importing states
may impose restrictive and protectionist regulatory barriers along the
lines of the laws challenged in U.S.-Gambling. In addition, given the
regulatory diversity of the services field, there is concern that friction
between competing regulatory jurisdictions, and a corresponding fear
of losing regulatory authority over cross-border electronic
transactions, may lead to the establishment of overly restrictive, if
451
not prohibitory, regulatory barriers to trade in e-services.
Absent a coherent WTO policy on the regulation of global ecommerce, the concern is that unilateral attempts to regulate crossborder trade will lead to excessive regulatory burdens on e-services
suppliers. 452 To achieve a stable, rule-based, multilateral trading
system, it is critical for GATS to offer a framework that ensures
secure and predictable access to domestic markets by foreign
suppliers of globally traded e-services. But while GATS is an obvious
platform for negotiating reciprocal concessions for trade in e-services,
deficiencies in the current approach of disciplining regulatory
barriers in the context of e-services raise several concerns. Given the
experience of the U.S.-Gambling litigation, it is clear that prevailing

450.
See WTO Agreements and Electronic Commerce, supra note 6,
1
(discussing the extensive use of electronic means to conduct international trade
services).
451.
See supra notes 348-59 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for
overregulation).
452.
See Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 353, at 18 (noting that the "absence of
international commitment to regulatory disciplines on e-commerce regulation has led
to very active single-handed national regulatory approaches").
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ambiguities and legal uncertainties present potential loopholes that
could be exploited for protectionist purposes.
This section of the Article identifies and discusses three complex
issues in U.S. -Gamblingthat must be addressed for GATS to be used
as an effective tool to liberalize cross-border e-services trade.
Although the litigation in U.S.-Gambling extends members'
understanding on the scope of market access under GATS, it does not
resolve with any certainty the broader issue of restrictions on eservices that ought to be scheduled as limitations on market access or
to be permitted as legitimate domestic regulation. However, it is not
the role of the dispute settlement system to resolve such precise
boundaries between GATS "consistent" domestic regulation and
market access restrictions except on a case by case basis; the ongoing
negotiations on domestic regulation under Article VI:4 of GATS
provide a more appropriate forum for such clarification. Therefore, it
is important that these issues be addressed in the current Article VI:4
negotiations if a desirable balance between regulatory autonomy and
the progressive liberalization of global e-services markets is to be
achieved.
A. Determiningthe Boundariesof the Market Access Obligation
Part of the difficulty in resolving the ambiguity of the GATS
approach to liberalization is the inherent flexibility with which the
liberalization obligation is defined. Although it is clear that the main
purpose of GATS is to achieve progressive liberalization of trade in
services, 453 entrenched language on the right to regulate,
accompanied by weak disciplines on domestic regulation, blur the
boundaries between the liberalization obligation and regulatory
autonomy.4 54 In U.S.-Gambling, the Panel attempted to reconcile its
interpretation of the liberalization obligation under GATS with
members' rights to regulate in terms of the overall objective of
GATS-progressive liberalization.4 5 5
For example, it stated:
"[p]rogressive liberalization entails including more sectors in
Members' schedules and reduction or elimination of limitations,
terms, conditions and qualifications on market access and national
treatment through successive rounds of negotiations. ' 456 Thus, while
progressive liberalization entails the "progressive elimination of
various restrictions [that] would occur, including those restrictions
covered under Article XVI:2," members making market access
commitments under Article XVI are only entitled to maintain such

453.
See GATS, supra note 4, pmbl. (second and third recitals); see also Panel
Report, supra note 1,
6.315, 6.317.
454.
See GATS, supra note 4, pmbl. (fourth recital).
455.
Panel Report, supra note 1,
6.310-6.313.
456.
Id. 6.313.
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457
restrictions if they are "explicitly" and "transparently" scheduled:
"[miembers' regulatory sovereignty is an essential pillar of the
progressive liberalization of trade in services but this sovereignty
ends whenever rights of other Members under the GATS are
'458
impaired.
Although the conceptual framework of GATS is relatively
straightforward, the implementation of its constituent elements has
In GATS, the boundary between
been less than satisfactory.
multilateral liberalization and regulatory autonomy is more easily
conceived in the abstract than in practice. The distinction often
comes down to distinguishing, on the one hand, between quantitative
and discriminatory qualitative measures that must be eliminated
unless scheduled under Articles XVI and XVII, and on the other
hand, nondiscriminatory, qualitative measures that are generally
permitted under Article VI. The distinction is crucial because
"[d]epending solely on how a government measure is categorized, the
measure may therefore be permitted or prohibited under WTO
459
law."
That GATS does not prohibit the use of all nondiscriminatory
regulatory barriers (the issue at the heart of the controversy in U.S.460
As the
Gambling) is a frequent assertion in GATS discourse.
the
obligation
United States was quick to point out in U.S.-Gambling,
to grant market access represents "a precisely defined constraint 4on
61
certain problematic limitations specifically identified by Members."
It is limited to the specific measures listed in Article XVI:2, and more
precisely, as the United States argued, limited to the measures
identified by their particular "form," such as "in the form of numerical
quotas."46 2 Significantly, the fact that Article XVI:2 does not prohibit
all quantitative restrictions on market access is frequently argued as
favoring a strict, literal interpretation of the market access obligation
that is consistent with the concept of regulatory autonomy under
463
GATS.

6.315.
Id.
457.
6.316.
Id.
458.
Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 133.
459.
See Drake & Nicolaidis, supra note 6, at 243.
460.
22 (quoting the United States'
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,
461.
submissions on the scope of Article XVI).
Panel Report, supranote 1, 3.132.
462.
According to Pauwelyn:
463.
The risk is that the per se prohibition on market access restrictions under
Article XVI encroaches on the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members to set
domestic regulation .... However to mitigate this risk, and to give effect to the
preamble of GATS (which explicitly reserves "the right of Members to regulate,
and to introduce new regulation, on the supply of services within their
territories, in order to meet national policy objectives") the types of market
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The argument for a literal interpretation of the market access
obligation under GATS cannot be easily dismissed. It is undoubtedly
true that Article XVI is limited in normative terms, i.e., the emphasis
is mainly on regulating quantitative or numerical barriers to trade.
The so called per se prohibition under Article XVI:2 is exhaustively
defined by reference to a closed list of quantitative restrictions.
Moreover, the list of quantitative limitations under the individual
paragraphs of Article XVI:2 also appears to be exhaustive based on
the explicit ruling of the Panel (and Appellate Body) in relation to
Article XVI:2(a) and (c). 46 4
Thus, according to U.S.-Gambling,
domestic regulatory barriers falling outside the scope of Article XVI:2
are not subject to its per se prohibition even if such measures do, de
facto, restrict the supply (or suppliers) of services in a particular
domestic service market. 465 Accordingly, barring a violation of the
national treatment rule, a measure that escapes the per se
prohibition under Article XVI:2 will only be subject to limited review
under Article VI:5 of GATS.
B. The Ambiguities of Classifying Regulations as Qualitativeor
Quantitative
There are obvious strategic advantages for members in
categorizing measures as subject to Article VI rather than Article
XVI. Measures falling within the scope of Article XVI of GATS form
the subject matter for multilateral negotiations on market access and
must be eliminated unless scheduled in accordance with Article XVI:2
of GATS. While domestic measures relating to qualification and
technical requirements and licensing procedures are still subject to
the criteria referred to in Article VI:5, until Article VI:4 "disciplines"
are developed, members retain the sovereign right to maintain such
regulations or introduce new regulations within the parameters of
Article VI.466
These parameters are so broadly defined that
commentators have often referred to the Article VI:5 "discipline" on
domestic regulation as being virtually non-existent. 467 Further,
domestic regulations that could reasonably have been expected at the

access restrictions per se prohibited under Article XVI were narrowly drafted
and must continue to be, narrowly defined. Put differently, a contextual
interpretation of Article XVI, in the light of Article VI and the GATS preamble,
should only apply Article XVI when the measure in question is clearly and
explicitly covered as prohibited under Article XVI.
Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 158-59.
464.
Panel Report, supra note 1,
6.325, 6.341.
465.
"A measure which cannot be subsumed under one of the categories
mentioned in Article XVI:2 is not prohibited by Article XVI, even if it effectively
restricts market access ("de facto market access restriction")." MARKUS KRAJEWSKI,
NATIONAL REGULATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SERVICES: THE LEGAL IMPACT OF
THE GATS ON NATIONAL REGULATORY AUTONOMY 84 (2003).
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time the specific commitments under Article XVI and XVII were
made are exempt from any review under Article VI:5, though they
remain subject to the procedural obligations under paragraphs 1
through 3 of Article VI.468
The dividing line between Article XVI and Article VI often
hinges on the difference between quantitative and qualitative
regulations and between maximum limitations and minimum
requirements. The distinction is important from the perspective of
members' regulatory autonomy because market access restrictionsin contrast with qualitative nondiscriminatory regulations-must be
eliminated. 4 69 Qualitative nondiscriminatory regulations may be
maintained as long as they do not constitute unnecessary burdens to
4 71
trade in services. 470 The distinction has been explored previously
and in great detail through various discourses both within and
outside the WTO. 4 72 While these distinctions are easily conceived in
the abstract, they are more problematic to apply in practice given the
complexity of regulations that apply to services. Clarification of these
distinctions is obviously needed in light of contemporary
developments in modern cross-border trade in services and in
consideration of the impact of Internet technologies on global trade in
services.
As noted earlier, Article VI takes a generally permissive view of
domestic regulation, permitting WTO members to regulate services
as long as such regulations are administered in a "reasonable,
objective manner" and are, broadly speaking, "not more burdensome
than necessary. '473 U.S.-Gambling establishes that such qualitative
regulations are not subject to review under Article XVI, which
remains focused on quantitative-type restrictions on market
access. 474 Articles XVI and VI:4-5 were also ruled to be mutually
exclusive by the Panel. 475 Although there is some doubt over the
correctness of the latter ruling, 476 this aspect of the Panel report was
not appealed by either of the parties and does not have the benefit of

466.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.316.
467.
Rudolf Adlung, The GATS Turns Ten: A PreliminaryStocktaking 18 (World
Trade Org., Econ. Research & Statistics Div., Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-5, Aug.
2004).
468.
See supra Part II.C (providing an overview of Article VI of GATS).
469.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.303.
470.

Id.

471.
See supra Part IV.A.
472.
See Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54,
11 (discussing the distinction);
Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 152-53 (same).
473.
See supra notes 108, 113 and accompanying text.
474.
Appellate Body Report, supranote 1, 248.
475.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.305.
476.
See Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 156 ("[N]o textual support exists for the
mutual exclusiveness finding ...").

1292

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 40.1189

appellate review. Nevertheless, a ruling of mutual exclusiveness
between Article XVI and Article VI is only helpful to the extent that it
clarifies that there cannot be overlap between a measure being
subject to Article XVI (and by implication Article XVII), on the one
hand, and being subject to paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI, on the
other hand.4 77 U.S.-Gambling does not provide explicit guidance as
to the measures that ought to be scheduled under Article XVI as
quantitative measures or, alternatively, left to be regulated, if at all,
under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI as nondiscriminatory
qualitative measures. 4 78
As the Scheduling Guidelines state,
qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, and
licensing requirements (the predominant focus of paragraphs 4 and 5
of Article VI) may still fall within the scope of Article XVI if they
47 9
contain any of the limitations specified in Article XVI.
To refer back to the facts of the U.S.-Gambling case, a
application
of
the
quantitative/qualitative,
mechanical
maximum/minimum criteria in determining the distinction between
Article XVI "quantitative measures" and the qualititative measures of
paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI is reasonably clear in the abstract.
It is less helpful when determining whether a measure prohibiting
the electronic supply of services that has the effect of precluding any
supply of the service within a fully committed mode of supply is a
minimum qualitative requirement (governing, as the United States
submitted, the "character of the activity involved")480 and thus a
domestic regulation under Article VI. A blanket prohibition of a
means of supply of the service under the relevant mode of supply is
unequivocal in its quantitative effects. Whether it is a quantitative
restriction that imposes a zero quota (i.e., a numerical quota) on the
number of service suppliers or quantity of service output-and is
consequently a maximum limitation within the scope of Article XVIwill not always be obvious when the policy objectives justifying such
However, in the
restrictions are not blatantly protectionist. 481
context of a full market access commitment, justifying such a

477.

As Pauwelyn notes:

If, on the one hand, Article XVI always applies to the exclusion of Article
VI:4/5, then a measure scheduled as a reserved market access restriction under
Article XVI is home free and cannot be scrutinized under any additional Article
VI:4/5 disciplines. If on the other hand, Articles XVI and VI:4/5 can, in certain
cases, overlap, then even a measure scheduled as reserved under Article XVI
could, in theory, still be found to violate GATS because it is, for example, more
burdensome than necessary under Article VI:4/5 disciplines.
Id. at 157.
478.
479
480.
481.

See Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, 248.
Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54, 10.
Panel Report, supra note 1, 6.257.
See Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54,
10-11.
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measure under Article VJ:4 as a qualitative restriction and a
minimum requirement relating to the quality of a service or the
ability of a service supplier to provide a service under a particular
mode will require at least some evidence that there exist other
feasible means of supply (i.e., by telephone or mail) that can be used
to supply the service under the mode of supply for which the
commitment is listed.
Critics of the decision in U.S.-Gambling characterize the U.S.
laws prohibiting operation of online gambling services as a "technical
standard," consistent with the WTO Secretariat's definition of
technical standards as encompassing "requirements which may apply
both to the characteristics or definition of the service and to the
manner in which it is performed. '48 2 Yet such definitions (which are
not authoritative or binding on members) only exist as general
guidance. 48 3 They may yield unreasonable results in the particular
case if applied too mechanically without due consideration to the
dynamics of the particular mode of supply under which a domestic
measure is assessed (as in the case of cross-border services that are
solely dependent on electronic means of delivery). Thus, for example,
a requirement to supply a service "face to face" may be more easily
viewed as a technical standard under mode 3 and a minimum
requirement when the supplier is physically present in the importing
territory, but has very different consequences when applied to the
supply of services under the definition of cross-border services where
the supplier and consumer are physically located in different
territories. 484 The argument that a prohibition on the electronic
means of supplying a service that can only be provided electronically
on a cross-border basis (if it is to be supplied at all) is somehow a

482.
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation, supra note 40, 4. The Working Party
on Domestic Regulation defines technical standards as: "measures that lay down the
characteristics of a service or the manner in which it is supplied. Technical standards
also include the procedures relating to the enforcement of such standards."
Consolidated Working Paper,supra note 397, § D(5). However, the United States, in
its most recent communication to the Working Party on Domestic Regulation, has
noted with concern that: 'The concept of technical standards is not well-developed in
the services sector, few countries have regulations in this area, and so far the proposed
definitions for technical standards are very vague." Outline of US Position, supra note
413,
G(14). The Draft Disciplines propose that technical standards be defined as
"measures that lay down the characteristics of a service or the manner in which it is
supplied. Technical standards also include the procedures relating to the enforcement
of such standards." Draft Disciplines, supra note 397, 9.
483.
Communicationfrom the European Communities, supra note 261, 11.
484.
This is one reason that members display a tendency to schedule a
requirement to establish some sort of commercial presence under mode 1 commitments
in their GATS Schedules under the market access column. See Rudolf Adlung &
Martin Roy, Turning Hills into Mountains? Current Commitments Under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services and Prospects of Change, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 1161,

1174 (2005).

1294

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40.'1189

minimum requirement because it leaves other means of supply open

(for example, supply of the service through ordinary mail or face to
face) is also equally disingenuous and simplistic. Such analysis is
undertaken in complete isolation of the defining characteristics of a
major proportion of cross-border trade in

services today, which is

wholly reliant on electronic communications for delivery. As WunschVincent observes, under the principle of technological neutrality in
GATS:
Once a member has made a commitment on gambling under GATS
mode 1, it has agreed to postal, electronic, or other "remote" ways of
delivering the service. Given the logic of the underlying WTO ruling on
intra-modal technological neutrality ... , a total prohibition of the
electronic delivery of a service is identical to a significant market access
limitation. A government cannot make an open commitment to crossborder supply, then disallow or ban on-line supply (even if other ways of
cross-border service delivery like regular postal mail remain
4 85
allowed).

In U.S.-Gambling, the Panel ruled that a market access
commitment for mode 1 implied the right to supply a service through
all means of delivery unless otherwise specified in a member's
Schedule.4 86 It specifically ruled that "where a full market access
commitment has been made for mode 1, a prohibition on one, several
or all means of delivery included in this mode 1 would be a limitation
on market access for the mode. '48 7 Although this "ruling" by the
Panel was initially appealed by the United States, the United States
subsequently decided to limit its appeal only to the Panel's
interpretation of Article XVI:2(a) and (c). This decision by the United
States permitted the Appellate Body to limit its review to the issue of
whether a prohibition or a "zero quota" on the supply of a service was
a quantitative restriction under the provisions of Article XVI:2(a) and

485.
Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 28, at 341. This position can be contrasted
with a Secretariat view expressed in 1998 that the types of restrictive measures
prohibited unless scheduled under Article XVI do not "include restrictions on the
technical means by which a service may be delivered-for example, on supply by
electronic means."
Work Programme on E-Commerce I, supra note 36,
32. The
Secretariat has clarified this statement by stating:
This means two things: first, that no such restrictions could be scheduled and
second, that such a measure, if taken, would not be in direct violation of specific
commitments under Article XVI. However, it seems clear that if a member
were to prohibit or restrict the electronic supply of a scheduled service, the
measure would be challenged under Article XXIII:3 as nullifying or impairing
the benefits which other Members could reasonably have expected to accrue
from the market access commitment. In other words it would probably become
the subject of a "non-violation" complaint.
Id.
486.
487.

Panel Report, supra note 1,
Id.

6.285.
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(c). 488 Having affirmed that a zero quota was within the scope of
Article XVI:2, the Appellate Body nevertheless confirmed the Panel's
overall finding that a prohibition on one, several, or all means of
delivery cross-border is a "limitation on the number of service
suppliers in the form of numerical quotas within the meaning of
Article XVI:2(a) because it totally prevents the use by service
suppliers of one, several or all means of delivery that are included in
mode 1. '' 489 Thus, notwithstanding speculation as to whether the
Appellate Body maintained any misgivings over the Panel's reasoning
in relation to restrictions on the means of supply, 490 the overall
finding is clear: a prohibition on the supply of a service is caught
within the scope of the market access obligation in GATS and
accordingly should be scheduled if it is to be maintained.
C. Whether Legitimate Policy Objectives Support GreaterRegulatory
Autonomy for Qualitativeas Opposed to QuantitativeMeasures
The difference between domestic regulations falling within the
scope of Article XVI and Article VI is often justified by reference to
the underlying policy objectives of the measures themselves. The
policy objectives for measures falling within the scope of Article XVI
are often said to be protectionist, while the policy objectives
underlying measures falling within the scope of Article VI are said to
be legitimate. 491 The legitimacy of the policy objectives underlying
domestic regulatory measures within the scope of Article VI is also
used to establish the dividing line between multilateral liberalization
obligations and regulatory autonomy under GATS:
This dividing line between quantity/maximum limitations (Article XVI)
and quality/minimum requirements (Article VI:4/5) goes back to the...
rationale for the basic distinction in both GATT and GATS between
market access and domestic regulation. The former can be presumed to
be protectionist since they are only applied to imports .. .or impose a
purely numerical ceiling on whether (more) services can be supplied in
the first place .... Domestic regulation in contrast is presumed to serve

a legitimate, non protectionist purpose, be it consumer protection,
49 2
safety or public order.

While helpful in delineating the distinction between Article XVI
on the one hand and Article VI in the abstract, this approach also has
its limitations. Under Article VI, the legitimacy or necessity of the
policy objective, mainly the quality of service (Article VI:4(b)), does

488.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 1,
219-220.
489.
Id. 239.
490.
See Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 163 ("[Tlhe Appellate Body wisely sidestepped this panel finding.").
491.
492.

See Ortino, supra note 33, at 142.
Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 154-55.
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not alone determine the consistency of a measure contested under the
provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article VI. Rather, it is the
particular means that are employed to ensure achievement of the
regulatory objective that is subject to evaluation under the "more
burdensome than necessary" criteria of Article VI:4. 493
The
legitimacy of the underlying policy objective (the quality of the
service) gives rise to a difference in the rigidity with which the
normative content of the rule is applied. 494 That is, the contrast
between the per se prohibition that is explicit in Article XVI and the
more flexible and permissive provisions of Article VI "may lie in the
presumed absence of a legitimate public policy justifying" measures
falling within the former provision. 495 Yet, a disproportionate means
of achieving a legitimate policy goal may also be more likely to be
motivated by quantitative considerations than qualitative objectives,
such as a case of total prohibition on a means of supply of a service
496
that remains permitted through other means of supply.
It is also prudent to note that prohibitive restrictions on the
supply of a service are frequently imposed not just for reasons
relating directly to the quality of a service, but also for overriding
public policy concerns that make such restrictions more amenable to
review as an exception under the provisions of Article XIV. In this
respect, Article XIV reserves considerable regulatory autonomy for
members in situations where sovereign considerations take
precedence over trade liberalization objectives. Although the general
exception clauses of WTO Agreements have been narrowly
interpreted in the WTO dispute settlement process, 4 97 Article XIV is
nevertheless a significant preservation of regulatory autonomy. A
substantial degree of policy flexibility is preserved for measures taken
in pursuit of the objectives specified by Article XIV, which has
undoubtedly been confirmed by the Appellate Body's decision in U.S.498
Gambling.
The above issues, which characterize the underlying tension
between Article XVI on the one hand and Article VI on the other
hand, are highly relevant to the ongoing negotiations under Article
VI:4.
They demonstrate the difficulties that members face in
determining the dividing line between market access restrictions and
GATS-consistent domestic regulation in dynamic contexts such as
global e-services trade.
Undoubtedly, resolving the parameters

493.
GATS, supra note 4, art. VI:4.
494.
Ortino, supra note 33, at 142.
495.
Id.
496
This problem was highlighted in discussions of the Working Party on
Professional Services. Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 54, attachment 4,
2
(Discussion on Matters Relating to Article XVI and XVII of GATS in Connection with
the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector).
497.
See Krajewski, supra note 26, at 444-45.
498.
Id. at 446.
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between quantitative and qualitative restrictions in the context of
cross-border e-commerce involve sensitive issues of domestic
regulatory autonomy. However, given the trade impact of these
restrictions, members must aim at shaping disciplines on domestic
regulation that achieve an optimal balance between domestic
regulatory concerns and liberal trading conditions. The role of the
necessity test and disciplines on regulatory transparency aimed at
ensuring the proportionality and objectivity of such domestic
restrictions, as proposed in this Article, will be particularly important
in guiding members to meet their obligations under GATS while
ensuring that their rights to regulate on legitimate policy grounds
remain relatively unencumbered.

VII. CONCLUSION

As GATS continues to evolve in the face of increased flows of
cross-border trade in services and changing technology, a key
challenge is to clarify how GATS applies to the newer and more
dynamic aspects of trade in cross-border e-services. 499 Just as
national governments are striving to adapt national regulatory
policies to the challenges posed by electronic commerce, the Internet,
the World Wide Web, and other emerging technologies, these
developments also test the WTO's institutional and legal mechanisms
and must be resolved within the parameters of its trade liberalization
objectives. 50 0 Nevertheless, the precise applicability of GATS rules to
cross-border e-services remains a matter of much uncertainty.
The failure by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in U.S.Gambling to fully examine and clarify the application of GATS rules
to cross-border e-services means that prevailing uncertainties will

499.

According to Drake and Nicolaidis:

There is nothing about electronic commerce that requires a fundamental
rethinking of these cardinal principles; rather the challenge is to clarify their
application, especially since discriminatory measures may be magnified in a
network world where a national point of entry can give access to a global
service market.
Drake and Nicolaidis, supra note 6, at 420.
500.
It would also appear that while political procrastination holds back the
WTO in the area of cross-border e-commerce, the newer regional initiatives are making
more progress. See Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 28 n.4 (referring to the U.S.-Singapore
Free Trade Agreement as being one of the first agreements on this front). See generally
Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 413, at 8 (noting that the central innovation of the
U.S. fast track authority to conclude trade agreements is its instruction to the U.S.
Trade Representative to conclude trade agreements that anticipate and prevent
creation of new trade barriers in the digital trade environment). See supra note 391
and accompanying text referring to the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.
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continue to hamper GATS negotiations and threaten the security of
existing commitments.
As U.S.-Gambling demonstrates, the
interaction between the market access disciplines of GATS and the
regulatory autonomy of WTO members is already an identifiable
source of contention that may threaten to destabilize the multilateral
framework for trade in services in the future. The physical absence of
the service supplier in the importing territory in cross-border eservices trade presents multifaceted regulatory challenges for
domestic regulators. The issues are wide-ranging and go beyond the
compliance and enforcement concerns typically associated with global
electronic commerce. While these concerns did not pose a serious
problem under GATS before the commercial potential of the Internet
was discovered, recent technological innovation and increased flows of
cross-border e-services trade have elicited a corresponding shift in the
regulatory focus of importing states. Obviously, such challenges to
the e-services trade will put more pressure on exporting members to
seek both relief and redress under the GATS disciplines on domestic
regulation.
Future review of the scope of Article VI is thus
inevitable.501
However, the effectiveness of GATS as an instrument for
liberalizing the global services market and for disciplining, if not
eliminating, domestic protectionist policies remains elusive.
A
detailed examination of the relevant GATS provisions has revealed
that although the principle of liberalization enjoys conceptual
dominance, members' rights to regulate domestically are staunchly
entrenched within its framework.
Conceptual and textual
ambiguities characterize the major GATS rules, further blurring the
demarcation between what may be regarded as GATS-consistent
domestic regulation and what may not. The appropriate balance is
generally left to be decided by members in the process of "market
access" negotiations and on a case by case basis through dispute
settlement. Yet, for the very reasons outlined above, defining the
precise scope of a liberalization commitment under GATS is often a
difficult task for both negotiators and dispute settlement panels.
WTO members that seek to establish these boundaries within the
context of a complex case will find that the text of GATS offers only
limited guidance on the manner in which a conflict between the
domestic policy interests of a member and the market access rights of
other members ought to be resolved.
U.S.-Gambling confirms that the list of quantitative limitations
prohibited under the market access obligation (i.e. Article XVI:2) is
finite, yet it expands conventional understanding of the market
access obligation through its flexible interpretation as to the

501.
Drake & Nicolaidis, supra note 6, at 422; Hauser & Wunsch-Vincent, supra
note 37, at 22.

2007/

IMPLICATIONS OFU.S.-GAMBLING

1299
129

particular "form" of those quantitative limitations. However, even if
broadly interpreted, the Panel and Appellate Body reports do not go
so far as to extend the prohibition on market access restrictions
beyond the quantitative limitations explicitly listed in Article XVI:2
to include all domestic regulation with quantitative effects.
Regardless, the Panel and Appellate Body's failure to fully examine
the border between market access restrictions and domestic
regulation, particularly in dynamic contexts such as cross-border eservices trade, exacerbates, rather than resolves, the tension and
ambiguity that prevails over the regulatory reach of GATS rules and
the autonomous regulatory rights of WTO members.
U.S.-Gambling also explicitly recognizes members' rights to
regulate their services industries in order to pursue policy objectives
under the general exceptions of GATS. However, to achieve the
degree of conceptual clarity needed to advance members'
understanding of the extent of their obligations and rights under
GATS, as well as to avoid over-reliance on the policy exemptions of
Article XIV as a means of preserving regulatory flexibility, WTO
members must negotiate precise disciplines on domestic regulation
that are relevant to cross-border trade in e-services. This is crucial to
achieving a desirable balance between members' regulatory autonomy
and progressive liberalization of global e-services markets, and for
GATS to remain an instrumental force in liberalizing cross-border
trade in e-services.

